Geopolitics Unplugged

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Episodes

Thursday Nov 21, 2024

Summary:
Multiple news sources report conflicting information regarding a missile strike on Dnipro, Ukraine. Ukrainian officials claim Russia launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a claim disputed by unnamed Western officials who suggest it was an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) instead. The lack of confirmation from Russia adds to the uncertainty. The potential implications of using an ICBM, even with a conventional warhead, are significant, raising concerns about escalation and the redrawing of lines between conventional and nuclear warfare. The incident highlights the difficulties in verifying real-time military actions during conflict.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the implications of Russia potentially using an ICBM in a conventional conflict?
How does this reported incident impact international agreements and norms regarding nuclear weapons?
What are the potential ramifications of Russia's alleged ICBM use on global security and future military actions?
Long format:
 Did Russia really launch an ICBM into Ukraine? If so, what is the significance?
As of the time of this publication Thursday, 21 November, 2024 at 1102 am Eastern time, the claim that Russia launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) into Ukraine has been disputed. Here's the current understanding based on available information.
Ukrainian officials and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy initially stated that Russia launched an ICBM at Dnipro, suggesting it was the first use of such a weapon in the conflict. They described the missile's characteristics as matching those of an ICBM. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned that the missile's speed and altitude were indicative of an ICBM. This suggests that the missile's flight characteristics, observed through radar or other tracking systems, matched the known capabilities of ICBMs, which are designed to reach very high speeds and altitudes to re-enter the atmosphere at high velocity. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that the missile was launched from the Astrakhan region in Russia. The distance from Astrakhan to Dnipro fits within the range capabilities of an ICBM, although it's noted that such a range would be unusually short for an ICBM's typical use. There have been mentions of visual evidence like videos and images shared on social media platforms, purportedly showing the missile in flight or its impact. While not definitive proof on their own, these could contribute to the narrative of an ICBM launch if the characteristics displayed align with known ICBM behavior, such as multiple reentry vehicles or warheads separating in flight. Although not directly cited as evidence for an ICBM, the nature of the damage and the attack's scale might be interpreted as consistent with what an ICBM could achieve, although this is speculative and less conclusive without detailed forensic analysis.
A Western official who was not named, as reported by sources like ABC News and NBC News, has contradicted this claim, stating it was not an ICBM but an experimental intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that was used. This missile, while still significant, does not qualify as an ICBM due to its range capabilities. ICBMs are designed for intercontinental ranges, typically over 5,500 kilometers. The distance from Astrakhan to Dnipro is around 600 miles (approximately 965 kilometers), which is significantly less than what an ICBM would usually be used for. The officials might have access to flight data which showed the missile's path and velocity did not match what would be expected from an ICBM launch aimed at an intercontinental target. An ICBM would typically achieve much higher altitudes and speeds for its intended range. Satellite data could have been used to track the missile's trajectory, showing it was not an ICBM due to the flight path and altitude profile.
The Russian Defense Ministry has not confirmed the launch of an ICBM, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov referred questions about the missile strike to the Defense Ministry without providing further details. There was an incident where Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry's spokeswoman, was instructed during a live briefing not to comment on the ballistic missile strike in Dnipro, as observed by posts on X. This indicates an intention to avoid direct commentary on the specifics of the attack from official sources.
Given these points, while Ukraine asserts an ICBM was used, this claim is not universally accepted or confirmed by Western intelligence sources, which suggest a different classification of missile was employed. Therefore, as of now, it is not conclusively confirmed that Russia launched an ICBM into Ukraine. This situation highlights the complexity of verifying military actions in real-time during conflicts, where information can be preliminary or subject to interpretation.
But it’s worth examining what if…
Historical Context and Implications:
The reported use of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) by Russia in an attack against Ukraine is indeed a significant escalation, marking a pivotal moment in military history where such long-range strategic weapons have been employed in an active conflict.
The unprecedented use of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in warfare, if confirmed, would mark a significant departure from the traditional roles these missiles have played. ICBMs were developed during the Cold War primarily as part of nuclear deterrence strategies. Their role was to provide a retaliatory strike capability in the event of a nuclear attack, ensuring Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Their deployment was always seen in the light of global strategic balance rather than tactical battlefield use. Until now, ICBMs have never been used in actual combat. Tests and launches have occurred, but always as demonstrations of capability or for space launches (e.g., the Soviet R-7, which launched Sputnik and Vostok spacecraft). ICBMs are designed to strike targets thousands of kilometers away, typically large, fixed installations like cities or military bases. Their use has been conceptualized for strategic, not tactical, purposes due to their range, cost, and the political ramifications of their deployment. The destructive power of an ICBM, especially if it carries multiple warheads (MIRVs), is far beyond what is necessary or practical for most battlefield operations. ICBMs aren’t designed for precision strikes on tactical targets. Their guidance systems are meant for large area coverage. The psychological impact might be the intended use here, more so than the physical destruction, as it would signal an escalation of the conflict to a potentially nuclear level.
Deploying an ICBM in this manner could set a dangerous precedent, potentially normalizing their use in conventional warfare, thus blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear forces. ICBMs are extremely expensive and resource-intensive. Using one in a tactical operation would not only be economically inefficient but also deplete valuable strategic assets.
Type of Missile Reported to Have Launched
The reported type of missile used was the RS-26 Rubezh. It is a solid-fuel propulsion missile and a range of approximately 5,800 kilometers. This missile, while classified as an ICBM, can also be viewed as an intermediate-range ballistic missile depending on its payload configuration.
RS-26 missile
Launch Origin and Trajectory:
The missile was allegedly launched from Russia’s Astrakhan region, which lies on the Caspian Sea, targeting Dnipro, in Ukraine. This trajectory underscores the long-range capabilities of ICBMs, typically designed to travel thousands of kilometers but used here in a relatively shorter range engagement, which is unusual for an ICBM.
Strategic Messaging and Nuclear Escalation:
The launch, if confirmed, could serve as a stark reminder to both Ukraine and its Western allies of Russia's nuclear capabilities. By employing an ICBM, Russia might be signaling its readiness to escalate to nuclear options if provoked, especially in light of recent Ukrainian use of Western-supplied long-range missiles against targets in Russia. This action might also be interpreted as Russia testing international reactions, or as an attempt to deter further escalation by demonstrating its capacity for a nuclear response, albeit with a conventional payload this time.
International Protocols and Precedent:
There's concern over whether the U.S. was informed prior to the launch, as per Cold War era protocols which require notification of ICBM launches. The absence of such notification could suggest a shift in Russian policy towards more aggressive posturing, potentially aligning with nations like North Korea, which does not typically provide warnings.
Global Reaction and Future Implications:
This incident has raised alarms about the stability of international norms regarding nuclear weapon use and missile launches. It could prompt a reevaluation of security policies, especially in how nations communicate military actions that could be perceived as nuclear threats.
The global community, particularly nuclear powers, must now reconsider the frameworks of communication and deterrence to prevent escalation, possibly leading to new dialogues or treaties aimed at reaffirming these protocols.
In summary, Russia's reported use of an ICBM with a conventional payload against Ukraine not only escalates the ongoing conflict but also poses broader questions about the integrity of international agreements meant to prevent nuclear miscalculation. This act, if confirmed, could redefine the rules of engagement in modern warfare, pushing the world closer to revisiting Cold War-era tensions where the threat of nuclear escalation was ever-present.
Sources:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-attack-ukraine-kyiv-says-2024-11-21/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/nov/21/russia-ukraine-war-live-storm-shadow-missiles-kyiv-putin-zelenskyy
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-icbm-test-launches/32733341.html
https://abcnews.go.com/amp/International/ukraine-russia-icbm-launch-intercontinental-ballistic-missile/story?id=116085317
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-launched-icbm-ukraine-war-putin-rcna181131
https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-russia-icbm-launch-intercontinental-ballistic-missile/story?id=116085317
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/42599
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-icbm-attackddnipro-38b0faf6eed2cef98bdbc9be18f58244
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/21/russia-fired-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-at-dnipro-says-ukraine
https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/11/21/russia-launches-first-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-at-ukraine-kyiv-says
https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-launches-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-at-ukraine/
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/21/russia-fired-icbm-for-first-time-in-war-ukraines-military-claims-a87088
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/11/21/russia-ukraine-zelensky-putin-war-latest-news57-icbm/
https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-launches-icbm-at-ukraine-for-the-first-time-says-kyiv-7071206

Thursday Nov 21, 2024

Summary:
In this episode, we explore the implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the future of globalism. The BRI is a massive infrastructure project aimed at connecting Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East through land and sea routes. The initiative aims to sustain and perhaps reshape globalism by creating new trade networks and fostering economic interdependence, particularly in the Global South. We examine both the potential benefits and challenges of the BRI, including its impact on global trade patterns, the role of debt dependency, and the possibility of a Sino-centric globalism. Ultimately, we suggest that the BRI could either save globalism by providing alternative economic networks or transform it into a new model centered around Chinese economic interests. We also go over the current and past BRI projects.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What is the potential impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the future of globalization?
How does China's BRI initiative attempt to address the challenges of global trade, particularly in the context of reshoring and nearshoring?
What are the key criticisms and potential risks associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?
Long format:
Is Globalism Dead, or Can China's BRI Revive It?: BRI vs. Reshoring: The Battle for the Future of Global Trade
By Justin James McShane
TL;DR
Globalism, the ideology supporting globalization, is under threat as nations shift toward reshoring and nearshoring. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a massive infrastructure project aiming to connect continents and sustain global trade networks. With over 150 countries participating, the BRI fosters economic interdependence and offers an alternative to U.S.-led globalization. Critics argue it creates debt dependency and shifts power toward China, but its scale could reshape globalism into a Sino-centric model. The BRI’s success depends on balancing geopolitical ambitions with genuine economic integration. Whether it saves or transforms globalism remains a key debate for the future of global trade.
Introduction
The concept of globalism, a system advocating for free and open cross-border exchanges, has been central to the post-World War II economic order. However, recent trends such as reshoring and nearshoring are challenging its viability, raising questions about the future of globalization. Against this backdrop, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) emerges as a significant player, potentially redefining global economic integration. This initiative, a monumental infrastructure project spanning continents, aims to sustain and perhaps reshape globalism by creating new trade networks and fostering economic interdependence. Could the BRI be the key to preserving globalism in an era of increasing isolationism and fragmented supply chains? This discussion explores the essence of globalism, the ambitions behind the BRI, its global impact, and its potential to counteract economic decoupling. Here we examine its major projects.
GLOBALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
Globalism is an ideology that supports globalization, while globalization is the process of cross-border exchanges. An ideology that advocates for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people across borders. Globalists often support free trade, freedom of immigration, and global governance. However, the term can be politically loaded and is sometimes used by those who oppose globalization. The process of cross-border exchanges of products, services, people, information, and finance. Globalization can include both voluntary economic activities and involuntary geopolitical activities. Globalization has been the mainstay of the current post WWII economic global model. It is currently under threat or revision depending on your point of view by reshoring or nearshoring.
BASIC BACKGROUND OF BRI:
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a Chinese led and largely Chinese funded massive infrastructure project that aims to connect Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East through a network of land and maritime routes. The BRI is a strategy to increase trade, improve regional integration, and stimulate economic growth. The BRI was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 and is inspired by the ancient Silk Road trade routes that connected China to the Mediterranean. The BRI has been described as one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever undertaken. The BRI is made up of two parts generally The Silk Road Economic Belt which is a land route that connects China with Central Asia, Russia, Europe, and South and Southeast Asia and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road which is a sea route that connects China with the Middle East, Eastern Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Europe.
GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE BRI
As of December 2023, 150 countries have signed documents to join China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including China itself. Countries join the BRI by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China. Depending upon who does the counting, there are certainly more countries in the BRI then outside of the BRI.
THE BIGGEST PROJECTS OF THE BRI:
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) encompasses a vast array of infrastructure projects around the world. Here are some of the largest and most expensive projects associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative:
1 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with an estimated cost at $62 billion is a corridor that  involves a series of infrastructure projects including highways, railways like the ML-1 railway, energy projects, and the development of Gwadar Port. The Sukkur-Multan Motorway, part of CPEC, has been highlighted as one of the largest projects under this initiative. CPEC was initially envisioned as a 15-year project when it was formally launched in 2015, with the planned completion date set around 2030. However, this timeline encompasses various phases, and the completion of individual projects within CPEC varies. Many initial infrastructure and energy projects were either completed within the first few years or are in advanced stages of completion. This phase primarily focused on energy generation and key infrastructure like highways. Beyond the early projects, there are phases involving industrial cooperation, economic zone development, and further infrastructure enhancements like railway upgrades (e.g., ML-1), which are slated for completion over time, with some major projects like the railway upgradation facing delays or renegotiations. Security issues in regions like Balochistan, where Gwadar Port is located, continue to pose challenges to project timelines. Gwadar Port is operational, handling cargo, but it has not yet transformed into the bustling international trade hub it was envisioned to be. The port's development continues with plans for further expansion, including the creation of a free economic zone.
2 China-Europe Railway Express is not a single project but a network. It is impossible to put an exact price on this project. Notable routes include: From Chongqing or Chengdu to Duisburg, Germany; From Yiwu in China to Madrid, Spain, known as the Yiwu-Madrid line and From Xi'an to Rotterdam or Hamburg, among others. Specific railway projects under BRI, like the Budapest-Belgrade railway, have been priced around $2.89 billion, with the possibility of rising above $3 billion.
This project has grown significantly in terms of routes and freight volume. This rail connection between China and Europe, part of the BRI, has seen over 77,000 trains operated by 2023, transporting goods worth billions. The infrastructure development along these routes involves substantial investment, though exact costs for the network as a whole are not typically consolidated into one figure due to its broad scope across multiple countries. It is potentially faster than shipping, but is not cheaper.
3 East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) in Malaysia with an initial estimated cost at $17 billion but revised to around $10 billion after renegotiations is rail project that aims to connect Malaysia's east coast with its west, significantly reducing travel time and boosting economic development in the less developed eastern regions. It is anticipated to be completed but December 2026 with rail service to begin operations in January 2027. It connects important ports like Port Klang with the East Coast, potentially altering trade routes by offering an alternative to the traditional maritime routes through Singapore.
4 Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway with an estimated cost of over $6 billion is a high-speed rail project in Indonesia aims to connect the capital city Jakarta with Bandung. It's one of the flagship BRI projects in Southeast Asia, designed to cut travel time significantly between these two cities. The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway, also known as "Whoosh," began commercial operations on October 2, 2023. Therefore, as of now, the project is not only completed but has been operational for over a year.
5 Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in Kenya with an estimated cost of pproximately $5 billion for the initial phase is a railway connects the Kenyan port of Mombasa to the capital Nairobi, with plans to extend further into East Africa. It's part of a broader initiative to modernize transport infrastructure across Africa. Phase 1 (Mombasa to Nairobi) was completed and has been operational since May 31, 2017. Phase 2A (Nairobi to Naivasha) is an extension that was completed and opened in October 2019. For any new or upcoming phases or extensions of the SGR, like the Naivasha-Kisumu-Malaba section, there have been delays and financial negotiations. The SGR significantly enhances the capacity for freight transport, aiming to shift a large portion of cargo movement from road to rail, reducing road congestion and wear. The SGR is intended to be part of a larger railway network connecting not just Mombasa to Nairobi but also extending to neighboring countries like Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan, promoting regional trade and economic integration within the East African Community. The railway improves logistics at the Port of Mombasa by providing a more efficient way to move cargo inland, reducing port congestion and turnaround times for ships.
6 The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway with its approximate $4 billion cost is an electric railway that connects Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, to the port city of Djibouti, providing landlocked Ethiopia with direct rail access to the sea. It is one of the largest BRI projects in Africa, enhancing regional trade and connectivity. It was completed and officially inaugurated for commercial operations on January 1, 2018. For Ethiopia, the railway provides an essential route to the sea, crucial for its import and export activities, reinforcing its economic strategy. Recall that China has a military base in Djibouti.
7 The Thailand-China High-Speed Railway with a total project cost that is expected to exceed $5 billion for the initial phase is a high-speed rail project aims to connect Bangkok with Nong Khai on the border with Laos, with plans to eventually reach Kunming in China through Laos. It's part of an effort to enhance connectivity within Southeast Asia and between Southeast Asia and China. Phase 1 (Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima), initially, the first phase was expected to be completed by 2026, with commercial operations starting then. However, due to delays, the latest information suggests that this phase might begin operations around 2027. The entire project from Bangkok to Nong Khai, which includes a second phase from Nakhon Ratchasima to Nong Khai, has been projected to be completed by 2028. This timeline reflects the Thai government's commitment to finish the line, though delays have been common due to various reasons including funding, land acquisition, and construction challenges. This is designed to be a segment of a broader network envisioned to connect China with Singapore, potentially extending through Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and beyond. This connectivity aims at fostering regional economic integration.
8 The Chancay Megaport in Peru is well covered in our episode 83 https://www.geopoliticsunplugged.com/audio/ep83-chancay-port-in-peru-the-new-frontline-in-the-us-china-global-trade-wars-how-the-port-could-bypass-the-panama-canal-and-challenge-u-s-trade/
9 The Karot Hydropower Project in Pakistan with costs around $1.7 billion is part of the CPEC (see above), this 720-megawatt hydropower project on the Jhelum River aims to provide sustainable energy to Pakistan. While not as large in investment as some infrastructure projects, its strategic importance in the energy sector makes it significant. The Karot Hydropower Project in Pakistan was successfully commissioned and started its commercial operations on June 29, 2022. The project operates on a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) basis, meaning after 30 years of operation by a Chinese-led consortium, ownership will transfer to the Pakistani government, ensuring long-term benefits for Pakistan.
10 The Port City Colombo in Sri Lanka was initially estimated at around $1.5 billion, but could be higher with ongoing expansions. This project involves reclaiming land from the sea to build a new city adjacent to Colombo. It includes residential, commercial, and leisure facilities, aiming to establish Colombo as a major financial hub in South Asia. The completion of The Port City Colombo in Sri Lanka is anticipated for 2041. The project aligns with China's Maritime Silk Road, aiming to secure sea routes crucial for trade. It is located near significant shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka's strategic location enhances China's maritime presence. The development of PCC and other projects in Sri Lanka can be seen as part of China's strategy to balance India's influence in the Indian Ocean region.
Other significant BRI projects that are being considered include: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway, Kyzyl-Kala - Makanchi Railway (Kazakhstan), Jalalabad Road (Kyrgyzstan), Piraeus Port (Greece), Budapest-Belgrade Railway (Serbia and Hungary), Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, Haifa Port (Israel).
CAN THE BRI BE THOUGHT OF AS A WAY TO COUNTER TRUMP, ISOLATIONISM, RESHORING OR NEARSHORING?
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could indeed serve as a mechanism to sustain or potentially redefine globalism if the United States were to pursue significantly more decoupling, reshoring, or nearshoring of its industries and manufacturing.
The current Chinese economy in its current form only works if globalism continues. If globalization is severed or if it collapses with continued global reshoring or nearshoring, China will survive but it will not likely be as strong as it is today. China sees the BRI initiative as a means to hedge its bets against these trends.
A PUSH TO DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION-DRIVEN ECONOMY
China has been transitioning towards a more domestic consumption-driven economy, which could theoretically insulate it somewhat from global trade disruptions. The Chinese government has emphasized policies like "Dual Circulation," aiming to enhance domestic economic cycles while still engaging with the global market. China has implemented policies like providing subsidies for consumer goods, encouraging trade-ins for old products, expanding access to social housing, promoting upgrades to home appliances, and investing in developing the service sector, all aimed at putting more spending power in the hands of Chinese consumers. There are certainly no quick fixes to this persistent issue. Unemployment, overproduction, consumer confidence, the housing inventory (real estate market dependence) and issues surrounding capital flight or attempts of that (high savings rates) are strong headwinds for the Chinese economy.
All of this suggests an intention to continue economic growth even if global trade diminishes, by stimulating domestic demand. China already has a massive domestic market, which could provide a significant buffer against a decline in exports if it can effectively stimulate internal consumption. Recall, according to data from the World Bank, in 2023, approximately 16.22% of China's total exports went to the United States. The US was its single largest export partner by 2x. So while exports to the US are significant, it is not total.
A PIVOT TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH
If the US reshores or nearshores, China might face challenges with its export-driven manufacturing sector. However, China has been actively diversifying its trade partners, especially with countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and through initiatives like the Belt and Road. China has moved manufacturing to other countries, including Southeast Asia, to take advantage of new infrastructure and to sell goods in untapped markets. The Chinese launched the “Going Out” strategy in 1999 to encourage Chinese enterprises to invest overseas. The Chinese also established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIV) as a multilateral financial instruction that invests in infrastructure projects across Eurasia. This diversification could mitigate some impacts of reduced trade with the US. China might boost economic ties with the Global South, potentially increasing its geopolitical and economic influence in these regions as a counterbalance to Western economic policies as evidenced by Xi’s recent sweep through the global south.
IN SUM
However, a significant reduction in globalization, particularly if it involves decoupling from the US, could lead to economic difficulties. China's economy has historically relied heavily on exports, and a sudden or significant drop in this sector could lead to overcapacity, unemployment, and economic slowdown unless domestic consumption ramps up sufficiently or new markets are effectively tapped. China's political stability has often been tied to its economic performance. A collapse in globalization might test this link, potentially leading to domestic unrest if economic conditions worsen significantly, although the Chinese government has robust mechanisms to manage such scenarios.
In essence, even if globalization collapses and the US significantly reshores manufacturing, China is still likely to continue as a major economic power, but its economic growth could be significantly impacted, with a potential shift towards a more domestic-focused economy and a greater reliance on its large domestic market to sustain growth. However, the extent of this impact would depend on how quickly China can adapt to a changing global trade landscape and diversify its economy beyond exports.
THE THOUGHT BEHIND BRI
Generally BRI can be seen as a means to support globalism, but with a massive change in some of its features. It supports globalism in many ways. It provides alternative economic networks. If the US reduces its global economic engagement, the BRI can provide an alternative network of trade and investment. Countries that might lose US investment could turn to China for economic partnerships, thus maintaining a form of global economic integration. It provides for significant infrastructure development. By investing heavily in infrastructure across continents, China is creating physical and digital pathways for trade that aren't dependent on US economic policies. This could keep global trade flowing by providing new routes and hubs for commerce. It provides economic interdependence even without the US at the helm. The BRI fosters economic interdependence among participating countries, which might cushion against the effects of US withdrawal from some global economic activities. Countries involved in BRI projects could become more economically tied to China, thereby sustaining a form of globalism centered around Chinese economic interests. It continues global supply chains with China at the center. China's push to integrate more countries into its supply chain through BRI could offer a counterbalance to any US strategy aimed at reducing reliance on China. This could maintain the global nature of supply chains, albeit with different dominant players.
BRI IS GLOABLISM WITH A CHINESE FOCUS
Some argue that the BRI represents a different model of globalism, one that might not align with the liberal, rules-based international order historically championed by the US. It could be seen as promoting a version of globalism centered on state-led economics, infrastructure investment with political strings attached, and potentially less focus on democratic governance or environmental standards. The debt and dependency model is not at all like the current form of globalism. Critics of the BRI suggest that it might lead to debt dependency rather than genuine economic integration, where countries could find themselves heavily indebted to China, potentially influencing their foreign policy decisions in favor of Chinese interests. If the US decouples significantly, the global trade system might fragment rather than remain interconnected. The BRI might then be seen as creating a parallel global economic system rather than universally saving globalism as traditionally understood. The BRI is often viewed as part of China's broader geopolitical strategy to expand its influence, which includes economic, strategic, and political dimensions. This might not be about saving globalism per se but about reorienting it towards a Sino-centric model.
IN SUM
The Belt and Road Initiative could serve as a significant platform for maintaining global economic integration in the face of US economic withdrawal. However, the nature of this globalism would likely differ from the post-World War II order, potentially leading to a bifurcated or multi-polar economic world where different regions or blocs might operate under different economic philosophies and governance models. Whether this would "save" globalism in a form acceptable to all stakeholders remains a matter of debate, reflecting broader discussions on the future of global economic integration.
CONCLUSION
The Belt and Road Initiative reflects China's strategic response to shifts in global economic dynamics, positioning itself as a proponent of sustained globalization—albeit with a significant Sino-centric focus and a major shift in economic theory underlying. By building extensive trade routes and fostering economic partnerships, the BRI seeks to maintain global economic integration, even as Western nations embrace reshoring and nearshoring. While critics argue that the initiative may promote debt dependency and geopolitical leverage rather than equitable development, it undeniably creates an alternative framework for global trade. Whether the BRI "saves" globalism or redefines it in China's image, its implications for global economic order are profound. In an era of uncertainty, the BRI may serve as both a challenge and an opportunity, shaping the contours of a new multipolar economic world.
SOURCES:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/11/china-belt-road-initiative-trade-bri-silk-road/#:~:text=$1%20trillion%20and%20counting,for%20the%20world%20to%20share.%E2%80%9D
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html#:~:text=China's%20Belt%20and%20Road,all%20the%20way%20to%20Europe
http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/n101/2023/1010/c124-895.html#:~:text=In%20March%202013%2C%20President%20Xi,global%20community%20of%20shared%20future
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/LTST/Summarytext#:~:text=China%20top%205%20Export%20and%20Import%20partners,with%20a%20partner%20share%20of%208.28%20percent
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/CHN
https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/analyse-markets/china/foreign-trade-in-figures#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20exports%20were%20directed,4.2%25%20%2D%20data%20Comtrade)
https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/China/TOTAL#:~:text=China's%20exports%202023%20by%20country,2.58%25%20(87%20billion%20US$)
https://www.china2west.com/chinas-top-10-exports-2024/#:~:text=China%2C%20known%20as%20the%20%E2%80%9Cworld's,impact%20on%20the%20global%20stage
https://www.schroders.com/en-us/us/intermediary/insights/deglobalisation-did-mexico-just-eat-china-s-lunch-/#:~:text=China%20should%20still%20benefit%20from%20global%20upturn%20in%20goods%20trade&text=However%2C%20while%20Mexico%20stands%20to,strengthen%20as%20exports%20pick%20up
https://hbr.org/2020/08/abandoning-globalization-will-only-hurt-u-s-businesses#:~:text=The%20United%20States'%20strongest%20tech,leadership%20away%20from%20the%20U.S
https://www.assemblymag.com/articles/98693-reshoring-and-chinas-overcapacity-surge#:~:text=China's%20excessive%20investments%20will%20not,in%20experiencing%20China%20shock%202.0
https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3279911/how-chinas-diversifying-overseas-investment-has-swung-open-doors-global-south#:~:text=The%20international%20marine%20services%20provider's,same%20seven%20months%20last%20year
https://market-insights.upply.com/en/trade-chinas-bumpy-road-to-the-global-south#:~:text=Expanding%20Global%20South's%20Market,56%25%20increase%20compared%20to%202019.&text=To%20make%20sense%20of%20the,of%20Chinese%20exports%20to%20Vietnam
https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3279911/how-chinas-diversifying-overseas-investment-has-swung-open-doors-global-south#:~:text=The%20international%20marine%20services%20provider's,same%20seven%20months%20last%20year
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-logistics-and-infrastructure/our-insights/diversifying-global-supply-chains-opportunities-in-southeast-asia#:~:text=China%20is%20diversifying%20its%20manufacturing,in%202023%20(Exhibit%203).&text=fDi%20Markets%2C%202024.,-3&text=Notably%2C%2088%20percent%20of%20Southeast,%E2%80%93Pacific%20(APAC)%20region.&text=This%20may%20be%20a%20consequence,becoming%20a%20global%20manufacturing%20hub
https://asiahouse.org/news-and-views/chinas-shift-export-led-domestic-consumption-driven-economy-will-see-6-5-growth/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CWe%20have%20announced%20that%20we,well%20underway%2C%E2%80%9D%20he%20concluded.&text=To%20read%20what%20H.E.,and%20Road%20initiative%20click%20here
https://rhg.com/research/no-quick-fixes-chinas-long-term-consumption-growth/#:~:text=Household%20income%20as%20the%20primary%20constraint,-One%20of%20the&text=The%20net%20result%20is%20household,income%20inequality%20and%20precautionary%20savings
https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/chinas-updated-playbook-reviving-growth-risks-more-tensions-world#:~:text=China%20has%20acknowledged%20in%20the,trillion%20in%20government%20guidance%20funds
https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202404/20/content_WS66232d5ac6d0868f4e8e642d.html#:~:text=China%20has%20vowed%20to%20expand,a%20continuously%20upgrading%20consumption%20pattern
https://www.dw.com/en/china-will-more-domestic-consumption-bolster-the-economy/a-66482160
https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/#:~:text=In%20response%2C%20China%20has%20established,Development%20Bank%20to%20fund%20projects
https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/gwadar-port-and-free-zone/
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1271659.shtml
https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/bri-factsheet-series-construction-of-breakwaters-gwadar-port/
https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/gwadar-port
https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-gwadar-port-shows-chinas-belt-and-road-can-fail/a-68992914
https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/bri-factsheet-series-gwadar-east-bay-expressway/
https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-gwadar-port-why-chinas-bri-flagship-is-stalling/a-68992914
https://gwadarport.gov.pk/
https://www.jusdaglobal.com/en/article/understanding-china-europe-railway-express-history-growth/#:~:text=The%20China%2DEurope%20Railway%20Express%20links%20many%20big%20cities.,covers%2025%20countries%20in%20Europe
http://wap.china-railway.com.cn/crcwapEnglish/InternationalCooperation_1299/CRexpress/201904/t20190409_93060.html#:~:text=China%20Railway%20Express%20(CR%20Express,Europe%20and%20other%20BRI%20countries
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202403/1308637.shtml#:~:text=The%20China%2DEurope%20Railway%20Express,first%20two%20months%20of%202024
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202406/1314206.shtml#:~:text=In%20May%2C%20the%20cumulative%20number,1%2C702%20to%20more%20than%2017%2C000
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2024/05/23/c_17219.htm#:~:text=The%20China%2DEurope%20Land%2DSea%20Express%20Line%2C%20utilizing%20Piraeus,and%20Central%20and%20Eastern%20Europe
https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/east-coast-rail-link-ecrl-project/
https://www.brimonitor.org/case-studies/east-coast-railway-link-ecrl/
https://paultan.org/2019/04/15/east-coast-rail-link-ecrl-is-back-on-rm21-5b-saved-construction-may-start-next-month-2026-completion/
https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/jakarta-to-bandung-high-speed-rail/
https://futuresoutheastasia.com/jakarta-bandung-high-speed-railway/
https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/the-jakarta-bandung-high-speed-railway-indonesias-lessons-learned/
https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/mombasa-nairobi-standard-gauge-railway-project/
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/kenyas-standard-gauge-railway-the-promise-and-risks-of-rail-megaprojects
https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/kenya-standard-gauge-railway-sgr/
https://www.gihub.org/connectivity-across-borders/case-studies/addis-ababa-djibouti-railway/
https://www.crecg.com/english/10059090/10059186/10060566/index.html
https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/ethiopia-djibouti-railway-line-modernisation/
https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/addis-djibouti-railway/
https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/thailands-high-speed-railway-on-the-fast-track-to-ties-with-china-but-at-what-cost/
https://www.voanews.com/a/thailand-sets-2028-target-to-finish-high-speed-rail-link-with-china/6662154.html
https://www.globalconstructionreview.com/china-thailand-high-speed-railway-sees-entire-phas/
https://www.railjournal.com/infrastructure/thai-chinese-high-speed-railway-construction-behind-schedule/
https://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/16
https://www.power-technology.com/projects/karot-hydropower-project-jhelum-river/
https://www.metso.com/insights/case-studies/aggregates/pakistan-karot-hydropower-is-ready-for-power-generation/
https://www.seetaoe.com/details/231183.html
https://www.portcitycolombo.gov.lk/port-city-colombo
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/colombo-port-city-project
https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/28/WS6333be1aa310fd2b29e7a38b.html

Wednesday Nov 20, 2024

Summary:
In this episode, we focus on the Epirus Leonidas High-Power Microwave (HPM) system, a new weapon developed by the United States to counter the threat of drone swarms. The system uses directed energy to disable electronics, effectively creating a “force field” that can disable multiple drones simultaneously. Unlike traditional kinetic weapons, Leonidas offers cost-effectiveness, scalability, and minimal collateral damage. It is currently being deployed by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marines and has already been used in Ukraine. The system represents a significant leap in electronic warfare and showcases the U.S.’s commitment to adapting to the evolving battlefield of the future.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
1. What is the current state of drone technology and its potential impact on the battlefield.
2. How does the Epirus Leonidas system counter drone threats, and what are its strengths and weaknesses compared to other countermeasures?
3. What are the broader implications of the Epirus Leonidas system for the future of warfare, particularly with regards to defense against emerging technologies?
Long format:
The Real Answer to Drone Swarms: Meet the U.S. Weapon Changing the Battlefield (Epirus Leonidas)
TL;DR:
Hyped headlines about China’s CH-7 stealth drones fueling fears of U.S. military inferiority overlook the reality: advanced defenses like the Epirus Leonidas High-Power Microwave system are game-changers. Leonidas can disable drone swarms with precision, cost-effectiveness, and scalability, proving the U.S. remains ahead in countering emerging threats. The battlefield isn’t about who has the flashiest tech—it’s about who innovates smarter, and America continues to lead the way.
Introduction:
Whenever articles such as this:
China Reveals Its New CH-7 Stealth Drone
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-reveals-its-new-ch-7-stealth-drone-213726
Henny Penny folks think that this will signal the end of the battlefield and China is “ahead” and that China has a “technological edge” over America. They imagine scenarios of unending Chinese CH-7 Stealth Drones reigning ruin on the US Navy and in Taiwan rendering America impotent. 
This is great clickbait!
But… let’s just consider one type of counter to the drone swarms scenario. 
The Epirus Leonidas
Information:
The Epirus Leonidas is a directed energy weapon system that uses High-Power Microwave (HPM) technology to disable electronics. 
The Epirus Leonidas system essentially functions as an EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) weapon in the sense that it emits high-intensity electromagnetic energy that can disrupt, damage, or destroy electronic equipment. However, there are some important distinctions:
1. Focused Energy: 
Unlike a traditional EMP which might affect a broad area indiscriminately, the Leonidas uses directed energy, which can be precisely aimed at specific targets. This minimizes collateral damage to non-targeted electronics.
2. Microwave vs. EMP:
While the term EMP often conjures images of nuclear-induced pulses or large-scale events, High-Power Microwave (HPM) systems like Leonidas operate on similar principles but use microwave frequencies. HPMs are a subset of EMP technology, but they're designed for more controlled, tactical use.
3. Non-Nuclear:
Traditional EMPs are often associated with nuclear detonations, whereas HPM devices like Leonidas are non-nuclear, making them more practical for battlefield use without the catastrophic side effects of nuclear weapons.
4. Operational Range:
The effective range of an EMP from a nuclear detonation could be vast, whereas the Leonidas system has a more localized effect due to its power output and the physics of microwave propagation.
5. Selective Disruption:
The Leonidas system can be tuned to specific frequencies that might affect certain types of electronics, allowing for some selectivity in its effects. Traditional EMPs are less selective in what they disrupt.
So, while the Epirus Leonidas does indeed generate an electromagnetic pulse through its microwave emissions, it's more accurately described in operational contexts as an HPM system due to its focused, non-nuclear, and tactical approach to countering electronic threats.
The Leonidas fires HPM beams to target individual electronics or cover a large area. The HPMs can be steered for precision or adjusted to create a force field effect.
The Leonidas is designed for both static and mobile defense. It can intercept  targets in crowded environments, address multiple threats simultaneously, identify and neutralize drone swarms and hit targets with high precision and accuracy. 
The Leonidas uses gallium nitride (GaN)-based semiconductors, which can operate at high voltages with low temperatures.
The Leonidas uses digital beamforming to create an invisible "force field" that can disable specific targets while leaving nearby friendly assets unharmed. The Leonidas can also attack an entire area at once by using wide beam mode. The Leonidas can be programmed to create no-fly zones that allow friendly drones to operate while disrupting hostile drones.
Leonidas has a short set-up and take-down time, allowing operators to move it quickly as the threat environment changes. Leonidas' line-replaceable amplifier modules (LRAMs) can be serviced or repaired in less than eight minutes.
Recent contracts suggest a cost of around $2 million per unit for a full system. The primary focus is on the low cost per drone neutralized, rather than the individual system price. Leonidas is designed to take down multiple drones simultaneously, further reducing the per-kill cost.
In January 2023, the US Army awarded Epirus a $66.1 million contract to deliver and support prototypes of the Leonidas. The first four Indirect Fire Protection Capability HPM systems were delivered to the US Army, with the final two delivered in May 2024.
The US Navy is testing Epirus' Leonidas technology to temporarily disable small vessels and outboard motors. The Navy is also testing the technology's effectiveness when deployed on uncrewed autonomous vessels.
The US Marine Corps is receiving the Leonidas Expeditionary, a long-pulse, high-power microwave system that can drop drone swarms with electromagnetic energy. The system is designed to be compact and maneuverable, and will be integrated with the USMC's Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S).
Epirus Leonidas is being used in Ukraine to defend against drone swarms. 
The Epirus Leonidas High-Power Microwave (HPM) system provides several advantages over traditional kinetic energy missile kills, particularly in the context of countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and drone swarms:
1. Cost Efficiency:
Traditional kinetic interceptors, like missiles, can be very expensive, sometimes costing millions per unit. In contrast, the cost per engagement for the Leonidas system is significantly lower, often described as pennies per kill, due to its non-kinetic method of operation which doesn't require physical projectiles.
2. Unlimited Magazine:
Unlike missile systems that have a finite number of interceptors, the Leonidas system can engage targets repeatedly without needing to reload. Its energy-based approach means it can theoretically operate as long as it has power, offering an "unlimited magazine" for continuous operation against multiple threats.
3. Area Denial and Swarm Defeat:
The Leonidas can create a wide-area effect where it can disable multiple drones at once, making it particularly effective against swarm attacks. Traditional missile systems typically engage one target at a time, which might not be as effective against mass drone incursions.
4. Reduced Logistical Burden:
The system's design allows for quick setup and takedown, which means less logistical support for deployment and redeployment. Traditional missile systems often require more extensive support for munitions logistics, maintenance, and resupply.
5. Safety and Minimal Collateral Damage:
The Leonidas uses microwave energy which is safer for humans and less likely to cause unintended damage compared to the explosive force of missiles. It selectively disrupts electronic devices, reducing collateral damage to surrounding areas or friendly assets.
6. Flexibility and Modularity:
The system can be integrated onto various platforms, from fixed installations to mobile units like vehicles or even drones. This flexibility allows for its use in different terrains and operational environments where traditional missile systems might be less adaptable.
7. Low Probability of Interception:
The Leonidas operates with low emissions, making it less detectable to enemy electronic warfare measures, which is an advantage in scenarios where stealth or low observable operations are required.
8. No Physical Debris:
After engaging a target, the Leonidas leaves no physical debris, unlike missiles which can produce shrapnel or unexploded ordnance, posing risks to civilians or friendly forces in the aftermath.
9. Scalability and Upgradeability:
Through software updates, the lethality and capabilities of the Leonidas can be enhanced or adjusted without hardware changes, providing a forward-looking solution that can evolve with new threats.
These advantages make the Leonidas system particularly suited for scenarios where cost, logistics, and the ability to counter mass threats are critical considerations over traditional kinetic solutions.
Leidos's Time Integrated Gigawatt Electromagnetic Response (TIGER):
This is a man-portable, battery-powered High Power Microwave (HPM) system focused on countering small UAS (Group 1 & 2). It's designed to operate in concert with other counter-UAS systems like jamming, lasers, or kinetic effects.
Conclusion:
While sensational headlines about the latest technological advancements from foreign adversaries may grab attention, they often overlook the robust and rapidly evolving defensive capabilities that counter such threats. The Epirus Leonidas High-Power Microwave system is a prime example of how the United States is not only keeping pace with emerging challenges like drone swarms but actively shaping the battlefield of the future.
With its cost-effective, precision-focused, and scalable design, Leonidas represents a significant leap in electronic warfare. By neutralizing drone swarms and other electronic threats with unparalleled efficiency, it demonstrates that the narrative of America being technologically outmatched is far from accurate.
Ultimately, systems like Leonidas reaffirm that the balance of power on the modern battlefield is not determined by any single piece of technology but by the ability to adapt and innovate. In this arena, the U.S. continues to lead, proving that for every offensive development, there is an equally, if not more, formidable defensive solution waiting in the wings.
Sources:
https://www.epirusinc.com/press-releases/northrop-grumman-taps-epirus-for-electromagnetic-pulse-c-uas-weapon-system#:~:text=Epirus'%20C%2DUAS%20EMP%20system,creating%20a%20force%20field%20effect
https://thedefensepost.com/2023/06/19/droneshield-epirus-counter-drone-defense/#:~:text=Leonidas%20is%20an%20electronic%20warfare%20system%20that,multiple%20threats%20simultaneously%20in%20a%20wide%20area
https://www.army-technology.com/projects/leonidas-high-power-microwave-hpm-system-usa/
https://thedefensepost.com/2023/06/19/droneshield-epirus-counter-drone-defense/#:~:text=Leonidas%20is%20an%20electronic%20warfare%20system%20that,multiple%20threats%20simultaneously%20in%20a%20wide%20area
https://www.epirusinc.com/press-releases/epirus-to-deliver-leonidas-expeditionary-in-partnership-with-onr-jco-usmc-expanding-high-power-microwave-product-suite#:~:text=Los%20Angeles%2C%20California%E2%80%94September%2023,%2C%20Chief%20Executive%20Officer%2C%20Epirus
https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-marine-corps/2024/09/30/marines-to-receive-new-system-for-zapping-drone-swarms-out-of-the-sky/#:~:text=Developed%20by%20Eprius%2C%20the%20long,$66%20million%20contract%20last%20year
https://www.epirusinc.com/press-releases/u-s-navy-set-to-test-epirus-drone-disabling-hpm-technology-against-seaborne-attack-vessels#:~:text=In%20addition%20to%20testing%20the,be%20found%20on%20their%20website
https://www.army-technology.com/projects/leonidas-high-power-microwave-hpm-system-usa/#:~:text=Epirus%20secured%20a%20$66.1m,were%20delivered%20in%20May%202024
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/11/ukraine-braces-winter-drone-attacks-allies-rush-provide-defenses/391740/#:~:text=Notably%20absent%20are%20some%20of,to%20Ukraine%20in%20August%202022
https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-marine-corps/2024/09/30/marines-to-receive-new-system-for-zapping-drone-swarms-out-of-the-sky/#:~:text=Developed%20by%20Eprius%2C%20the%20long,$66%20million%20contract%20last%20year

Tuesday Nov 19, 2024

Summary:
In this episode, we provide a detailed analysis of Suriname's economic and political landscape, focusing specifically on its potential as a major oil producer. We explore Suriname's oil and gas sector, particularly Block 58, highlighting the discoveries made by TotalEnergies and APA Corporation. We discuss the country's infrastructure, legal framework, and potential challenges such as corruption, political instability, and the risk of the resource curse. We also explore Suriname's socioeconomic conditions, including its demographics, poverty rate, and the brain drain it is experiencing. Finally, we assess how the country can effectively manage its oil wealth to avoid the pitfalls of resource-rich nations and leverage its newfound potential for sustainable development.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
1. How will Suriname's oil wealth affect its economic growth and social development?
2. What are the main challenges Suriname faces in managing its newfound oil wealth?
3.How can Suriname leverage its oil resources to advance its position in the global value chain?
Long format:
The Next Oil Frontier: Suriname's Path to Wealth or Woe
 
By Justin James McShane
In Episode 80, we examined the future of Guyana.  https://www.geopoliticsunplugged.com/audio/ep80-the-future-of-guyana/ IN 15 November 2024, OilPrice.com published “Suriname Poised to Follow Guyana's Footsteps as Major Oil Producer”
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Suriname-Poised-to-Follow-Guyanas-Footsteps-as-Major-Oil-Producer.html#google_vignette and that begs us to likewise examine Surinam to see if and how their future differs from that of Guyana.
 
TL;DR:
Suriname, thanks to major offshore oil discoveries in the Guyana-Suriname Basin, has the potential to transform its economy, similar to neighboring Guyana. The country faces challenges like underdeveloped infrastructure, political instability, corruption, and the risk of the "resource curse" (economic and social stagnation despite resource wealth). Its oil and gas sector could significantly boost GDP and government revenue, with production expected to reach 200,000 barrels per day by 2028.
 
To avoid pitfalls and maximize benefits, Suriname must invest in infrastructure, education, and governance reforms while creating a clear plan for managing oil revenues, such as a sovereign wealth fund. If managed well, oil wealth could modernize the country and elevate its position in the global economy; otherwise, it risks falling into the same traps that have hindered other resource-rich nations.
 
Introduction:
Suriname stands at the cusp of significant transformation, poised to follow in the footsteps of its neighbor Guyana as a burgeoning oil producer. With major offshore oil discoveries in the Guyana-Suriname Basin, the country has a unique opportunity to harness its natural resources for economic development. Yet, like many resource-rich nations, Suriname faces a host of challenges, including infrastructure limitations, political stability concerns, and the potential pitfalls of the resource curse. By examining Suriname’s demographics, economic trends, and burgeoning oil and gas sector, we can evaluate whether it is indeed on the verge of an economic takeoff akin to Guyana or whether it will chart a different path shaped by its own unique circumstances.
 
INFORMATION 
Thanks to major oil discoveries Suriname has the POTENTIAL of developing itself into a more modern country. However, it does have significant headwinds. While it will not become a regional power player, it will likely join the ranks of relevant countries in the hemisphere. Surinam is the most forested country in the world. The IMF expects Suriname's economy to grow by 3% in 2024, with inflation falling below 14%. The country is also recovering from the recession caused by COVID-19. Suriname is one of the smallest countries in South America, but it has one of the most ethnically diverse populations in the region. Its economy is dependent on its natural resources, most notably bauxite, of which it is one of the top producers in the world.
 
WHERE IS SURINAME AND WHAT ARE ITS BASIC STATISTICS?
Suriname is located in the northern part of South America, on the northeastern Atlantic coast. Suramine’s neighbors include: the Atlantic Ocean to the north, French Guiana to the east, Guyana to the west and Brazil to the south. Suriname is the smallest sovereign state in South America, with a land area of just under 165,000 square kilometers. The capital and largest city is Paramaribo, which is located on the north coast. Suriname is a tropical country with a diverse geography that includes rainforests, savanna, coastal swamps, and two mountain ranges. About 67% of Suriname's population lives in Paramaribo, the capital city. This means that roughly two-fifths of the country's population live in Paramaribo and its surrounding area. Most of Suriname's population lives in the north of the country, along the 386 km long coastal plain. The least populated county is Sipaliwini, which is located in the interior of the country. About two-thirds of Suriname's population lives in urban areas. Suriname is one of the least densely populated countries in the world.
Source: Wikipedia under WikiCommons
 
As of 2023, Suriname's population is 628,886. Suriname's ethnic groups include Hindustani, Maroon, Creole, Javanese, and mixed. Suriname’s official language is Dutch. Dutch is spoken as a mother tongue by about 60% of the Surinamers, while most others speak it as a second or third language. The other languages used in Surmise include Sranan Tongo which is an English-based creole language that is widely used as a lingua franca; Hindi which is a dialect of Bhojpuri spoken by descendants of British Asian contract workers; Javanese which is spoken by descendants of Javanese (Indonesian) contract workers and Urdu which is a prestige language for Muslims in Suriname. 
 
The Dutch established a colony in Suriname in 1667, and Dutch became the language of communication between the Dutch, African slaves, and the Native Surinamese. Suriname gained independence from the Netherlands in 1975, but it remains close to the Netherlands in terms of culture, economics, and diplomacy.
 
POVERTY
According to the 2022 Suriname Poverty and Equity Assessment, the poverty rate in Suriname is 17.5%. This is based on the World Bank's upper-middle-income threshold of $6.85 per day in 2017 PPP. The assessment also found that 1.1% of the population live in extreme poverty, earning less than $2.15 per day. In 2021, 2.9% of the population was multidimensionally poor (which is a way to measure poverty that considers a range of factors beyond income, such as access to education, healthcare, and basic needs), and 4% were vulnerable to it. The Gini index, a metric for global inequality, shows that the Caribbean has high inequality compared to other upper-middle income countries. The poor have lower employment rates, with only about 40% of the poor aged 15 and older employed. The country's tumultuous political history is what a lot of scholars attribute as the root cause of persistent poverty in conjunction with over reliance on the mining industry, which is vulnerable to market shocks and contributes to 85% of exports.
Compared to Guyana, Suriname has a lower poverty rate, with estimates suggesting around 26% of Suriname's population lives in poverty compared to 43% in Guyana; meaning, while both countries face poverty challenges, Suriname is performing better in this regard based on available data.
 
NEET RATE
There isn't much information about the NEET rates in Suriname. However, we can look at labor force participation rates compared to other countries to glean some information about this area of global concern.
BRAIN DRAIN
Suriname is experiencing a brain drain. In 2020, 273,200 people left Suriname. Suriname is losing skilled workers and prospective students, especially in healthcare. Research by Beine et al. (2008) and Dulam & Franses (2011) suggests that Suriname is experiencing a net outflow of highly skilled migrants. Family migration is a primary reason for leaving Suriname. For example, between 2002 and 2011, over 9,000 Suriname-born migrants moved to the Netherlands for family reunification.
 
DEMOGRAPHIC CONCERNS
The proper way to look at whether or not a country is in demographic decline is to look at three variables: Total Fertility Rate (TFR), infant mortality rate and life expectancy. Ideally, you want a TFR is above the minimum replacement rate which is 2.1. You want a low mortality rate because having a high TFR but also a high infant mortality rate, then you will be in demographic decline. Thinking very myopically and morbidly, you do not want a long life expectancy because you will have a lot of non-working/non-producing folks that need to be supported.
Suriname's total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.322 children per woman in 2022 which is above the replacement rate of 2.1. This TFR has been stable around these numbers for over a decade. When we compare it to others we can see that Suriname’s TFR is above most if not all of the fully industrialized world. It is on par but slightly lower than Guyana.
Life expectancy is lower in Suriname than its cohorts which is bad from the individual and family connection perspective but is beneficial from a purely economic demographic point of view as the old generally are net “takers” of resources in their old age.
Infant mortality rates are dropping in Suriname which bodes well for their future population needs.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Suriname's infrastructure is focused in the capital city of Paramaribo, and frankly the country needs to improve it to support economic growth. Most of Suriname's infrastructure is in Paramaribo, which is the center of the country's roads, railways, bridges, imports, and exports. The main modes of travel and transporting goods are water, railway, and flight. Many roads and airport runways are unpaved. Suriname has around 28,000 miles of roads, most of which are unpaved. Roughly 19.16% of roads in Suriname are unpaved. The country has two main roads, the Northern East-West Link and the Southern East-West Link. Approximately 40% of paved roads in Suriname are in poor condition. Approximately 40% of unpaved roads are inaccessible during the wet season.
Suriname's bridges are being improved with the construction of new bridges and the replacement of ferries with bridges. The Jules Wijdenbosch Bridge is a two-lane bridge that connects Paramaribo to Meerzorg and is part of the East-West Link. It's the only major bridge in Suriname along with the Coppename Bridge. The Coppename Bridge connects Jenny to Boskamp. Bailey bridges span the Coppename and Nickerie Rivers near Bitagron and Kamp 52. The Corentyne River Bridge is a project being undertaken by the governments of Guyana and Suriname. The border bridge will be built using a Public-Private Partnership arrangement.
Suriname is developing a deep-water port (Port of Nickerie) and anSpecial Economic Zone. A mega deep-water facility being built by Phoenix Development Company, N.V. Havenbeheer, and Van Oord Dredging and Marine Contractors B.V. The port will include an oil jetty, a shorebase facility, and a multipurpose terminal. The design will integrate green energy, sustainable transport, and nature-based solutions. The Port of Nickerie in Suriname is expected to be completed in 2025. The first phases of the project were finished in the second quarter of 2023, and the Dutch maritime company Van Oord will continue to dredge the seabed for final completion.
Suriname's rail infrastructure is limited and primarily concentrated in the capital city of Paramaribo. It has 166 km of single track. Other tracks exist but are not in use. 
The Telecommunications Company Suriname (Telesur) is the only provider of fixed-line and broadband services in Suriname. The fixed-line infrastructure is reliable in the coastal region, but poor in the interior. Suriname is connected to other countries by submarine cables, including the Suriname-Guyana Submarine Cable System and the Americas II fiber optic submarine communications cable. The mobile telecom market is much larger than the landline market, and Suriname is ranked 7th in the world for mobile telecommunications. The main players in the mobile market are Telesur and Digicel. Telesur runs a 450 MHz CDMA network, 900 MHz and 1800 MHz GSM, and a 2100 MHz 3G HSDPA network. Digicel is another local operator that offers reliable coverage, even in remote areas. In 2024, the 3G network coverage is estimated to be 95.76%. Suriname's mobile penetration is much higher than the regional average. This is because many Surinamese people have multiple phones from different providers. In 2024, the median mobile internet connection speed in Suriname was 48.37 Mbps. 

Reliable broadband internet connection can be found in the capital but not in the interior regions. Suriname's Online Service Index is 0.29, which is well below the regional average of 0.59 for Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2022, 69.1% of the population in Suriname used social media.
In 2024, Suriname is projected to have 98.13% of its population with access to drinking water, 99.17% with access to electricity, and 90.23% with access to basic sanitation.
 
ECONOMY
Suriname's economy is based on its natural resources. Mining accounts for nearly half of the public sector's revenue, and gold makes up more than three quarters of total exports. Its main exports surround bauxite, gold and petroleum. The Aluminium Company of America began mining bauxite in Suriname in 1916, and it became the country's main export. Gold mining is a significant part of Suriname's economy, and large-scale operations are run by China's ZiJin Rosebel Goldmines and Newmont. However, gold mining is controversial due to its impact on Indigenous people and child labor. Crude oil is a growing major export (more in its own section). Other exports from Suriname include: alumina, precious metal scraps, refined petroleum, rough wood, and bananas. 
Suriname's mining industry accounts for about 85% of its exports and 25% of government revenues. The country's main trade partners are the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Trinidad and Tobago, the Netherlands, Belgium, and China.
Suriname generally encourages local and foreign investment, and has no sector-specific laws that discriminate against foreign investors. 

Suriname's top import countries are the United States, the Netherlands, Trinidad, China, and Japan. Its top export countries are the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

 
GDP
In 2023, Suriname's nominal GDP was $3.5 billion. In 2023, Suriname's GDP per capita was $5,454. This is lower than the global average of $10,589. Statistia forecasts that Suriname's GDP will increase by 22.36% between 2024 and 2029, reaching $5.98 billion. Trading Economics expects Suriname's GDP per capita to reach $7,410 by the end of 2024, and trend around $7,618 in 2025 and $7,846 in 2026.
Suriname's GDP and GDP per capita are expected to significantly grow due to the recent discovery of large offshore oil and gas reserves, with forecasts predicting a substantial economic boost once production begins, likely around 2028, leading to a significant increase in government revenue and investment in the country, potentially transforming Suriname's economy.
 
UNEMPLOYMENT
As of December 2023, the unemployment rate in Suriname is 8.00%. Here are some other recent unemployment rates for Suriname: 2022: 8.23%; 2021: 8.46%; 2020: 8.73%; 2019: 7.54%
There are significant issues involving child labor and related abuses particularly in the gold mining sector in Suriname.
 
EDUCATION LEVEL AND NUMBER OF UNIVERSITIES
The average number of years of schooling in Suriname is 3.8 years, which is lower than the global average of 8.7 years. This places Suriname 144th out of 150 countries in the world. More than 90% of children attend primary school, which is known as the "basisschool". The primary net enrollment rate is 98% and the primary completion rate is 100%. In 2021, 51.9% of girls and 31% of boys completed lower secondary school.
 
Suriname has one university, Anton de Kom University of Suriname, and several other higher education institutions. There are five teacher training colleges in Suriname. There are five higher professional institutes in Suriname. Suriname has 54 LBO schools, which are technical trade schools.
 
This education and skilled labor rate is a very strong headwind that Suriname faces in its development.
 
LABOR FORCE
Suriname's skilled labor force is growing in importance as the country works to strengthen its economy and support new industries. In 2023, Suriname's labor force was estimated to be 250,000 people. In 2023, the labor force participation rate for women was 44.7% and 64.1% for men. 43.5% of the labor force has primary education as their highest level of education. However, 30.2% of the labor market demands people with a university degree or vocational training, which is higher than the 9.4% of the labor force with that level of education.
 
THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR
Suriname's oil and gas sector began with initial exploration in the late 1920s, where oil seepages were reported, but the first commercially viable discovery only occurred in the 1960s when Shell found oil onshore, though it was deemed non-commercial at the time. The state-owned company, Staatsolie, later developed the Tambaredjo field in 1982, marking the start of significant oil production in the country, primarily focused on onshore operations until recent offshore discoveries. While initial exploration focused onshore, recent years have seen increased interest in offshore exploration, with significant discoveries made in the Guyana-Suriname Basin. Recent offshore discoveries have raised Suriname's profile as a potential oil producer, with several international companies actively exploring blocks in the region.
 
After years of speculation fueled by significant oil discoveries in Guyana, Suriname's offshore Block 58 has become central to its oil ambitions. TotalEnergies entered Block 58 in December 2019 by acquiring a 50% working interest from Apache Corporation. This acquisition included operatorship of the block. At that time, TotalEnergies paid a bonus of $100 million for the stake, plus their share of past exploration costs. After acquiring the interest, TotalEnergies, alongside Apache (now APA Corporation) both holding a 50% interest in Block 58 own the area free and clear of any legal disputes like the one that has embroiled Guyana. TotalEnergies and APA embarked on an exploration campaign. They made several significant discoveries in Block 58 from 2020 to 2022, namely Maka Central, Sapakara West, Kwaskwasi, Keskesi East, and Krabdagu. This phase of exploration involved substantial investment in drilling and testing wells to assess the block's potential.
 
Despite early optimism, concerns arose over the reservoir quality, the number of dry wells, and a high gas-to-oil ratio. Between 2020 and 2022, several discoveries were made, including Maka Central, Sapakara West, Kwaskwasi, Keskesi East, and Krabdagu. These discoveries raised expectations for substantial oil reserves similar to those found in neighboring Guyana. A notable dry hole was drilled at the Keskesi South-1 location. This well, although intended as an appraisal well, found non-commercial quantities of hydrocarbons. It was drilled about 6.2 km from the Keskesi East-1 discovery well. The lack of suitable reservoir-quality sands in the Campania target at this location led to its abandonment, highlighting the geological complexity of the area. The Bonboni-1 well, drilled in the northern portion of Block 58, encountered only water-bearing reservoirs in the primary Maastrichtian and Campanian objectives, despite being near known discoveries in the Maka-Kwaskwasi-Sapakara-Keskesi trend. This result was disappointing as it did not extend the known oil-bearing zones. These issues led TotalEnergies to delay the final investment decision until the problems were addressed.
 
TotalEnergies has made a significant commitment by investing $10.5 billion in the development of this block, named the GranMorgu project. This decision marks a pivotal step towards Suriname's oil production boom. 
 
Suriname currently produces about 16,000 barrels per day from minor onshore operations, but with Block 58's development, production is expected to surge past 200,000 barrels per day by 2028. This increase could significantly boost Suriname's GDP, similar to what Guyana experienced post-oil production commencement. The oil boom is anticipated to lift Suriname out of poverty, with the GDP potentially mirroring Guyana's tripling between 2019 and 2022 due to oil revenues.
 
Suriname has implemented a favorable regulatory framework for oil operations, offering production sharing contracts with terms up to 30 years and a royalty rate of 6.25%, which is relatively low, attracting more investment into its offshore oil sector. There's speculation that by 2035, Suriname could be producing up to 650,000 barrels per day, making the Guyana-Suriname Basin a significant contributor to global oil supply growth. This development comes amidst global pressures to reduce carbon emissions, yet the economic benefits are seen as outweighing these concerns in the short term.
 
Source: TotalEnergies
 
The estimates for the amount of oil in Suriname's Block 58 have varied over time due to ongoing exploration and appraisal activities. Morgan Stanley's modeling in 2020 suggested that Block 58 could contain around 6.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe), which would be developed across seven phases. TotalEnergies and APA's Recent 2023 Assessment (2023) appraisal of the Sapakara South and Krabdagu fields, which are part of Block 58, confirmed recoverable resources close to 700 million barrels of oil after drilling and testing three wells in August 2023. This figure specifically relates to these two fields but does not represent the total potential of Block 58. For the development plan named "GranMorgu", which primarily focuses on the Krabdagu and Sapakara oil discoveries, the gross estimated recoverable resources were cited as more than 750 million barrels of oil. This project covers the area where the appraisal drilling provided the above figures. The total oil in Block 58 might exceed these figures when considering other discoveries or prospects within the block. Initial optimism suggested potential reserves could be in the billions of barrels, similar to the estimates for the broader Guyana-Suriname Basin. However, actual recoverable reserves are more conservatively estimated now due to the complexities encountered during appraisal, such as high gas-to-oil ratios or less optimal reservoir quality in some areas.
 
It's important to note that these numbers can change with further exploration and development. The figures mentioned relate to recoverable reserves, which are not the same as total oil in place. Recoverable reserves are what can economically and technically be extracted with current technology. The actual oil in place could be significantly higher, but recovery rates vary, and not all oil in place is recoverable. 
 
Therefore, while Block 58 has been confirmed to hold significant oil, the precise total amount of oil that can be economically extracted might still be subject to further evaluation as development progresses.
 
How does Block 58’s 6.5 billion barrels of oil stack up to other fields? The Stabroek block, operated by ExxonMobil, has discovered over 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil and gas resources, making it one of the largest offshore oil finds in the world in recent years. One of the largest oil fields in the world, Kazakhstan’s Kashagan field recoverable reserves are estimated at around 13 billion barrels of oil equivalent. While the North Sea has many smaller fields, the larger ones like Ekofisk or Statfjord each have recoverable reserves in the range of 1 to 3 billion barrels. Tengiz (Kazakhstan) is one of the deepest supergiant oil fields, with recoverable reserves exceeding 6 billion barrels. Fields like Lula (formerly known as Tupi) in the Santos Basin offshore Brazil have recoverable reserves estimated at around 6.5 billion barrels.
 
In terms of production capacity comparison among fields, we can look at that as a means of comparison too. The production capacity planned for the GranMorgu development (Block 58 in Suriname) is 220,000 barrels per day (b/d). At the Stabroek Block (Guyana) current fields like Liza Destiny and Liza Unity produce around 220,000 b/d each, with plans for further developments increasing this capacity significantly. Saudi Aramco's offshore fields like Manifa produce over 900,000 b/d, and Ghawar, the world's largest oil field, produces at a much higher rate, though it consists of multiple zones. When at full capacity, Kashagan (Kazakhstan) aims to produce around 370,000 b/d, but this has been subject to delays and operational challenges. The FPSOs in the pre-salt fields, like P-75 in Búzios (Brazil), can produce up to 180,000 b/d, with some platforms designed for much higher capacities as part of Brazil's push to become one of the top oil producers globally.
 
While Block 58 in Suriname holds significant oil reserves and has a planned production capacity that's substantial on its own, it falls into the category of large fields but is not among the absolute largest in terms of either recoverable reserves or current production capacity when compared globally. Block 58's recoverable reserves are considerable but are dwarfed by supergiant fields like those in the Middle East, or even some of the newer major finds like Stabroek. Its planned production capacity is robust, especially for a new development in a region previously less known for major oil production, but it's below the output of many of the world's largest fields but is comparable to Guyana.
 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM OIL AND GAS
Following the oil discoveries in its offshore blocks, Suriname has been considering the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund to manage the revenues from oil and gas. This concept was introduced in legislation passed by Suriname's National Assembly in May 2017. While not explicitly called a "trust," President Chandrikapersad Santokhi has referred to directing oil revenues into a "prosperity and stability fund." This fund would serve similar purposes to a Sovereign Wealth Fund by investing in sustainable sectors, education, health, and infrastructure while also saving for the future. The establishment of such a fund involves legislative action, setting up governance structures, and defining investment policies. As of late 2024, the specifics of how this fund operates, including its exact structure, governance, and investment strategy, might still be in development or refinement stages.
 
POLITICAL STABILITY
Suriname's political stability can be assessed through various lenses, including its political history, current governance, economic conditions, and social factors. Suriname has experienced political instability in the past, notably during the 1980s when Desi Bouterse led a coup and established military rule. This period was marked by political assassinations, known as the "December murders," for which Bouterse was later convicted in 2019. After military rule, Suriname transitioned back to democracy in 1987 with a new constitution. However, political instability persisted with coups and attempted coups, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 2020 elections saw a peaceful transition of power when former police chief Chandrikapersad Santokhi was elected president, defeating Bouterse. This transition was noted for being free and fair, indicating an improvement in democratic processes. Suriname operates with a multi-party system where coalition governments are common, which can lead to political instability if coalitions fracture, but also reflect a form of political inclusivity. Suriname is ethnically diverse, and while this diversity can enrich political life, it has also historically contributed to political tensions, especially in elections where parties often align along ethnic lines.
 
CORRUPTION
Corruption in Suriname is a notable issue that permeates various sectors of society, affecting governance, the economy, and public trust. There are consistent reports of corruption in public procurement, where contracts are often awarded based on political connections rather than merit or competitive bidding. This includes infrastructure projects, government service contracts, and the allocation of mining and timber concessions. While the judiciary has shown signs of independence, especially in significant cases like the conviction of former President Desi Bouterse, corruption within the legal system remains a concern. Bribery for favorable judicial decisions has been reported. Political patronage systems are deeply entrenched, with positions in government and state companies often filled based on political allegiance rather than competence. This practice significantly contributes to corruption. Suriname has laws in place to combat corruption, like the Anti-Corruption Law passed in 2017, but enforcement has been inconsistent. The law aims to criminalize corruption, set up a National Anti-Corruption Commission, and mandate asset declarations by public officials. The government under President Santokhi has expressed intentions to tackle corruption more aggressively, including promises to establish an Anti-Corruption Commission and to investigate past corruption cases. However, progress has been slow, and implementation challenges persist. The political will to fight corruption can vary with changes in government, and there have been instances where high-profile corruption cases were not pursued vigorously, suggesting a lack of consistent commitment. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In 2023, Suriname scored 40 out of 100, indicating a moderate level of perceived public sector corruption. This score has fluctuated over the years, suggesting ongoing issues with corruption control.
 
Suriname serves as a transit country for cocaine produced in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, destined primarily for Europe but also for the United States and West Africa. Its location makes it an attractive route for drug traffickers. The country's geography, with vast areas of dense jungle and a relatively low population density, provides cover for drug production, storage, and trafficking activities. Small planes often fly drugs into Suriname from neighboring countries, utilizing numerous airstrips, many of which are unmonitored. Drugs are also smuggled via sea routes, either directly to Europe or via West Africa. The use of fishing boats, pleasure yachts, and even submarines has been documented. Traffickers use the porous borders with Guyana, French Guiana, and Brazil for land-based drug smuggling.
 
HOW TO EXAMINE INVESTING IN FOREIGN CAPITAL PROJECTS or FDI
Here are some of my bigger take aways:
 
Whenever you are going to make a capital investment in a foreign market as especially when it involves property, you’d do well to consider several things: respect for the rule of law for private property ownership and stability of the regime. Primarily, one looks for how long entrenched and how well developed the legal system is with respect to private property ownership and especially foreign ownership of property.  You are also, of course, concerned about taxation. Finally, NIMBY related issues should be considered.

Here is what I found:

RESPECT FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS

Foreigners are legally allowed to own property in Suriname, but they must first obtain a residence permit. This requirement can complicate the process but does not inherently restrict ownership rights once obtained. Suriname's Civil Code and other related laws provide for the protection of property rights, including those of foreigners. The legal system allows for property disputes to be resolved through courts, although the judicial system has faced criticism regarding efficiency and corruption.
 
Suriname primarily uses Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) for its oil and gas exploration and production activities. These contracts define the terms under which foreign companies can explore, develop, and produce hydrocarbons in Suriname. All hydrocarbons are owned by the state, but the PSC allows the contractor (usually a foreign company) to recover costs and share in the profits from the hydrocarbons produced. The PSC specify rights to explore, develop, and produce, as well as obligations regarding taxation, environmental protection, and local content.
 
The Petroleum Law of 1990 governs the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in Suriname. This law and subsequent amendments provide the legal basis for foreign companies to operate, ensuring they have rights to the hydrocarbons they find and produce under the terms of their contracts with Staatsolie (the state oil company) or the government directly. Suriname has signed bilateral investment treaties with several countries, which includes provisions for the protection of investments in the oil and gas sector, although these treaties focus more broadly on investment rather than specifically on hydrocarbons.
 
Suriname states that it has adopted an "open door" approach for bidding on oil and gas exploration blocks, signaling an intent to attract foreign investment by providing access to its resources. The government has tried to offer fiscal stability to investors to ensure that changes in tax or other fiscal policies do not adversely affect existing investments, although this stability can sometimes be tested by political or economic shifts.
 
While there have been no major publicized disputes specifically related to foreign oil and gas rights in Suriname, the general business environment includes arbitration. PSCs usually contain arbitration clauses for resolving disputes, which respects the international standard practice for handling such issues outside of local courts if needed. Suriname is a supporting country for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which suggests a commitment to improving transparency and governance in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, which indirectly supports respect for foreign investor rights by ensuring accountability.
 
TAXATION
The taxation of oil and gas in Suriname involves several key elements, structured to ensure that the state benefits from its natural resources while also providing an investment-friendly environment for foreign companies. Here's an overview based on the available information and common practices. Typically, a royalty is levied on the production of oil or gas. In Suriname, under PSCs, royalties are usually set at a rate around 6.25% of the gross production value. This rate can be adjusted based on specific contract terms or amendments in the law. Companies are allowed to recover their operating and capital expenditures from a certain percentage of the produced hydrocarbons before profit oil is shared. The cost recovery ceiling in Suriname has been known to be around 75%, meaning companies can recover up to 75% of their costs before profit sharing. After cost recovery, the remaining hydrocarbons (profit oil) are split between the state (or Staatsolie) and the contractor. The split can vary based on production levels, the rate of return (R-Factor), or other contractual terms but is designed to increase the state's share as profitability increases.

Corporation Tax: 
The standard corporate income tax rate in Suriname is 36% for profits from oil and gas activities. However, under the PSC framework, there might be provisions where the tax is handled differently, often through the profit oil mechanism where the government takes its share in kind, thus effectively taxing the company's profit.
 
Capital Gains Tax: 
Suriname has no specific capital gains tax.
 
Withholding Taxes: 
There's a withholding tax on dividends, which might be applicable to profits distributed by oil and gas companies to their shareholders, although specifics can vary based on double taxation agreements or fiscal stability clauses in PSCs. The specific rate can vary based on the tax treaty between Suriname and the country where the shareholder resides
 
VAT: 
Goods and services related to oil and gas exploration and production are subject to VAT. Suriname has implemented VAT at a rate of 10%, but this can change, and there might be exemptions or zero-rating for certain transactions.
 
Import Duties: 
Companies engaged in oil and gas exploration and production might benefit from exemptions or reduced rates on import duties for equipment and materials needed for their operations. These are usually negotiated within the PSC to encourage investment.
 
Wage Tax and National Insurance: 
Suriname uses a progressive tax system for wage income, meaning the tax rate increases as income increases. However, exact brackets and rates can change with legislative updates. ◦ Employees in Suriname contribute to social security through payroll deductions. This system includes Old Age Pension (AOV) which are contributions for retirement benefits; and General Widows and Orphans Insurance (AWW) which are benefits in case of death of a family breadwinner. Typically, there's a flat rate or a rate based on income up to a ceiling. For instance, previously, this might have been around 3% to 5% of salary, but these figures can vary. Employers also contribute to these funds, generally at a higher rate than employees, to support the social security system.
 
OIL AND GAS INFRASTURCTURE 
Suriname's offshore oil and gas infrastructure, particularly in relation to the developments in Block 58, is still in the early stages of development. Exploration activities in Suriname's offshore blocks, like Block 58, have involved the use of mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs). These rigs are not permanent but are moved in for exploration and appraisal drilling. For instance, rigs like the Maersk Valiant have been used for drilling operations. Extensive 2D and 3D seismic surveys have been conducted to map the subsurface geology, identify potential reservoirs, and plan drilling locations. This is a crucial part of the infrastructure setup for any offshore oil exploration. TotalEnergies has announced plans to develop the GranMorgu project with an Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading (FPSO) Vessel for the Sapakara and Krabdagu discoveries. It will act as a production platform, storage facility, and offloading point for oil, eliminating the need for pipelines to shore in the initial phase. The development includes plans for subsea wells connected to the FPSO via subsea production systems. This involves Subsea Trees and Manifolds for controlling the flow of oil and gas from the well to the surface and Subsea Pipelines which are short pipelines or flow lines from the wells to the FPSO. Onshore logistics bases are being developed or enhanced to support offshore operations. These bases handle the logistics for personnel, equipment, supplies, and maintenance services. As outlined above, there have been discussions about and definitive actions in developing facilities in Port Nickerie for oil and gas operations.
 
While not physical infrastructure, the development of local content through training programs for Surinamese nationals in oil and gas operations is crucial. This includes setting up facilities for technical training and education to ensure local participation in the industry. Staatsolie has developed programs like the NATIN (National Training Institute) Oil & Gas Program, aimed at providing Surinamese students with specific knowledge and skills in the oil and gas industry. This includes theoretical education in oil-related disciplines, practical experience, and focuses on increasing local capacity. Over the years, a number of local service companies have emerged that provide services ranging from logistics to maintenance for oil operations. While they might not have the depth of experience found in countries with longer oil histories, they are gaining expertise as the sector grows. While there is very limited experience in onshore operations, the offshore sector, particularly deepwater, presents new challenges where local expertise is very much less developed compared to international counterparts.
 
NIMBY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM
There have not been widely noted, high-profile, or sustained protests or movements specifically targeting the development of Block 58 in Suriname in the mainstream international media or detailed reports.
 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN
If one is a structuralist in terms of economic development and adheres to Rostow's five stages of economic growth, then clearly Guyana is in the “take off stage” as it meets all of the conditions for take-off but certainly is not in the drive to maturity, maturity or age of mass consumption stages yet. 
 
Right now Surinam sits at the second lowest stage of the Global Value Chain (GVC) as a pure raw commodity exporter. To move up the GVC to the next level which is manufacturing and/or processed/refined commodity exporter is through the well known process of focusing on and providing:
 
Improving coordination
Governments must create a clear vision and ensure the private sector is involved and capital is deployed in an efficient and controlled manner. What activities will be incentivized through reduced taxation, grants, preferential loans and the like and what activities will be “punished” through strict regulation and/or taxation needs to be very clearly defined and outlined. 
 
Attracting investment
Opening borders and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) will help countries enter GVCs and advance up the GVC ladder. 
 
Improving infrastructure
Countries must invest in modernizing communications, roads, railways, and ports.
 
Reducing border delays
Small steps like speeding up customs can help countries transition from commodity exports to basic manufacturing.
 
Upgrading processes and products
Countries can improve efficiency by adopting better technology, or upgrade the quality of their products by using higher quality materials or through the use of domestic design. 
 
Investing in education and training
Countries must invest in education and vocational training to complement their GVC strategies.
 
Comment:
In fairness to Suriname, this entire oil and gas sector is very new to them. With the potential of overnight change of fortune in their country as seen in Guyana, it would be wise for them to plan how they plan to reinvest their oil and gas revenues to move up the GVC from mere pure commodity exporter to manufacturing or commodity refiner. As if today, there is no defined and unified vision as whether or not these funds will be segregated into a trust and if they are how and on what ordered priority they are to be used. This is an immediate need otherwise the country will likely default to the old “resource curse” situation. The "resource curse" is a paradoxical situation where countries rich in natural resources, like oil, gas, minerals, or timber, experience less economic growth and development compared to countries with fewer natural resources. This phenomenon suggests that instead of being a blessing, abundant natural resources can lead to detrimental economic, social, and political outcomes. Inflation, rent-seeking, volatility in revenue, conflict, worsening of economic inequities, a dependence culture as well as even more corruption are potential outcomes without such a vision.
 
Conclusion:
Suriname’s newfound potential oil wealth holds the promise of transformative economic growth, potentially lifting it from its status as a small commodity exporter to a significant player in the global energy market. However, realizing this potential requires strategic investment in infrastructure, governance reforms, and a clear vision for the future. The country’s ability to rise above the resource curse and leverage its oil revenues for sustainable development will determine whether Suriname can emulate Guyana’s recent successes and do better than it or become a cautionary tale which seems to be the path that Guyana is on. With prudent management, Suriname can not only strengthen its economy but also secure a more prosperous and equitable future for its people. The journey ahead is fraught with challenges, but it also presents an unprecedented opportunity for growth and modernization.
 
SOURCES:
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Suriname-Poised-to-Follow-Guyanas-Footsteps-as-Major-Oil-Producer.html#google_vignette
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/10/01/new-world-bank-strategy-to-boost-economic-resilience-and-inclusive-development-in-suriname#:~:text=With%20Suriname's%20forests%20covering%2093,civil%20society%2C%20and%20development%20partners
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/suriname/overview#:~:text=The%20discovery%20of%20several%20offshore,and%20have%20negative%20environmental%20impacts
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/suriname/overview#:~:text=The%20discovery%20of%20several%20offshore,and%20have%20negative%20environmental%20impacts
 
https://www.coface.com/news-economy-and-insights/business-risk-dashboard/country-risk-files/suriname#:~:text=Recovery%20gains%20slight%20traction.%20The%20deep%20recession,durably%20high%20gold%20prices%20will%20support%20exports
 
https://www.worldbank.org/dv/news/press-release/2024/07/18/joint-world-bank-idb-report-highlights-pathways-to-reducing-poverty-in-suriname#:~:text=PARAMARIBO%2C%20Suriname%2C%20July%2018th%2C,on%20less%20than%20$2.15%20daily
 
https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/MPI/SUR.pdf
 
https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/bridging-the-data-gap-to-tackle-poverty-and-inequality-in-the-ca
 
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https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-g294082-d12255078-Reviews-Jules_Wijdenbosch_Bridge-Paramaribo_Paramaribo_District.html#:~:text=How%20this%20over%201500m%20long,Written%20March%2031%2C%202017
 
https://www.offshore-mag.com/regional-reports/latin-america/article/14214669/deepwater-port-in-suriname-to-support-offshore-ep
 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/suriname-deep-water-port-special-economic-#:~:text=Suriname%20is%20an%20ideal%20geographic,to%20become%20a%20logistics%20hub
 
https://www.phoenix-develop.com/post/suriname-deep-water-port-special-economic-zone
 
https://www.dredgingtoday.com/2023/07/13/van-oord-part-of-the-massive-nickerie-port-project/
 
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https://en.portnews.ru/news/339069/#:~:text=It%20is%20planned%20to%20complete%20the%20port,of%20Nickerie%20is%20an%20initiative%20of%20the
 
https://www.dredgingtoday.com/2022/11/24/surinamese-president-oks-port-of-nickerie-project/#:~:text=Surinamese%20President%20Chandrikapersad%20Santokhi%20has,port%20%E2%80%93%20called%20Port%20of%20Nickerie.&text=According%20to%20the%20Surinamese%20government's,the%20Caricom%20and%20Northern%20Brazil
 
https://oilnow.gy/featured/dutch-maritime-giant-now-part-of-massive-suriname-port-project/
 
https://www.budde.com.au/Research/Suriname-Telecoms-Mobile-and-Broadband-Statistics-and-Analyses#:~:text=Telesur%20is%20the%20only%20provider,5%2C000%20subscribers%20at%20the%20time
 
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https://tradingeconomics.com/suriname/gdp-per-capita#:~:text=GDP%20per%20Capita%20in%20Suriname%20is%20expected%20to%20reach%207410.00,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models.&text=The%20GDP%20per%20capita%20is,inflation%2C%20by%20the%20total%20population
 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/728432/unemployment-rate-in-suriname/
 
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https://borgenproject.org/education-in-suriname/#:~:text=In%20the%20South%20American%20nation,upper%20secondary%20education%20in%20Suriname
 
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https://www.cijn.org/oil-secrets-of-suriname-public-largely-in-the-dark-as-offshore-dreams-deferred/#:~:text=The%20government's%20revenue%20from%20oil,with%20the%20International%20Monetary%20Fund
 
https://theenergyyear.com/articles/suriname-a-rising-star-in-oil-and-gas/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20authorities%20took%20a,assets%20are%20now%20under%20exploration
 
https://geoexpro.com/petroleum-a-new-economic-boost-for-suriname/#:~:text=Mixed%20Exploration%20Success%20Oil%20was%20first%20discovered,when%20a%20number%20of%20IOCs%20became%20interested
 
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Tuesday Nov 19, 2024

Summary:
In this episode, we discuss the ongoing political and military instability in Libya, which has persisted since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The country is divided between two rival governments, each vying for control of resources and political power. This division has led to frequent shutdowns of the oil and gas sector, a crucial source of income for Libya, and has deterred foreign direct investment. While there have been temporary resolutions to some conflicts, the underlying issues of mistrust and fragmentation remain, making Libya's future uncertain. We explore the impact of this instability on the global energy market and regional security, highlighting the international community's concern for Libya's fragile peace.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the main challenges to stability in Libya, and how do they interact with one another?
How does Libya's oil and gas sector contribute to both the stability and instability of the country?
What are the implications of Libya's instability for the global community, particularly in terms of energy markets and security?
Long format:
Libya’s ‘Stable Instability’: What’s Keeping the Peace—and What Could Break It? Implications for the Oil and Gas Sector and Foreign Direct Investment 
TL;DR
Libya remains caught in a cycle of “stable instability,” with two rival governments—the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the eastern administration led by Khalifa Haftar—competing for control. The country’s deep divisions, failure to hold elections, and reliance on fragmented militias perpetuate political and military tensions. Foreign powers play a dual role, both preventing full-scale conflict and exacerbating instability by supporting competing factions.
Libya’s oil and gas sector, crucial to its economy, is both a blessing and a curse, frequently disrupted by political disputes. While recent deals, like resolving the 2024 oil shutdown, have temporarily eased tensions, these solutions fail to address long-term challenges. Foreign investment is cautiously returning, but instability and the risk of sudden shutdowns remain deterrents.
Globally, Libya’s instability affects energy markets and regional security. Without significant reforms, reconciliation, and unified governance, Libya risks descending back into conflict, making its fragile peace a critical concern for both Libyans and the international community.
Introduction
Libya’s modern history is a testament to the paradox of “stable instability.” Despite years of ceasefires, political agreements, and foreign interventions, the country remains deeply divided, teetering on the edge of renewed conflict. Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has been locked in a cycle of power struggles, civil wars, and failed attempts at national reconciliation. Its dual government system—the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the eastern administration led by Khalifa Haftar—exemplifies the fragmentation that prevents sustainable peace and governance.
This paper delves into the complexities of Libya’s ongoing instability, examining its political dynamics, the interplay of internal and external actors, and the critical role of its oil and gas sector. It explores the tensions between rival governments, the factors that fuel divisions, and the temporary measures that stave off outright collapse. While Libya’s challenges are immense, its stability—or lack thereof—has significant implications for regional and global security, energy markets, and international relations. Understanding Libya’s precarious balance is essential for grasping the broader implications of its fragile peace.
Information
Libya’s stability is that it is stable in its instability.
Libya's political landscape remains volatile, characterized by a division between two main rival governments: the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, backed by the United Nations, and the House of Representatives in the east, supported by Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA).
Libya has been split since 2014, with each government controlling different parts of the country, which inherently increases the risk of conflict. There have been very reports of significant troop movements on posts on X and on telegram, especially by forces affiliated with Khalifa Haftar, indicating potential preparations for military action. This was highlighted by posts suggesting deployments for a possible new war. Recently, there have been small-scale clashes, like those between militias in Tripoli, which, while not necessarily escalating into full civil war, illustrate the fragility of peace and the ever-present threat of violence. The balance of foreign powers, like Turkey and Russia, has been mentioned as a factor preventing full-scale conflict due to their influence over different factions. However, this also means that international dynamics could either stabilize or destabilize the situation especially as Russia becomes increasingly occupied with events in the Ukraine. The failure to hold national elections and the continued division between governmental bodies indicate a lack of progress towards national reconciliation, fueling ongoing tensions.
Given these points, while there's a ceasefire in place since 2020, the political and military developments suggest that Libya remains at risk of sliding back into conflict or civil war. The current risk factors include: persistent division between rival political and military factions; military mobilizations and readiness and counter mobilizations; and the influence of external powers, which might have their interests best served by instability. The current mitigating factors against civil war include: international calls for restraint and ceasefire agreements; and the economic incentive of oil production, which both sides have an interest in maintaining.
Therefore, while there's no definitive action indicating an immediate return to civil war, the underlying conditions suggest that Libya could indeed revert to conflict if the current political stalemate continues without resolution or if significant provocations occur.
The Future of Libya’s Government Stability
Libya's path to a stable government remains fraught with obstacles, defined by its ongoing political fragmentation and rivalry between the western Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the eastern administration associated with General Khalifa Haftar. The fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 created a power vacuum, leading to over a decade of instability, marked by civil wars, international interventions, and fragmented governance.
The GNU, recognized by the United Nations, struggles to maintain authority even in its own territories, as it depends on a coalition of militias that often prioritize local interests over national unity. Meanwhile, the eastern government, centered in Benghazi and led by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), controls key oil facilities and substantial swaths of territory but lacks international legitimacy.
International actors, particularly the United Nations, have prioritized national elections as the solution to Libya's instability. However, logistical and political challenges—such as disputes over the electoral framework, candidates' eligibility, and security concerns—continue to delay this critical step. Moreover, Libya's inability to unify its military under a single command structure exacerbates the security situation, making any political progress tenuous.
Differences Between the Tripoli and Eastern Governments
The divide between Libya’s two governments reflects deep-rooted disagreements over governance, resource distribution, and political legitimacy.
Tripoli’s Government of National Unity (GNU) is led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. The GNU is internationally recognized and claims jurisdiction over all of Libya, though it effectively governs the western region. The GNU controls the Central Bank of Libya, which handles oil revenues. This control has been a contentious point with the eastern administration. Security in the west is maintained by a coalition of militias, which, while loyal to Tripoli, often act independently, undermining central authority.
The Eastern Government (Benghazi-Based) is backed by Haftar’s LNA, the eastern administration holds power in eastern Libya and parts of the south. It lacks international recognition but compensates with control over vital oil export terminals. This administration often accuses the GNU of mismanaging oil revenues and marginalizing eastern Libya. The conflict between these governments has created a dual power structure, with each side vying for control over Libya’s vast resources and political future.
Tensions Between Benghazi and Tripoli
The rivalry between Tripoli and Benghazi is a defining characteristic of Libya’s instability. At its core, the tension revolves around resource control, governance, and military dominance. Libya's oil wealth is both a blessing and a curse. While Tripoli manages revenues through the Central Bank, Benghazi wields control over oilfields and export terminals. This division has led to periodic shutdowns as each side attempts to leverage its position. The LNA and western militias have engaged in repeated skirmishes, further destabilizing the country. Haftar’s failed assault on Tripoli in 2019 deepened the animosity between the factions. Both governments claim legitimacy, with little willingness to compromise. This rivalry undermines efforts to establish a unified national government. These tensions perpetuate a cycle of instability, where progress in one area, such as oil production, is often offset by setbacks in governance or security.
Reduction of Tensions During the 2024 Oil Shutdown
In late 2024, Libya faced another crisis as the eastern government halted oil production over a dispute concerning the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya. The month-long shutdown affected major oilfields like Sharara and El Feel, disrupting the flow of approximately 350,000 barrels per day to the Zawiya refinery. This disruption not only cost Libya millions in lost revenue but also threatened global energy markets. The shutdown ended in October 2024 after both factions agreed to address the Central Bank issue. A unified Central Bank governor was appointed, temporarily easing tensions. This agreement allowed oilfields to reopen and production to resume, stabilizing the country’s economy. However, this resolution was more of a tactical ceasefire than a long-term solution, as the underlying issues of mistrust and political fragmentation remain unresolved.
The Return of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Oil and Gas Sector
Libya’s oil and gas sector is beginning to attract foreign investment after years of decline. Recent developments highlight a cautious yet renewed interest from international energy companies. Italy’s Eni and BP resumed onshore drilling in October 2024, marking their first operations in Libya in over a decade. This move signals confidence in Libya’s potential despite its ongoing challenges. France’s TotalEnergies has not been as full throttle a return to Libya as Eni. Posts from X suggest that there's interest from Emirati firms. For instance, there was a mention of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) presenting a new offer to the Emirati energy company "Trasta" regarding the Ras Lanuf refinery. This indicates ongoing negotiation or exploration of potential investment, though it's more about potential rather than confirmed investment.
Foreign investors are drawn to Libya’s vast oil reserves, low production costs, and strategic location near European markets. These factors make Libya one of the most resource-rich countries in Africa. While the return of FDI is encouraging, companies remain wary of the risks associated with Libya’s instability, including sudden shutdowns, infrastructure sabotage, and regulatory uncertainty.
Impact of Instability on FDI in the Oil and Gas Sector
Instability remains a significant deterrent to investment in Libya’s energy sector. Frequent protests, abductions, and armed clashes disrupt operations and threaten the safety of personnel. Oil facilities have repeatedly been shut down due to political disputes, creating an unreliable business environment. Years of conflict have left much of Libya’s oil infrastructure in disrepair to a degree, requiring substantial investment for repairs and upgrades. The absence of a unified government complicates legal frameworks, making it difficult for foreign companies to navigate contracts and compliance issues.
These challenges deter long-term investment, limiting Libya’s ability to fully capitalize on its energy resources.
Global Implications of Libyan Instability
Libya’s instability has far-reaching consequences for global energy markets. Libya holds Africa’s largest proven oil reserves. Disruptions in its oil exports, such as the 2024 shutdown, can contribute to global price volatility. But the more recent shutdown in 2024 did not impact the market at all from a price perspective. The global oil market is highly interconnected with numerous suppliers. If Libyan oil were to be shut down, other oil-producing countries could potentially increase their production to compensate for the shortfall. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and others within OPEC+, or non-OPEC countries like the U.S. and Russia, have the capacity to adjust their output to stabilize prices and supply, though they might not always choose to do so due to various economic or geopolitical reasons. Even if there's no direct oil supply issue for the U.S., a shutdown in Libya might temporarily increase oil prices globally due to perceived supply tightness.
Europe relies heavily on Libyan oil, with Italy, Spain, and Germany among the largest importers. Instability in Libya directly impacts energy security in these countries. Prolonged instability in Libya creates opportunities for extremist groups to operate, posing threats to regional and global security. Libya’s stability is thus not only a national issue but also a global one, with implications for energy markets, geopolitics, and economic stability.
Libya’s Major Trading Partners in Oil and Gas
Libya’s oil exports primarily target European markets are:
Italy: The largest importer of Libyan crude, leveraging its geographic proximity and strong historical ties.
Spain and Germany: Significant buyers of Libyan oil, reflecting Europe’s dependency on North African energy supplies.
China: An emerging partner, driven by its growing energy needs.
United States: While less reliant, the U.S. occasionally imports Libyan crude, particularly during periods of global supply constraints.
Libya’s role as a key supplier to Europe underscores the importance of its stability to the global energy market.
Impact on the USA of a Possible Libyan Oil Shutdown
A shutdown of Libyan oil production would likely have a minimal direct impact on the United States for several reasons. Libya's contribution to the global oil market, while significant to its economy, is relatively small on a global scale. The U.S. imports very little oil directly from Libya. Before Libya's civil unrest in the 2010s, it supplied about 1%-2% of U.S. oil imports, and this figure has likely decreased further with the diversification of U.S. import sources and increased domestic production. Over the past decade, the U.S. has significantly increased its own oil production, particularly from shale oil in regions like the Permian Basin. This surge has led to the U.S. becoming a net exporter of oil, reducing its reliance on imports from unstable regions like Libya. As of recent years, the U.S. has been more focused on exporting its surplus crude oil and refined products rather than relying heavily on imports. The U.S. maintains a Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which can be tapped in case of significant supply disruptions. Although the SPR levels have been drawn down in recent years, it still represents a buffer against short-term supply shocks. The U.S. has diversified its sources of oil imports, relying on countries like Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and others, which reduces the impact of any single country's supply disruption. This diversification strategy helps in mitigating risks associated with geopolitical instability in any one region. The U.S. has robust refining capabilities and can source crude from various grades and regions worldwide. If Libyan sweet crude were unavailable, U.S. refineries could adjust by sourcing similar crude grades from other regions or by modifying their operations to handle different crude types.
Conclusion
Libya’s continued instability underscores the challenges of navigating a fractured political landscape in a country rich in resources yet plagued by division. The duality of its governance—split between the Government of National Unity in Tripoli and the eastern administration led by Khalifa Haftar—has entrenched mistrust and stymied efforts at national reconciliation. While ceasefires and temporary agreements, such as the 2024 resolution of the oil shutdown, provide moments of reprieve, they fail to address the root causes of division and conflict.
The influence of external actors, both stabilizing and destabilizing, complicates the situation further. International calls for elections and unity are often undermined by competing interests, leaving Libya vulnerable to external manipulation and internal collapse. The oil and gas sector, a cornerstone of Libya’s economy, reflects this instability, attracting cautious foreign investment but remaining susceptible to political disputes and sabotage.
Without a unified government, a clear electoral framework, and a commitment from both domestic and international stakeholders to prioritize national stability over factional gains, Libya risks sliding back into open conflict. Its challenges serve as a stark reminder of how unresolved political fragmentation can perpetuate cycles of violence and undermine opportunities for sustainable development.
Libya’s stability, precarious as it is, remains crucial not only for its people but for global energy markets and regional security. Addressing the country’s deep-seated issues will require sustained diplomatic efforts, robust institutional reforms, and a commitment to ensuring that its vast resources benefit all Libyans, rather than fueling further division.
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https://oec.world/en/profile/country/lby#:~:text=Exports%20The%20top%20exports%20of,Arab%20Emirates%20($1.31B)
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/return-libyan-exports-weighs-european-crude-market-2024-10-16/#:~:text=Italy%20is%20the%20biggest%20buyer,and%20Greece%2C%20Kpler%20data%20show.&text=The%20Reuters%20Power%20Up%20newsletter,Sign%20up%20here
https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/Finance-and-trade#:~:text=The%20country's%20biggest%20import%20partners,countries%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States
https://www.statista.com/topics/9253/oil-and-natural-gas-industry-in-libya/#:~:text=Libya's%20oil%20refineries%20had%20a,supply%20to%20the%20European%20Union
https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/crude-petroleum/reporter/lby#:~:text=About,primarily%20from:%20N/A
 

Monday Nov 18, 2024

Summary:
In this episode, we examine the opening of the Chancay Port in Peru, a state-of-the-art shipping terminal built by China as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The port is designed to enhance trade between South America and Asia, bypassing the Panama Canal and reducing shipping times. While this development promises economic growth and job opportunities for Peru, it also increases China's influence in the region and challenges U.S. trade dominance. We explore the potential economic, geopolitical, and strategic implications of this new port, analyzing its impact on trade routes, global competition, and regional dependencies.
 
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
1. What are the key economic and geopolitical implications of the Chancay Port's construction and operation?
2. How might the Chancay Port impact US trade interests and what are the potential economic and strategic consequences for the US?
3. What are the long-term implications of the Chancay Port for global trade dynamics and the balance of power between the US and China?
 
Long format:
 Chancay Port in Peru: The New Frontline in the US-China Global Trade Wars: How the Port Could Bypass the Panama Canal—and Challenge U.S. Trade
By Justin James McShane 
TL;DR:
Chancay Port in Peru, opened on November 15, 2024, is a state-of-the-art shipping terminal designed to enhance trade between South America and Asia. Built by China’s Cosco Shipping and Peru’s Volcan Mining Company, the port is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and can handle 1.5 million TEUs annually. It reduces shipping times to Asia by 10 days, boosting South American export competitiveness and positioning Peru as a major logistics hub.
While Chancay offers economic growth and job opportunities for Peru, it also increases China’s influence in Latin America and challenges U.S. trade dominance. The port’s success could reshape global trade routes, but it also raises concerns about Chinese influence, regional dependencies, and geopolitical shifts. The long-term implications will depend on how stakeholders address these challenges and opportunities.
Introductory:
The opening of Chancay Port in Peru on November 15, 2024, represents a pivotal development in the global shipping industry. Strategically positioned along the Pacific coast, just 60 kilometers north of Lima, this state-of-the-art facility has the potential to redefine trade routes between South America and Asia. As a joint venture between China’s Cosco Shipping and Peru’s Volcan Mining Company, Chancay Port symbolizes more than just infrastructure. It is a critical link in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and a bold statement about the future of global trade.
This paper explores the significance of Chancay Port in three key dimensions. First, we will examine its technical capabilities and design, which allow it to accommodate the world’s largest container ships and rival major global ports in efficiency and scale. Second, we will analyze its economic and geopolitical implications, particularly its role in fostering direct trade routes between South America and Asia, bypassing traditional hubs like the Panama Canal. Finally, we will consider its broader impact on U.S. trade interests, exploring potential shifts in competitive dynamics and strategic responses.
Chancay Port is not just a Peruvian project. Some argue it is a transformative force in the world economy. As trade patterns evolve and geopolitical alliances shift with reshoring and decoupling, understanding the role of this port is essential for assessing the future of international commerce and geopolitics. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of Chancay Port’s role in shaping this new era of connectivity and competition.
Information:
Chancay Port is a major shipping terminal in Chancay, Peru, that opened on 15 November 2024. Located about 60 kilometers north of Lima, on the edge of Peru's coastal desert, we can find the port.   It is now 17.8 meters deep. It was built by the Chinese company Cosco Shipping in association with the Peruvian company Volcan. It is owned by China Cosco Shipping Ports and Peru Volcan Mining Company. It is operated by Chancay Port Terminals. It can accept up to 1.5 million twenty-foot equivalent unit intermodal containers and 6 million tons of cargo annually. It has an ability to accommodate very large container ships that can carry up to 18,000 TEUs.
It is part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the port is intended to reduce shipping times between China and Peru, and to become a hub for Chinese containerized exports in South America. The port is touted as South America's first green and smart port. 
In comparison Balboa port (Panama) handles around 3.8 million TEU annually, making it one of the busiest in the Americas due to its canal connectivity. Port of Manzanillo, Mexico manages around 2.4 million TEU annually. Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, USA handles over 16 million TEU, making them the busiest ports in the Western Hemisphere. Yangshan Port, Shanghai, China moves about 49 million TEU per year, making it the world's busiest container port. 
Chancay Port in Peru and Its Importance to China:
Chancay Port benefits from its location in the Pacific Ocean, offering direct access to Asian markets without the need for transshipment points like the Panama Canal. This reduces shipping times significantly, which is critical for perishable goods and just-in-time manufacturing.
By reducing shipping times by about 10 days to Asia, Chancay is poised to become a major hub for exporting South American commodities, particularly to China. This efficiency leads to lower transportation costs, which could make South American products more competitive internationally.
Beyond the port itself, plans include developing an economic zone around Chancay. This zone would facilitate processing, manufacturing, and logistics activities, potentially turning the area into a significant industrial hub. Such development would not only enhance trade but also foster local economic growth by attracting investments.
The port's operations are expected to generate significant revenue and create thousands of jobs directly and indirectly. For Peru, this could mean a substantial increase in GDP contribution from trade and logistics.
By establishing a direct route, China reduces its dependency on potentially congested routes like the Panama Canal, thereby ensuring more stable supply chains.
The Chancay Port underscores China's increasing influence in Latin America, not just economically but potentially in terms of soft power, as infrastructure projects like this foster goodwill and economic ties.
Chancay is envisioned as part of a new maritime silk road that connects Latin America directly with Asia. This corridor not only serves immediate economic needs but also aligns with China's long-term vision of a global trade network where it holds significant sway.
The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is a development strategy by China to connect the country to trading hubs around the world. It's a key part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a larger plan to improve infrastructure and connectivity across Asia, Africa, and Europe. 
The success of Chancay could lead to more infrastructure projects in the region, creating an integrated network that enhances China's strategic presence.
In summary, Chancay Port represents more than just infrastructure; it's a symbol of China's deepening economic ties with Latin America, a strategic move to secure and diversify its supply chains, and an opportunity for Peru to significantly enhance its global trade position. However, its success will depend on managing economic, environmental, and social challenges effectively.
Impact on USA:
The Chancay Port in Peru, while primarily beneficial to China and Peru, could potentially impact the USA in several ways.
The port could divert trade routes traditionally involving the U.S. For instance, goods from South America destined for Asia might bypass U.S. ports, reducing the volume of cargo handled by American ports and consequently affecting port-related industries.
The efficiency and reduced shipping times provided by Chancay could make South American goods more competitive in Asian markets. This shift might hurt U.S. exporters who compete in the same markets, particularly in agriculture and certain commodities where South America has a strong presence.
By facilitating easier access to South American resources, China could strengthen its economic ties with the region, potentially at the expense of U.S. economic influence. This might affect the U.S.'s strategic economic partnerships in Latin America.
The U.S. has historically considered Latin America within its sphere of influence. China's investment in ports like Chancay introduces a new player with significant economic power, potentially shifting regional dynamics and diminishing U.S. dominance.
There's an underlying concern that infrastructure like Chancay could be used for geopolitical leverage. Although primarily commercial, the strategic location of such ports could potentially support military or intelligence operations in the future, although currently, there's no indication of such activities.
The U.S. might feel compelled to increase its infrastructure investments in Latin America or at home to maintain or regain economic leverage, which could divert resources from other domestic or international priorities.
U.S. companies might find themselves in a position where they need to compete more aggressively with Chinese investments in Latin America, possibly leading to a bidding war for influence or projects, which could inflate costs or alter U.S. foreign investment strategies.
The direct route from South America to Asia via Chancay might encourage companies to restructure their supply chains, potentially excluding U.S. ports from certain trade routes. This could lead to logistical challenges or increased costs for U.S. businesses relying on these imports or exports.
If Chancay or similar projects operate under less stringent environmental or labor regulations, this could pressure U.S. companies to lower their standards to remain competitive, potentially impacting the U.S.'s commitment to environmental or labor policies.
However, it's important to note:
The global economy benefits from efficient trade routes, and while Chancay might hurt certain U.S. interests, it also contributes to the broader efficiency of global trade, which indirectly can benefit the U.S. consumer through lower prices and increased product availability.
The impact is not necessarily a zero-sum game where China's gain is directly the U.S.'s loss, but it does introduce new variables into the complex equation of international trade and geopolitics, requiring strategic responses from the U.S. to maintain its competitive edge and influence.
The math and the realities
But let’s also remove some of the Henny Penny. Let’s look at realistic scenarios to discover the overall “damage” this port may bring to US maritime interests. 
Estimating the exact monetary impact of Chancay Port on U.S. trade involves numerous variables and assumptions, making it quite speculative. However, we can outline potential areas where U.S. trade might incur costs or losses:
If we assume a small percentage of South American cargo that would transit through U.S. ports now uses Chancay for direct shipping to Asia, the financial impact could be substantial. For example, if U.S. Pacific ports handle about 20 million TEU annually, and let's conservatively estimate that 1% of this volume might shift due to Chancay Port. 1% of 20 million TEU  = 200,000 TEU. Assuming an average revenue per TEU of about $200 (for handling, storage, and other services), this would mean: 200,000 TEU * $200 = $40 million in potential lost revenue per year.
The U.S. exported about $143 billion in agricultural products in 2022. If South American products become more competitive in Asia due to reduced shipping costs, a 1% loss in market share could translate to: $1.43 billion in lost export value. This number could be higher if the competition affects more sensitive markets or if the percentage loss is greater.
U.S. companies might need to lower prices or pay for faster shipping options to remain competitive, which could increase their costs. If we estimate this at an additional 0.5% of the value of goods shipped to Asia and for simplicity, let's say U.S. exports to Asia are worth around $300 billion (this figure varies year by year), then 0.5% of $300 billion = $1.5 billion in additional costs.
The U.S. might respond with investments in infrastructure or subsidies to support its ports or exporters. If the U.S. decides to invest an extra $1 billion annually in port enhancements or trade incentives as a reaction to Chancay, this would be an additional cost.
Long-term economic influence is harder to quantify but could involve billions over time in terms of lost opportunities for U.S. companies in South America if China's influence grows substantially.
Total Hypothetical Cost: 
- Port Revenue Loss: $40 million per year
- Market Share Loss: $1.43 billion per year
- Additional Export Costs: $1.5 billion per year
- Strategic Investment: $1 billion per year
Adding these up, we might look at an annual cost or loss to U.S. trade in the range of approximately $3.97 billion. However:
This is an extremely rough estimate with many assumptions. The actual percentage of cargo diversion might be different. Market share might not decrease linearly. Costs could be offset by efficiencies or new trade agreements. The strategic investment could vary widely.
Moreover, while this represents potential costs or losses, the actual impact could be mitigated by U.S. trade policies, new trade deals, or innovations in logistics and trade that adapt to the new dynamics created by Chancay Port. Additionally, the U.S. might find new ways to leverage this situation for its benefit or adapt its trade strategy to focus on different markets or goods.
In terms of the grand scheme of U.S. shipping, the potential loss of income due to the operations of Chancay Port, while significant for specific sectors or ports, might not be considered a massive deal in the context of the entire U.S. economy or even just the shipping industry at large. 
Conclusion:
The opening of Chancay Port marks a potential critical turning point in the global maritime industry, potentially creating new opportunities while challenging existing trade dynamics. By establishing a direct link between South America and Asia, this cutting-edge facility reduces shipping times, lowers transportation costs, and enhances the competitiveness of South American exports in global markets. For Peru, the port signifies a leap forward in economic development, job creation, and trade facilitation, potentially transforming the region into a major industrial and logistics hub.
However, the implications of Chancay Port extend far beyond its immediate economic benefits. It is a cornerstone of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, exemplifying the country’s growing influence in Latin America and its strategic efforts to secure global trade routes. This development has introduced a new layer of complexity to U.S. economic and geopolitical interests, challenging American dominance in the region and reshaping traditional trade routes.
While Chancay Port presents significant opportunities for efficiency and connectivity, it also raises critical questions about Chinese influence, regional equity, and long-term economic dependencies. As global trade continues to evolve, the port serves as a reminder that infrastructure investments are not merely commercial endeavors—they are instruments of power, influence, and transformation.
Ultimately, the success of Chancay Port will depend on the ability of stakeholders to navigate these opportunities and challenges responsibly. Whether it becomes a beacon of prosperity or a flashpoint for geopolitical tension will shape not only the future of trade in the Americas but also the broader dynamics of global commerce in the decades to come.
Sources:
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/11/16/the-opening-up-of-the-chancay-port-in-peru-and-its-role-in-the-chinese-maritime-silk-road/
https://www.aiddata.org/blog/chancay-port-opens-as-chinas-gateway-to-south-america
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/14/china-peru-port-latin-america/
https://apnews.com/article/china-peru-port-poverty-latin-america-1e06904f76cca1d7aaf19bca8bd24d93
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/rcna180289
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/perus-chinese-built-mega-port-begin-moving-two-container-ships-week-november-2024-10-18/
https://www.barrons.com/amp/news/peru-s-chancay-china-s-megaport-of-entry-to-south-america-5671f310
https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/port-of-chancay-creates-new-competition-in-latin-america

Monday Nov 18, 2024

Summary:
In this episode we examine the rapid development of China's naval aviation capabilities, specifically its aircraft carrier program. We discuss China's progress in building carrier-based aircraft, training pilots, and acquiring the necessary technology to operate a powerful fleet. We acknowledge the significant challenges China faces in catching up to the experience and technology of the US Navy but highlight China's determination to develop a globally capable blue-water navy. We analyze the advancements in China's carrier program, from the initial refurbished Soviet-era vessel to the more advanced, domestically built carriers, and discuss the implications of these developments for regional and global power dynamics.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
1. What are China's current naval aviation capabilities and how do they compare to those of other global powers?
2. How has China's aircraft carrier program evolved, and what are its future goals and challenges?
3.How is China's development of naval aviation impacting the global maritime balance of power?
Long format:
The Dragon Takes Flight: China's Growing Naval Air Power
On 14 November 2024, NationalInterest.org published “Evidence Is Building China Wants a Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier”
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/evidence-building-china-wants-nuclear-powered-aircraft-carrier-213708
And friend of the website and podcast Dan Moreman asked a question and made several very good comments that inspired this episode.
TL;DR:
Traditional notions that the Chinese navy cannot takeoff and land aircraft reliably is outdated information. While nowhere near the operational quality or pace of the US Navy, China's naval aviation capabilities have significantly advanced over the recent years, moving from one-time basic operations to now launching and landing aircraft on carriers with increasing sophistication. With new, more advanced carriers like the Fujian and improved pilot training, China aims to protect its maritime interests, project power, and challenge U.S. naval dominance in the South China Sea and beyond. However, again, its capabilities still lag behind the U.S. Navy due to limited operational experience and ongoing challenges. China's long-term goal is to build a globally capable blue-water navy, with plans to expand its carrier fleet, including potential nuclear-powered vessels.
Introduction:
China's rapid advancements in naval aviation have reshaped global perceptions of its military capabilities, particularly its aircraft carrier program. Once criticized for its inability to reliably take off and land aircraft on carriers, China has made significant progress, transforming its naval aviation into a cornerstone of its maritime strategy. This development underscores China's intent to protect vital sea lanes, assert its dominance in contested regions like the South China Sea, and challenge the established global naval order. By leveraging technology, strategic planning, and foreign expertise, China has embarked on an ambitious journey to establish itself as a formidable naval power.
Information
The old adage was that China can’t takeoff or land on aircraft carriers, why are they even building them. And this was certainly the case in the past. However, current evidence has prompted a re-examination of this pre-existing notion.
China considers developing naval aviation crucial to protect its maritime interests, project power beyond its coastline, secure vital sea lanes, and assert its status as a major global power, particularly in the contested South China Sea, by enabling operations far from its shores and potentially challenging the dominance of the U.S. Navy in the region; essentially allowing them to deter or respond to potential threats at sea with a robust air component based on naval vessels. Aircraft carriers and naval aviation give China the ability to deploy military force further from its mainland, influencing regional dynamics and potentially deterring adversaries. A strong naval aviation force can safeguard critical trade routes and energy supplies by monitoring and defending against potential threats at sea. Building a powerful naval force, including carrier-based aviation, is often seen as a symbol of national strength and global influence.
It is temping to compare Chinese capabilities against the US Navy. But perhaps that is unfair given that the US Navy has been operating naval aviation for over 100 years. Nevertheless, it is important to do the comparison. 
China can reliably take off and land aircraft on its aircraft carriers, although compared to the US Navy, their capabilities are still considered limited, with challenges in complex weather conditions, pilot training, and overall carrier operations, particularly when it comes to high sortie rates and advanced combat scenarios; their newer carriers are improving this capability with the addition of catapult launch systems. While China has successfully conducted carrier operations with aircraft like the J-15 fighter on their carriers like the Liaoning, their overall experience and proficiency are still considered less developed than the US Navy. Earlier Chinese carriers used a ski-jump design for takeoffs, which restricts the types and weight of aircraft that can operate from them. China is building newer carriers like the Type 003 class with electromagnetic catapults, significantly enhancing their launch capabilities and allowing for heavier aircraft. Pilot training for carrier operations is a major area where China needs improvement, including night landings and operations in rough weather. 
China's aircraft carrier program has progressed significantly over the past decade. The Liaoning (Type 001), a refurbished Soviet-era vessel, was commissioned in 2012 and serves as a training platform to develop carrier operation skills. It uses a ski-jump for aircraft launches, limiting the payload of aircraft. The Shandong (Type 002), China's first domestically built carrier, entered service in 2019, featuring improvements over its predecessor. It also was built carrier with a similar ski-jump configuration to the Liaoning. The most recent addition, the Fujian, launched in 2022, is equipped with advanced electromagnetic catapult systems (EMALS), enabling the launch of heavier and more diverse aircraft (CATOBAR - Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery). This technological advancement positions the Fujian comparably to the most advanced conventionally powered carriers globally.
The operational tempo of China's aircraft carriers is expected to increase with the commissioning of the Fujian, which will allow the PLAN's carrier strike groups to deploy more frequently. The Fujian is expected to enter service in late 2024 or 2026. The Fujian's electromagnetic catapults allow it to launch heavier aircraft, including those with anti-surface and land-attack weapons. The Fujian can also launch larger airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, such as the KJ-600, similar to the US Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye. The current primary carrier-borne fighter is the J-15 Flying Shark, with variants like the J-15D focusing on electronic warfare, showing China's intent to enhance its naval air combat capabilities. There's also progress on the J-35, a new fighter jet designed for carrier operations, which would complement or eventually replace the J-15 series. (The carriers also host Z-20) helicopters which is a medium utility helicopter with a potential doe anti-submarine warfare roles.
In November 2024, China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted its first dual-aircraft carrier operation in the South China Sea. The operation involved the PLAN's two active carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, and at least 11 other vessels. The operation demonstrated the PLAN's growing air wing and its ability to operate farther from the Chinese coast.
Developing proficient carrier-based pilots is a critical component of China's naval strategy. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has focused on training pilots capable of operating from carriers, a complex skill set requiring extensive practice. Notably, China has sought to accelerate this process by recruiting former Western military pilots to impart advanced carrier operation techniques. This approach aims to bridge the experience gap and enhance the proficiency of Chinese pilots in carrier-based operations.
China has learned naval aviation skills from many sources. The Soviet design of the Liaoning provided China with a foundational understanding of aircraft carrier operations and helped them adapt Soviet-style naval aviation for their own use. China adapted the Sukhoi Su-33 fighter design to create the Shenyang J-15, a carrier-capable aircraft tailored for the Liaoning and Shandong carriers. China has a fairly robust training cadre involving land-based simulators before transitioning to carrier-based operations. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) established dedicated naval aviation academies to train pilots in takeoffs, landings, and combat operations specific to aircraft carriers. Reports indicate that China has recruited retired military aviators, including British and other Western carrier-trained pilots, to fast-track their learning curve. These experts have provided valuable insights into advanced operational techniques and carrier air wing integration. Former civilian instructors and private contractors were allegedly employed to teach fundamental and advanced techniques related to naval aviation. China closely observed the operations of U.S. and other foreign carriers during joint exercises, deployments, and conflicts. Chinese vessels have followed U.S. carrier strike groups during their regional deployments to study their formation, logistics, and operations. Finally, there are open source materials such as hours and hours of YouTube videos that give tactics and training methods of carrier operation and even carrier based piloting available.
Despite these advancements, China faces challenges in matching the operational capabilities of established naval powers like the United States. The U.S. Navy's extensive experience and larger fleet provide a significant advantage in carrier operations. China's relatively nascent carrier program must overcome a steep learning curve to achieve comparable operational proficiency.
Looking ahead, China plans to expand its carrier fleet, with reports indicating the construction of additional carriers, including potential nuclear-powered vessels. This expansion aligns with China's broader objective to develop a blue-water navy capable of sustained operations across the globe, thereby enhancing its strategic influence in international waters.
Conclusion:
While China's naval aviation capabilities have advanced considerably, they remain in their formative stages compared to established naval powers like the United States. The challenges of operational proficiency, pilot training, and carrier technology persist, but China’s commitment to overcoming these hurdles is evident in its investments and strategic planning. With the launch of newer, more advanced carriers and a focus on training proficient carrier-based pilots, China is steadily building a blue-water navy capable of projecting power globally. As the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to develop, its trajectory will significantly influence the balance of power in the maritime domain, signaling the dawn of a new era in naval competition.
SOURCES:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-flexing-its-aircraft-carrier-muscles-all-over-asia-212909
https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-aircraft-carriers-play-theatrical-role-pose-little-threat-yet-2023-05-05/
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202411/15/WS6736f127a310f1265a1cda0d.html#:~:text=On%20Nov%2023%2C%202012%2C%20pilot,defense%20to%20far%2Dsea%20defense
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_aircraft_carrier_Liaoning#:~:text=The%20Chinese%20carrier%20aircraft%20inventory,and%20anti%2Dsubmarine%20patrol%20aircraft
https://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-more-to-learn-to-match-us-2024-5#:~:text=As%20China%20continues%20to%20build,actually%20doing%20the%20operations%20themselves
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202405/1311543.shtml
https://chinapower.csis.org/aircraft-carrier/#:~:text=Two%20months%20after%20the%20ship,Liaoning%20is%20now%20combat%20ready
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Articles/Article-Display/Article/2842336/chinas-domestic-aircraft-carrier-program-modernization-and-challenges/#:~:text=After%20the%20first%20successful%20launches,of%20the%20Chinese%20Communist%20Party
https://defenseopinion.com/chinas-long-march-toward-aircraft-carrier-capability/597/
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-vs-chinese-navy-aircraft-carriers-2024-5#:~:text=With%20vessels%20from%20follow%2Don,those%20of%20the%20US%20Navy
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-09-07/navy-affiliated-academic-confirms-chinas-plan-for-two-more-aircraft-carriers-101602169.html#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Department%20of%20Defense%20also%20said,by%202024%2C%20with%20additional%20carriers%20to%20follow.''
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-chinas-aircraft-carriers-compare-to-us-navy-flattops-2020-10#:~:text=The%20latest%2C%20the%20Type%20003%20class%2C%20which,soon%20as%20the%20end%20of%20this%20year

Friday Nov 15, 2024

Summary:
In this episode, we explore the growing trends of reshoring and nearshoring, which involve bringing manufacturing operations back to a company's home country or relocating them to nearby countries. These trends are fueled by a desire for supply chain resilience, reduced reliance on foreign suppliers, and economic incentives like the Inflation Reduction Act and the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement. We present compelling statistics demonstrating the increasing popularity of these strategies, highlighting the potential for significant job creation and economic growth. We also discuss the role of government support in encouraging these shifts and the impact of technological advancements, such as automation, on making domestic production more competitive.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the primary economic and geopolitical factors driving the resurgence of reshoring and nearshoring?
How are government policies and trade agreements influencing the reshoring and nearshoring trends?
What are the future prospects for reshoring and nearshoring in the global manufacturing landscape?
Long format:
 
 
Reshoring Revolution: How Jobs Are Returning to the USA and Changing Global Trade
 
By Justin James McShane
 
TL;DR
Reshoring—bringing operations back home—and nearshoring—relocating them to nearby countries—are reshaping global supply chains. These trends are driven by the need for supply chain resilience, reduced dependency on foreign suppliers, and economic incentives like the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Reshoring has brought nearly 2 million jobs back to the U.S. since 2010, with record-breaking growth in 2023. Nearshoring, especially in Mexico, is gaining momentum, offering lower costs and logistical advantages. Together, these shifts are creating a more regionalized, diversified, and secure trade environment, powered by automation, innovation, and government support. The statistics show that nearshoring and reshoring is not only happening and will accelerate in the near term and into the future.
 
INTRODUCTION
Reshoring, the practice of bringing business operations back to their home country after having been outsourced abroad, represents a transformative shift in global supply chain dynamics. While often associated with manufacturing, reshoring increasingly encompasses service and industrial sectors, driven by the desire to reduce reliance on complex and vulnerable international supply chains. This movement aligns with broader trends of decoupling, where nations strive to strengthen domestic capabilities amidst geopolitical uncertainties and economic pressures. However, this trend has met resistance from proponents of globalization, whom I term "reshoring deniers." These individuals argue that interwoven global supply chains are irreplaceable and beneficial. This piece will explore the rising momentum of reshoring, its statistical underpinnings, and the government incentives driving this shift, as well as the closely related trend of nearshoring, which aims to bring operations closer to home while retaining certain economic advantages.
 
INFORMATION
Restoring is the practice of transferring a business operation that was moved overseas (outsourced) back to the country from which it was originally relocated. This is mostly seen in the manufacturing sector but is not exclusive to it. It includes the service and industrial sects as well. Reshoring is a feature of decoupling whereby a country seeks to remove dependence on external supply chains and their complexities. 
 
Some folks, in particular globalists who believe in interconnection between countries and intermeshed supply chains, deny that restoring is happen or that it is a “good” idea. I call them restoring deniers. Globalization is a historical process that describes the increasing connection between the world's economies, cultures, and populations. It's characterized by the movement of goods, services, capital, people, and ideas across borders. The term became more common in the 1980s due to technological advances that made it easier to conduct international transactions.
 
RESHORING FROM A STATISTICAL POINT OF VIEW
Here are the facts and the sources. What are yours other than your own personal experience?
 
The rate of reshoring in the United States has been increasing, with a record number of jobs announced in the first half of 2023.
 
2022: Reshored jobs increased by 25% compared to 2021. 2023: The Reshoring Initiative reported 182,000 jobs announced in the first half of 2023, which is more than the 340,000 jobs announced in the same period in 2022. Cumulative jobs: Since 2010, nearly two million jobs have been brought back, which is about 40% of what was lost to offshoring.
 
The Chips and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law have incentivized domestic production.
 
Kearney, a global management consulting firm, revealed in a survey that 96% of CEOs are now evaluating reshoring their operations, or have done so already.
 
THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT INCENTIVIZES RESHORING
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) incentivizes reshoring by US companies by providing significant tax credits and subsidies for domestic manufacturing of clean energy technologies, like electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels, essentially making it more financially attractive for companies to produce these goods within the United States rather than overseas, thereby encouraging them to bring manufacturing back to the country (reshoring) to access these benefits. The IRA offers substantial tax credits specifically for companies that invest in domestic clean energy manufacturing, making it more cost-effective to produce these goods within the US. The incentives are designed to encourage the production of components within the US, not just the final assembled product, which helps to build a stronger domestic supply chain. By incentivizing domestic manufacturing, the IRA is expected to create new jobs in the clean energy sector across the country.
 
THE FUTURE FOR RESHORING
In the future, reshoring is expected to continue gaining momentum, with companies increasingly bringing manufacturing back to their home countries, driven by factors like geopolitical tensions, advancements in automation, and a growing preference for locally produced goods, leading to a more balanced approach to global supply chains with a focus on regional manufacturing and diversification of risk rather than complete reliance on offshore production; this could involve "near-shoring" to nearby countries with favorable conditions, and will likely require government support through policies that incentivize domestic manufacturing and workforce development. Reshoring is likely to become more prevalent as companies prioritize supply chain resilience and seek to mitigate risks associated with global disruptions. Automation and advanced manufacturing technologies will play a crucial role in making domestic production cost-competitive, enabling reshoring in industries previously considered too expensive to bring back. Instead of solely focusing on bringing production entirely back to the home country, companies may adopt a "China plus one" strategy, where they manufacture in multiple regions to diversify their supply chains (nearshoring). 
 
NEARSHORING
Nearshoring is a business strategy that involves moving a company's operations from an offshore location to a nearby country or region, often to take advantage of lower labor costs, a similar time zone, and a shared culture. Nearshoring can help companies reduce lead times, improve quality control, and minimize supply chain disruptions. It can also help companies save money on labor, avoid language barriers, and tap into a global talent pool. Popular nearshoring destinations for US companies include Mexico, Canada, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. The trend of nearshoring has gained momentum in recent years, especially after supply chain disruptions during and after the pandemic. In late 2022, American manufacturers purchased more goods from nearshore countries than from China for the first time.
 
NEARSHORING STATISTICS
In 2021, 92% of U.S. manufacturing executives considered nearshoring or reshoring, up from 78% the previous year. Of those, 47% had already nearshored, 29% planned to nearshore in the next three years, and 16% were considering reshoring. US buyers prefer nearshoring over domestic sourcing. Only 20% of US buyers reported increasing domestic sourcing in the past 12 months. A Deloitte 2024 survey found that 62% of manufacturers have started nearshoring or reshoring their production. Mexico has become the source of the most imports to the United States, surpassing China. In 2022, 52.5% of Mexico's imports of parts and accessories for motor vehicles came from the U.S. 
 
USMCA INCENTIVIZES TO NEARSHORING BY US COMPANIES
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) incentivizes nearshoring by US companies in several ways. The USMCA reduces trade barriers and simplifies customs clearance procedures. The USMCA encourages manufacturers to source components and raw materials from North America. This can help companies secure a reliable source of materials and avoid supply chain bottlenecks. The USMCA allows qualified products to be imported to the US from Mexico without incurring duties or taxes. Mexico has a de minimis tax-free threshold of US $50 and a tariff-free entry threshold of US $117. This frees a larger volume of trade from taxes, duties, and fees. The Mexican government expects U.S. nearshoring operations to grow the country’s economy by 3.5%. Manufacturing exports from Mexico are expected to grow from $455 billion in 2023 to $609 billion by 2028. From January to November 2023, Chinese goods accounted for 13.9 % of U.S. imports, while Mexican goods accounted for 15%. Sectors that benefit from the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) are expected to grow by $38 billion in the next five years thanks to nearshoring.
 
CONCLUSION
The reshoring and nearshoring movement reflects a fundamental recalibration of global supply chain strategies, underscoring the necessity for resilience and adaptability in a rapidly changing economic and geopolitical landscape. Supported by substantial government incentives, such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, reshoring and nearshoring initiatives are empowering companies to reduce risks, cut costs, and build stronger domestic and regional production networks. These strategies not only create jobs and stimulate economic growth but also signal a shift toward a more balanced global trade environment. As automation and advanced technologies continue to evolve, reshoring and nearshoring are poised to play central roles in redefining the future of global manufacturing and supply chain management, ensuring that nations can navigate uncertainties with greater stability and independence.
 
SOURCES:
 
https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/trade-and-geopolitics/china-decoupling-vs-de-risking/#:~:text=Decoupling%20refers%20to%20a%20complete,and%20potential%20weaponization%20of%20energy
 
https://reshorenow.org/content/pdf/Reshoring_Initiative_2023_Annual_Report.pdf
 
https://stispfa.org/reshoring-unpacked-a-transformational-shift-from-global-to-local/#:~:text=Are%20Companies%20Actually%20Reshoring?,2023%2C%20resulting%20in%20365%2C000%20jobs
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimvinoski/2024/01/25/covid-is-fading-but-reshoring-isnt/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIn%20the%20face%20of%20a,be%20associated%20with%20onshore%20production.%E2%80%9D
 
https://optimation.us/blogs/manufacturing-trends-in-2024-its-all-about-reshoring/#:~:text=In%20addition%20to%20bringing%20back,a%20risk%20associated%20with%20this
 
https://stispfa.org/reshoring-unpacked-a-transformational-shift-from-global-to-local/#:~:text=Are%20Companies%20Actually%20Reshoring?,2023%2C%20resulting%20in%20365%2C000%20jobs
 
https://reshorenow.org/content/pdf/Reshoring_Initiative_2023_Annual_Report.pdf
 
https://manufacturing-today.com/news/why-the-reshoring-renaissance-is-the-future-of-u-s-manufacturing/#:~:text=Looking%20ahead%2C%20the%20reshoring%20trend,consumer%20preference%20for%20local%20products
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyshih/2023/02/22/the-inflation-reduction-act-will-bring-some-manufacturing-back-to-the-us/#:~:text=What%20all%20this%20means%20is%20that%20it,to%20be%20shown%20below%20the%20EBITDA%20line
 
https://www.wri.org/insights/inflation-reduction-act-anniversary-manufacturing-resurgence#:~:text=At%20a%20factory%20in%20Jonesboro,were%20announced%20in%2044%20states
 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1830#:~:text=First%2C%20the%20Inflation%20Reduction%20Act%20provides%20targeted,create%20opportunity%20in%20communities%20across%20the%20country.&text=By%20creating%20incentives%20for%20paying%20prevailing%20wages,allow%20workers%20to%20earn%20while%20they%20learn
 
https://morelle.house.gov/funding-opportunities/inflation-reduction-act-consumers#:~:text=The%20Inflation%20Reduction%20Act%20is,per%20year%20in%20energy%20costs
 
https://www.fticonsulting.com/insights/articles/return-manufacturing-north-americas-reshoring-movement
 
https://www.columbiathreadneedle.co.uk/en/inst/insights/us-inflation-reduction-act-a-strong-force-to-accelerate-energy-transition-technologies/#:~:text=The%20act%20primarily%20aims%20to%20support%20US,chain%20of%20clean%20energy%20and%20transportation%20technologies
 
https://www.mholland.com/market-insights/inflation-reduction-act-will-spark-north-american-manufacturing-renaissance#:~:text=Inflation%20Reduction%20Act%20Will%20Spark,increased%20innovation%20and%20industrial%20productivity.%E2%80%9D
 
https://stispfa.org/government-incentives-fuel-us-reshoring-recovery/#:~:text=Inflation%20Reducation%20Act,Tilly%2C%20and%20an%20AMT%20webinar
 
https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/analyst-comment/analyst-comment-reshoring-nearshoring-is-the-future/#:~:text=In%20the%20coming%20years%2C%20reshoring,chain%20disruptions%20and%20boost%20competitiveness
 
https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/reshoring-the-future-of-supply-chains#:~:text=It's%20becoming%20less%20chain%2Dlike,economic%20challenges%20we're%20seeing.&text=Ultimately%2C%20the%20decision%20to%20relocate,some%20sort%20of%20competitive%20advantage
 
https://www.automate.org/industry-insights/reshoring-and-nearshoring-trends-making-north-america-competitive#:~:text=Both%20reshoring%20and%20foreign%20direct,Automation%20and%20Reshoring%20Initiative%C2%AE
 
https://www.nmb-t.com/resources/blog-post/reshoring-manufacturing-creates-production-jobs#:~:text=Reshoring%20manufacturing%20gained%20significant%20traction,continue%20in%202023%20and%20beyond
 
https://www.fticonsulting.com/insights/articles/return-manufacturing-north-americas-reshoring-movement#:~:text=Long%2Dterm%20Projections,2022%2C%20largely%20attributed%20to%20nearshoring.&text=However%2C%20this%20shift%20doesn't,manufacturing%20strategy%20to%20diversify%20risks
 
https://www.up.com/customers/track-record/tr110723-what-is-nearshoring-shipping-to-from-mexico.htm#:~:text=Nearshoring%20is%20a%20business%20strategy,production%20from%20China%20to%20Mexico
 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectives-events/publications/2023/05/whitepaper_nearshoring_fnl.pdf?rev=0383024119224587a4a922b07f9632bd#:~:text=Nearshoring%20is%20an%20economic%20trend,reducing%20costs%20and%20improving%20efficiency
 
https://productdistributionstrategy.com/nearhsoring-statistics/#:~:text=References-,U.S.%20Nearshoring%20Statistics%20In%20the%20Western%20Hemisphere,prospect%20of%20reshoring%20their%20operations
 
https://blog.qima.com/traceability/nearshoring-reshoring-trends
 
https://www.shippingsolutions.com/blog/u.s.-companies-reshoring-and-nearshoring#:~:text=A%20recent%20Deloitte%20survey%20found%20that%2062%,started%20reshoring%20or%20nearshoring%20their%20production%20capacities
 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/usmca-and-nearshoring-the-triggers-of-trade-and-investment-dynamics-in-north-america/#:~:text=Mexican%20exports%20incorporate%20inputs%20with,%2C%20this%20number%20was%2012.7%25.&text=This%20underscores%20the%20role%20the,while%20Canada%20supplied%20approximately%205.9%25.&text=So%2Dcalled%20%E2%80%9CFactory%20Asia%E2%80%9D,Malaysia%2C%20Taiwan%2C%20and%20Vietnam.&text=This%20is%20particularly%20evident%20in,manufacturing%20(see%20Figure%202)
 
https://www.controleng.com/articles/reshoring-nearshoring-trends-making-north-american-manufacturing-competitive/#:~:text=Mexico%20has%20exceeded%20China%20as,energy%20to%20railways%20and%20ports
 
https://novalinkmx.com/2024/09/26/leverage-nearshoring-in-mexico-for-a-competitive-advantage/#:~:text=Rules%20of%20Origin,tensions%20or%20international%20shipping%20delays
 
https://www.averitt.com/blog/ultimate-guide-nearshoring-reshoring#:~:text=The%20practice%20of%20nearshoring%20has,procedures%20and%20reducing%20trade%20barriers
 
https://www.taylor.com/blog/nearshoring-in-mexico-has-transformed-manufacturing#:~:text=3:%20Favorable%20Trade%20Agreements,to%20be%20friendly%20and%20stable
 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/external/document/X7FIB1NK000000/commercial-professional-perspective-nearshoring-to-mexico-opport#:~:text=De%20Minimis%20Threshold%20(USMCA%20Ch.&text=Mexico%20has%20implemented%20a%20US,of%20the%20US%20($800)

EP80: The Future of Guyana

Friday Nov 15, 2024

Friday Nov 15, 2024


Summary:
In this episode, we examine the potential for growth in Guyana due to its recent oil discoveries. While the country's economic prospects appear promising, it faces various challenges, including poverty, emigration of skilled workers, limited infrastructure, and political instability. We explore the social and economic indicators for Guyana, its oil and gas sector, its taxation system, and its potential for investment. Ultimately, we argue that Guyana's future depends on its ability to effectively manage these issues and leverage its oil revenues responsibly to become a relevant player on the global stage.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
1. What are the most significant challenges that Guyana faces in its quest to manage its newfound wealth responsibly?
2. How will Guyana's growing oil and gas sector impact the country's economic, social, and environmental landscapes in the years to come?
3. What are the key strategies Guyana must implement to successfully transition from a raw commodity exporter to a more diversified and value-added nation?
Long format:
 The Future of Guyana
TL;DR
Guyana has vast potential for growth thanks to major oil discoveries, which could help it become more modern and relevant globally. However, the country faces significant challenges like high poverty, brain drain, limited infrastructure, and political instability. Success depends on effectively managing these issues and leveraging oil revenues responsibly. If Guyana can do this, it may secure a stronger economic future and serve as a model for other small, resource-rich countries.
Introduction
Guyana, a small yet resource-rich nation on the northeastern coast of South America, stands at a critical juncture in its development. Following a series of major oil discoveries, the country now possesses an extraordinary potential to transform its economy and improve the quality of life for its citizens. However, this newfound wealth comes with its own set of challenges, ranging from a high poverty rate and emigration of skilled professionals to infrastructural limitations and political stability concerns. These factors will play a decisive role in shaping whether Guyana can leverage its resources to overcome poverty, curb the brain drain, and expand its influence within the hemisphere. This report delves into the many facets of Guyana’s evolving landscape, exploring its economic outlook, demographic profile, and infrastructure needs.
INFORMATION 
Thanks to major oil discoveries Guyana has the POTENTIAL of developing itself into a more modern country. However, it does have significant headwinds. While it will not become a regional power player, it will likely join the ranks of relevant countries in the hemisphere. THE WORLD BANK HAS WRITTEN “The country is expected to remain one of the fastest growing economies with double-digit growth rates in 2023 and 2024 as additional oil fields start operation.”
WHERE IS GUYANA AND ITS BASIC STATISTICS?
Guyana is a country in the northeast of South America, on the Atlantic Ocean coast. Suriname to the east, Brazil to the south and southwest, and Venezuela to the west. It has 215,000 square kilometers, making it the third-smallest sovereign state in mainland South America. Its population of approximately 800,000 largely live along the northern coast. The interior is steppe, jungle and plains with mountains. Guyana is known for its many rivers, which is how it got its name, meaning "land of many waters". It's also home to Kaieteur Falls, the world's largest single-drop waterfall. English is the official language of Guyana which is interestingly the only South American country where English as the official language. Historically, it was part of the British Empire gaining its independence in 1966. They drive on the left.
POVERTY
Poverty is a significant issue in Guyana, with a high poverty rate and limited access to basic services in rural areas. Guyana's poverty rate is high, with the World Bank estimating that 48% of the population live in poverty. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reported that in 2017, 41.2% of the population lived on less than $5.50 per day. 
NEET RATE
In 2019, Guyana's NEET (not in education, employment, or training) rate for youth was 45.66%. NEET is the percentage of young people in a given age group who are not in education, employment, or training. For comparison purposes, in Latin America in 2023, 25.9% of young women were NEET, compared to 13.5% of young men
BRAIN DRAIN
Guyana's brain drain is the emigration of skilled and educated professionals from the country, which has had a significant impact on the country's ability to develop. Guyana has one of the highest emigration rates in the world, with over 55% of its citizens living abroad. More than 80% of Guyanese with a tertiary education have left the country. This is a significant issue for the future.
DEMOGRAPHIC CONCERNS
The proper way to look at whether or not a country is in demographic decline is to look at three variables: Total Fertility Rate (TFR), infant mortality rate and life expectancy. Ideally, you want a TFR is above the minimum replacement rate which is 2.1. You want a low mortality rate because having a high TFR but also a high infant mortality rate, then you will be in demographic decline. Thinking very myopically and morbidly, you do not want a long life expectancy because you will have a lot of non-working/non-producing folks that need to be supported.
The 2022 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Guyana is at 2.37 which is above the required 2.1 replacement rate to avoid demographic decline. However, it has declined a lot since the 1960s where it was 6.0.
And when we look at Guyanese TFR versus other countries, we see the following: 
The infant mortality rate is shrinking well and is comparative to other developed countries as shown below:
INFRASTRUCTURE
Guyana's infrastructure is experiencing significant growth, but there are still challenges, particularly in rural areas. Guyana's digital infrastructure is limited, especially in rural areas. The country's terrain makes it difficult to deploy the necessary infrastructure for universal broadband access. Satellite internet providers are expected to play a key role in connecting rural communities. The coastal main road system is not continuous, and there are gaps where rivers intersect. People and goods move across these gaps by ferry, the Demerara Harbour Bridge, and the Berbice Bridge. Guyana is experiencing a construction boom, but there are several challenges. These include a shortage of skilled labor, regulatory challenges, corruption, and bureaucratic red tape. China is very heavily involved in this construction boom. Guyana is a formal part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.
ECONOMY
The Guyanese economy is dominated by oil and gas. It will be discussed in its own section. Guyana's economy is heavily dependent on exporting six commodities: sugar, gold, bauxite, shrimp, timber, and rice. These commodities make up nearly 60% of the country's GDP. Mineral fuels, oils, and distillation products make up 54% of Guyana's total exports. Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, and equipment make up 30% of Guyana's total exports. Non-traditional exports include value-added wood products, seafood, light manufacturing, garments and textiles, tourism, horticultural products and agro-processing, wood, ceramic and woven handicrafts, information and communications technology, and processed foods.
Major export products: Crude Petroleum 85.9% ($15.9B), Gold 7.36% ($1.36B), Rice 2.32% ($429M), Aluminium Ore 1.04% ($192M), and Hard Liquor 0.65% ($120M). (2022)
Export partners: US$18.5 billion; Panama 31.6%, Netherlands 15.5%, United States 12.8%, United Arab Emirates 6.39%, and Italy 6.35%. (2022)
GDP
Guyana's GDP in 2022 was $14.48 billion, and its GDP per capita was $16,777. In 2022, Guyana's GDP growth rate was 57.80%. In 2022, Guyana's real GDP was $4,608,724,292. Guyana's economy has experienced a period of double-digit GDP growth since the discovery of large offshore oil deposits in 2019. 
UNEMPLOYMENT
As of 2023, Guyana's unemployment rate was 12.43%. This is the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed but available and looking for work. In 2023, Guyana's youth unemployment rate was 25.87%. This is the percentage of the labor force aged 15–24 that is unemployed but available and looking for work. IN 2020 it was 15.7%, in 2021 14.93% and 2022 12.43.%
EDUCATION LEVEL AND NUMBER OF UNIVERSITIES
Guyana's average education level is 9 years of schooling. A child who starts school at age 4 can expect to complete 12.2 years of school by age 18. In 2022, Guyana's literacy rate was 90.03%. In 2019, 4.469% of the population over 25 had at least a bachelor's degree or equivalent. Only 2% of children of the official primary school age are out of school. There are at least 11 universities and colleges in Guyana and 8 post secondary education trade schools.
LABOR FORCE
Guyana's workforce is made up of people ages 15 and older who are employed or looking for work in the production of goods and services. The workforce is diverse, with a relatively young population and a narrowing gender gap. The majority of workers are employed in the private sector, with a significant number working in the not-for-profit sector. In 2023, the labor force participation rate was 62.5% for men and 39.6% for women. This is higher than the labor force participation rate in high income countries. Guyana's education system has improved, leading to a more skilled workforce. However, there is a shortage of specialized skills in technical and vocational areas.
THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR
The future prospects of Guyanese oil and gas is pretty impressive. In 2021, most of the oil was sold to Asian countries, including China and India, while shipments to Europe accounted for around 16% of the total. In 2022, that dynamic has radically changed. While Asian buyers remain important, Europe has assumed the lion’s share of buying of Guyanese crude. From January to early September, it is estimated that cargoes to Europe, average 110,000 bpd, account for 49% of the Caribbean country’s oil exports. In 2023, Guyana produced around 142.9 million barrels of oil, or approximately 391,000 barrels per day. This is five times more than the amount of oil produced in 2020. Guyana's oil production in 2024 is estimated to be around 228 million barrels. This is a significant increase from 2023, when Guyana produced 68.7 million barrels in the same period. Exxon plans to increase its crude oil production by 18,000 b/d from the Unity platform. So it is booming.
But there are issues brewing and overflowing. There are several issues and arbitration in the oil and gas industry in Guyana, including:
Chevron and ExxonMobil's dispute over Hess Chevron and ExxonMobil are involved in arbitration over a disputed stake in a Guyana oil field: 
Background: Chevron proposed a $53 billion takeover of Hess Corporation, which owns a 30% stake in the Guyana oil project. ExxonMobil, which operates the field with a 45% stake, claims a right of first refusal on Hess's stake. ExxonMobil is concerned that the merger could be a way to transfer assets, which would give ExxonMobil the right to buy out Hess's share.
Arbitration: An arbitration hearing has been scheduled for May 2025. The companies are confident that the arbitration will confirm that a right of first refusal does not apply to the merger.
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is involved in arbitration over the Stabroek oilfield in Guyana in connection with a proposed merger between Chevron and Hess. CNOOC and ExxonMobil, which own 25% and 45% of the Stabroek block, respectively, are disputing the terms of their joint operating agreement. They claim a right of first refusal to Hess's stake in the block, which is a key part of the merger. CNOOC filed an arbitration application on March 15, 2024, and ExxonMobil and CNOOC merged their arbitration claims into a single case on March 26, 2024. The arbitration threatens to delay or even derail the merger, which was originally scheduled to close by October 2024. Chevron and Hess have agreed to extend the timeline by a year if the arbitration continues.
NATIONAL RESOURCE FUND
In 2019, Guyana created a Natural Resource Fund to help manage its wealth. The fund's resources are deposited in a bank in New York, and the parliament approves annual transfers to the national budget. It is funded by revenue from oil, gas, and mineral extraction, including: profit oil, royalties, and income tax or corporate income tax. The NRF is managed by the Ministry of Finance, which provides the Bank of Guyana with an Investment Mandate. The Bank of Guyana then manages the fund's operations. 
POLITICAL STABILITY
Guyana has a history where political stability was challenged by ethnic divisions between the Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese communities, which has largely shaped the political landscape. The 1992 elections marked a shift towards more democratic governance with international oversight, but stability has been tested by election disputes in subsequent years. The 2020 elections in Guyana were highly contentious, leading to a significant political crisis due to allegations of electoral fraud. However, international pressure, legal proceedings, and recounts eventually led to the acceptance of the results by the major political parties, indicating a resilience in the democratic process despite initial turmoil. Guyana's World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism estimate for 2022 was around 0.02706, which suggests a relatively neutral stance in terms of stability, with a percentile rank improving to 58.02%. Political parties in Guyana are still largely organized along ethnic lines, which can lead to social and political tension, although recent political engagements have shown some signs of thawing.
CORRUPTION
Guyana has an average score of 40 and is ranked 87 out of 180 countries for the fourth consecutive year on the Corruption Perceptions Index. Leading the regional rankings are Uruguay and Canada, each with a score of 74, followed by the United States with 69. In Venezuela (14), Haiti (17) and Nicaragua (19), the countries with the lowest scores, it is difficult to draw a line between public institutions and criminal activities. There's a noted public perception of corruption, which impacts political stability. The government's handling of oil wealth and anti-corruption measures will be crucial for future stability.
HOW TO EXAMINE INVESTING IN FOREIGN CAPITAL PROJECTS or FDI
Here are some of my bigger take aways:
Whenever you are going to make a capital investment in a foreign market as especially when it involves property, you’d do well to consider several things: respect for the rule of law for private property ownership and stability of the regime. Primarily, one looks for how long entrenched and how well developed the legal system is with respect to private property ownership and especially foreign ownership of property.  You are also, of course, concerned about taxation. Finally, NIMBY related issues should be considered.
Here is what I found:
RESPECT FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
In summary, Guyana's constitution protects the right of foreigners to own property and land in the country. However, the property rights system in Guyana is complex and can be convoluted. 
Guyana’s property rights framework comprises two distinct registries—the Deeds Registry and the Land Registry—with differing legal bases, leading to bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of transparency, and public mistrust. This system complicates property ownership transfers and deters foreign investment due to lengthy procedures and unreliable documentation. Foreign and domestic banks avoid mortgages in the traditional sense, viewing property-based loans as reputational consumer loans due to unreliable registry records and costly foreclosure processes. This undermines the potential for using property as collateral in financing, which is critical for capital-intensive sectors like oil and gas.
The Local Content Act (adopted in 2021) and the Investment Act of 2004 further fortifies this protection for investments and stipulates non-discrimination between foreign and domestic investors. In Guyana, the Local Content Act (LCA) of 2021 prioritizes the use of Guyanese goods, services, and workforce within the oil and gas sector, essentially forcing foreign companies operating in the industry to partner with local businesses and build local capacity, while the Investment Act of 2004 provides a broader framework for attracting foreign investment, ensuring that both local and foreign companies have a legal environment to operate within, although the LCA sets specific requirements for oil and gas operations to prioritize local participation. Companies operating in the oil and gas sector must submit local content plans outlining how they will meet the stipulated quotas, potentially impacting contract awards based on their commitment to local content. 
Key to me is that The Investment Act provides legal protections and guarantees to foreign investors, aiming to attract international companies to Guyana's oil and gas sector while still ensuring local participation through the LCA. According to Guyana's Investment Act, foreign investors are protected by guarantees such as the right to freely repatriate profits and dividends, non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic investors, the ability to employ foreign personnel when necessary, and the right to seek international arbitration in case of disputes such as International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
<<<As an aside, the Guayanize government is very aggressive in trying to get oil and gas folks to “co-invest” in other industries. Like they will not leave you alone about it. The Government of Guyana is providing incentives for investments in sectors like agriculture, business support services, healthcare, information technology, manufacturing, and energy, particularly in remote areas. These incentives are administered through the Guyana Office for Investment (GOINVEST). >>>>
TAXATION
Entities engaged in petroleum activities would normally be taxed at a rate of 25% corporation tax as a non-commercial company. Other entities are taxed more or less as outlined here: https://www.grantthornton.aw/contentassets/e2c0e51bfb8f487b909dbc5420db05d3/tax_guyana-oil--gas-2022.pdf
Briefly…
Corporation Tax: Companies in the petroleum sector are taxed at 25% as non-commercial entities, with a dual rate (25% and 40%) applied for those involved in both commercial and non-commercial activities. Quarterly advance taxes are mandatory, and audited financial statements are required for filing. Expenses for income production are deductible, and losses can be carried forward indefinitely.
Capital Gains Tax: A 20% rate applies to gains from asset disposal held over a year, with losses available for offset for up to 24 years.
Withholding Taxes: Payments to non-residents, including dividends, interest, royalties, and rents, are generally taxed at 20%. Treaties with Canada, the UK, and CARICOM allow for reduced rates in certain scenarios.
VAT: A 20% VAT applies to most goods and services, while essential items and exports are exempt. VAT registration is mandatory for taxable activities exceeding GYD 15,000,000 (about $70,000 USD) annually.
Import Duties: Range from 5-150%, with exemptions available for specific cases, like temporary imports.
Wage Tax and National Insurance: Employers must withhold income tax and contribute to National Insurance. Employee income up to GYD 1,800,000 is taxed at 28%, and amounts beyond that at 40%.
Property Tax: Rates vary based on property valuation, starting from 0.5% for values exceeding GYD 40,000,000 ($190,000 USD).
INFRASTURCTURE 
This is from my personal observations from when I went there. The country has a low percentage of paved roads, and the road network is aging and needs to be expanded. The main shipping port is congested, which affects imports, exports, and consumers. Guyana has frequent and unpredictable electrical outages, and I am told high electricity costs. Internet and telecommunications at the level that we take for granted here in the US is few and far between. There is a complete lack of a deepwater port, massively outdated infrastructure and a near total lack of road safety features.
NIMBY
While Guyana does not have a large or widely established environmental lobby, there is a growing movement of citizens and activists actively campaigning against the development of oil and gas, particularly focused on challenging ExxonMobil's operations and pushing for stricter environmental regulations, highlighting the work of lawyers like Melinda Janki who are leading legal battles against oil drilling in the country. This can be considered a developing environmental lobby against oil and gas development in Guyana, but it has not gathered too much steam and the money being generated is real and accounts for over 50% of the country’s budget.
GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN
If one is a structuralist in terms of economic development and adheres to Rostow's five stages of economic growth, then clearly Guyana is in the “take off stage” as it meets all of the conditions for take-off but certainly is not in the drive to maturity, maturity or age of mass consumption stages yet. 
Right now Guyana sits at the second lowest stage of the Global Value Chain (GVC) as a pure raw commodity exporter. To move up the GVC to the next level which is manufacturing and/or processed/refined commodity exporter is through the well known process of focusing on and providing:
Improving coordination
Governments must create a clear vision and ensure the private sector is involved and capital is deployed in an efficient and controlled manner. What activities will be incentivized through reduced taxation, grants, preferential loans and the like and what activities will be “punished” through strict regulation and/or taxation needs to be very clearly defined and outlined. 
Attracting investment
Opening borders and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) will help countries enter GVCs and advance up the GVC ladder. 
Improving infrastructure
Countries must invest in modernizing communications, roads, railways, and ports.
Reducing border delays
Small steps like speeding up customs can help countries transition from commodity exports to basic manufacturing.
Upgrading processes and products
Countries can improve efficiency by adopting better technology, or upgrade the quality of their products by using higher quality materials or through the use of domestic design. 
Investing in education and training
Countries must invest in education and vocational training to complement their GVC strategies.
Comment:
What appears to be lacking is the first essential element: a unified vision. By self-admission, the government seems to be focused on attracting FDI which it does very well in the oil and gas sector, but not so well outside of that sector. It is making a major priority that one can see in infrastructure. Over the course of a year one can truly see the wide scale construction of roads and bridges, even the port is being improved, the electrical grid and basic as well as advanced electricity delivery has improved much and telecommunication and internet availability and quality (speed of data transfer) has improved a lot. Starlink has been invaluable although it is expensive for the average Guyanan. The average Guyanan in Georgetown (the capital) can be seen with a cell phone certainly and even the poor are seen largely with cell phones in hand in Georgetown. The two main carriers are Digicel and GT&T mobile. They have areas of 5G coverage even. Outside of Georgetown, there is no cell phone coverage. But also, in fairness, there’s not a lot of people outside of Georgetown and the coastal north. A satellite phone is your only option outside of the Georgetown area. 
When asked about a vision, officials in the government focus on infrastructure and FDI in oil and gas. When prompted to discuss moving towards thoughts of manufacturing or processed/refined commodity exporter activities, the attitude seems to be best summed up as “we’ll get there”. 
But one must openly ask if there is no vision beyond the immediate construction related tasks how one can expect to advance beyond being merely a raw commodity exporter?
Conclusion
In sum, Guyana's future hinges on its ability to navigate the complex interplay between rapid economic growth and the structural issues that have long hindered its progress. With its impressive GDP growth, driven by the booming oil and gas sector, Guyana could be on the cusp of becoming a more prosperous and modern nation. Yet, realizing this potential will require strong governance, substantial investment in education and infrastructure, and effective management of natural resources. If Guyana can address its developmental and social challenges, it may set a precedent for other small, resource-rich nations aspiring to leverage newfound wealth for national growth and stability. Guyana’s journey will be one to watch as it strives to become a relevant player on the global stage.
Sources:
https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/guyana/#:~:text=Guyana's%20constitution%20protects%20the%20rights,legally%20protected%20under%20the%20LCA
https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191160.htm#:~:text=Right%20to%20Private%20Ownership%20and,report%20much%20longer%20processing%20times
https://webimages.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Guyana-Property-Rights-Study.pdf
https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/guyana/
https://theintercept.com/2023/06/18/guyana-exxon-mobil-oil-drilling/#:~:text=The%20local%20attorney%20on%20the,people%2C%20by%20the%20people.%E2%80%9D
https://antoniajuhasz.net/interview/the-quest-to-defuse-guyanas-carbon-bomb/#:~:text=We%20speak%20with%20Guyanese%20environmental%20lawyer%20Melinda,1%20million%20barrels%20of%20oil%20a%20day%2C
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guyana/overview#:~:text=the%20Atlantic%20coast.-,Guyana's%20GDP%20per%20capita%20is%20rapidly%20increasing%20due%20to%20oil,additional%20oil%20fields%20start%20operation
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guyana/overview#:~:text=Guyana%20has%20experienced%20a%20decline,services%E2%80%93remain%20in%20Guyana's%20hinterland
https://borgenproject.org/poverty-in-guyana-2/#:~:text=The%20poverty%20rate%20is%20high,trained%20professionals%20in%20the%20country
https://borgenproject.org/world-banks-efforts-in-guyana/#:~:text=The%20country's%20heavy%20dependency%20on,2016%2C%20focusing%20on%20three%20areas
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/guyana/#:~:text=Guyana's%20emigration%20rate%20is%20among,HIV%20treatment%20and%20prevention%20programs
https://home.fau.edu/peralta/web/facs/braindrain.pdf
https://www.instagram.com/guyana_tapestry/reel/DAicWPfRxKi/#:~:text=Now%2C%20economists%20generally%20define%20brain%20drain%20as,educated%20professional%20people%20from%20a%20country%20and
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/guyana-discovery-oil-labor-migration-climate-displacement#:~:text=Though%20Guyana's%20history%20as%20first,education%20living%20and%20working%20abroad
https://books.openedition.org/obp/8158#:~:text=A%20perfect%20storm%20of%20post,reasons%20why%20we%20leave%20Guyana
https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/guyana-infrastructure-sector#:~:text=Guyana%20%2D%20Infrastructure%20Sector&text=The%20Ministry%20of%20Public%20Works,with%20well%2Dconnected%20existing%20companies
https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/guyana-digital-economy#:~:text=While%20progress%20is%20being%20made,to%20rural%20and%20isolated%20communities
https://www.guyanabusinessconference.com/ibc-news/guyanas-construction-boom-opens-up-opportunities-road-ahead#:~:text=Challenges%20in%20the%20Construction%20Boom&text=One%20of%20the%20most%20pressing,sector%20must%20tackle%20head%2Don
https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/guyana-digital-economy#:~:text=While%20progress%20is%20being%20made,to%20rural%20and%20isolated%20communities
https://www.guyanabusinessconference.com/ibc-news/guyanas-construction-boom-opens-up-opportunities-road-ahead#:~:text=Challenges%20in%20the%20Construction%20Boom&text=One%20of%20the%20most%20pressing,sector%20must%20tackle%20head%2Don
https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/
https://guyanainvest.gov.gy/becoming-an-exporter/
https://tradingeconomics.com/guyana/exports#:~:text=Guyana's%20main%20exports%20are:%20mineral,:%20Spain%2C%20Jamaica%20and%20Spain
https://www.britannica.com/place/Guyana/Economy#:~:text=offer%20agricultural%20credit.-,Trade,has%20its%20headquarters%20in%20Georgetown
https://tradingeconomics.com/guyana/exports#:~:text=Guyana's%20main%20exports%20are:%20mineral,:%20Spain%2C%20Jamaica%20and%20Spain
https://gfmag.com/country/guyana-gdp-country-report/#:~:text=Economic%20Boom%20Driven%20By%20Oil,and%20floods%20present%20additional%20challenges
https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/guyana-gdp/#:~:text=(Current%20US%20Dollars).,:%20World%20Bank%2C%20United%20Nations.&text=Nominal%20(current)%20Gross%20Domestic%20Product,56.6%25%20in%20GDP%20per%20capita
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1392310/gross-domestic-product-gdp-by-fiscal-year-guyana/
https://www.statista.com/statistics/808521/unemployment-rate-in-guyana/
https://tradingeconomics.com/guyana/unemployment-total-percent-of-total-labor-force-wb-data.html#:~:text=Unemployment%2C%20total%20(%25%20of%20total,Bank%20on%20November%20of%202024.&text=Unemployment%20refers%20to%20the%20share,available%20for%20and%20seeking%20employment
https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/GUY/guyana/youth-unemployment-rate#:~:text=Youth%20unemployment%20refers%20to%20the,a%204.32%25%20increase%20from%202019
https://www.worldeconomics.com/Indicator-Data/ESG/Social/Mean-Years-of-Schooling/
https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/GUY/guyana/literacy-rate
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/guyana/social-education-statistics/educational-attainment-at-least-bachelors-or-equivalent-population-25-years--cumulative-female
https://tradingeconomics.com/guyana/labor-force-total-wb-data.html#:~:text=Labor%20force%2C%20total%20in%20Guyana,Indicators
https://statisticsguyana.gov.gy/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GLFS_Bulletin_2019.pdf
https://www.rivermate.com/guides/guyana/overview#:~:text=The%20Guyanese%20workforce%20is%20characterized,skills%20gap%20in%20some%20sectors
https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/economies/guyana#:~:text=In%20Guyana%2C%20the%20labor%20force,World

Thursday Nov 14, 2024


Summary:
In this episode, we discuss the various types of chips used in Artificial Intelligence (AI), focusing on GPUs, CPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs. Each chip type has its own strengths and weaknesses: GPUs excel at processing power for complex tasks, CPUs are becoming less relevant as AI advances, FPGAs offer versatility and efficiency for custom applications, and ASICs specialize in specific AI tasks with high performance and energy efficiency. We conclude by highlighting the geopolitical implications of AI chips, including their impact on economic competitiveness, tech sovereignty, defense and intelligence sectors, innovation, and energy efficiency.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the different types of chips used in AI and how do they compare in terms of their strengths and weaknesses?
How do AI chips impact global economic competitiveness, tech sovereignty, and defense capabilities?
What are the broader implications of AI chips for innovation, alliances, and environmental sustainability?
Long format:
 Four types of chips used in AI
There are essentially four different silicon options that can be used for the training and development of artificial intelligence technology: GPUs, CPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs.
GPUs
A GPU chip, or Graphics Processing Unit chip, is an electronic circuit that performs mathematical calculations at high speeds to handle graphics-related work. These are the type of “gammer chips” that PZ mentioned. GPUs have many smaller, more specialized cores that work together to divide processing tasks across many cores simultaneously. This design allows GPUs to perform the same operation on multiple data values in parallel, increasing their processing efficiency. Within GPUs, there are three subsets generally framed as:
Integrated GPUs: Built into a PC's motherboard, allowing laptops to be thin, lightweight, and power-efficient
Mobile GPUs: Found in larger laptops, these chips are less bulky than a full desktop-style GPU but offer better graphics performance than a CPU's built-in graphics power
High-end GPUs: Can sell for tens of thousands of dollars
Importantly, there are other types of chips used in AI these days.
CPUs
A central processing unit (CPU) is a general-purpose chip that can be used for some AI tasks, but it's becoming less useful as AI advances. CPUs are designed to handle sequential tasks, like running operating systems and managing applications. They can also be used for pre-processing data, initial data analysis, and orchestrating overall system operations. However, CPUs are less specialized than other chips, and their processing power tends to decline quickly compared to more specialized chips.
FPGAs
A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) chip is a reprogrammable integrated circuit that can be used to accelerate artificial intelligence (AI) applications. An FPGA is a flexible computer component that can be reconfigured to meet specific needs after manufacturing. The circuitry inside an FPGA is not hard etched, unlike in graphics processing units (GPUs) or application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). FPGAs are valued in AI for their versatility, power efficiency, and adaptability. They can be used to build neural networks from scratch and optimize applications for specific needs. FPGAs are particularly useful for real-time processing and prototyping new projects. FPGAs offer a number of benefits, including: reduced latency (FPGAs can provide low latency and deterministic latency (DL)); speed to market (FPGAs can help speed time to market by reducing the need to develop and release new hardware) and cost savings (FPGAs can help reduce costs by reducing the complexities of developing application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs)).
ASICs
ASIC stands for Application-Specific Integrated Circuit, and it's a type of computer chip that's custom-designed to perform a specific task, such as artificial intelligence (AI). ASICs are digital or analog circuits that are custom-built to perform a specific function. They're not reconfigurable and can't contain additional instructions. ASICs are often used in industry, intelligence agencies, space programs, and defense systems. They're also used in AI to create accelerator chips that are designed to support specific applications. ASICs offer similar computing ability to FPGAs, but they're not reprogrammable. Because their circuitry is optimized for a specific task, they often outperform general-purpose processors or other AI chips. ASICs are designed early in the process to address specific needs. The two primary ASIC design methods are gate-array and full-custom.
November 2024 Inventory of major AI chip designers and fabricators
Which one is better?
It depends.
FPGAs are best used for custom, low-latency applications that require customization for specific deep learning tasks, such as bespoke AI applications. FPGAs are also well suited for tasks that value energy efficiency over processing speeds.
Higher-powered GPUs, on the other hand, are generally preferred for heavier tasks like training and running large, complex models. The GPUs superior processing power makes it better suited for effectively managing larger datasets.
CPUs are fading off into the sunset. CPUs do offer some initial pricing advantages. When training small neural networks with a limited dataset, a CPU can be used, but the trade-off will be time. The CPU-based system will run much more slowly than an FPGA or GPU-based system. Another benefit of the CPU-based application will be power consumption. Compared to a GPU configuration, the CPU will deliver better energy efficiency.
The primary advantage of using ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated Circuits) in AI chips is their superior performance and energy efficiency for specific AI tasks, as they are custom-designed to excel at a particular workload, like neural network processing, resulting in significantly faster execution compared to general-purpose processors while consuming less power; making them ideal for applications with well-defined AI requirements, particularly in edge computing scenarios where power consumption is critical.
CONCLUSION
Understanding what these chips are, how they are best used and the related issues are important in geopolitics.
AI chips impact economic competitiveness. Advanced chip design and fabrication are crucial for countries aiming to lead in AI and tech innovation. Nations with robust AI chip industries can boost their economic power and maintain competitive advantages. For instance, the U.S., China, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea are major players in chip manufacturing, and access to AI chip technologies has become a priority to maintain economic influence.
AI chips impact tech sovereignty and trade relations. Given the strategic importance of AI chips, countries have become more protective of their semiconductor industries, as seen with the U.S.-China trade tensions. Export controls, such as those restricting high-end GPUs and ASICs, are designed to prevent rival nations from acquiring advanced AI capabilities that could threaten national security or economic interests.
AI chips impact defense and intelligence sectors. High-performance AI chips, especially ASICs and FPGAs, are increasingly critical in military applications for their processing power, low latency, and energy efficiency. Countries investing in custom AI chips for intelligence gathering, autonomous systems, and real-time decision-making gain substantial defense advantages. This has led to competition to secure supply chains, develop local industries, and ensure that military applications do not rely on foreign chip manufacturers.
AI chips impact innovation and alliances. Nations are fostering alliances to secure the resources and intellectual property needed for chip innovation. For instance, alliances like the Quad (involving the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India) focus on semiconductor supply chains as part of their strategy to counterbalance China's influence. Additionally, governments are investing in research and development to ensure that their tech ecosystems can support sustainable chip innovation, essential for long-term leadership in AI.
AI chips impact energy efficiency and environmental concerns. As countries work to balance energy policies and meet sustainability targets, the energy efficiency of AI chips, like those of FPGAs and ASICs, plays into larger energy strategies. Countries with a lead in energy-efficient AI chips may position themselves as leaders in sustainable technology, reinforcing their influence in international environmental and technology forums.
Sources:
https://aws.amazon.com/what-is/gpu/#:~:text=A%20graphics%20processing%20unit%20(GPU,for%20many%20compute%2Dintensive%20tasks
https://semiengineering.com/knowledge_centers/integrated-circuit/ic-types/processors/graphics-processing-unit-gpu/#:~:text=An%20electronic%20circuit%20designed%20to%20handle%20graphics%20and%20video
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/all-about-graphics-processing-units-gpus-e159bedb-80b7-4738-a0c1-76d2a05beab4#:~:text=The%20graphics%20processing%20unit%20(GPU,lightweight%2C%20and%20power%2Defficient
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/products/docs/processors/cpu-vs-gpu.html#:~:text=The%20graphics%20processing%20unit%20(GPU,are%20built%20for%20different%20purposes
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https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/fpga-solutions/artificial-intelligence/fpga-gpu.html#:~:text=Field%20programmable%20gate%20arrays%20(FPGAs,investment%E2%80%94to%20design%20and%20fabricate
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https://builtin.com/articles/ai-chip#:~:text=ASICs%20are%20accelerator%20chips%2C%20designed,to%20boost%20machine%20learning%20performance
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https://www.arm.com/glossary/asic#:~:text=An%20application%2Dspecific%20integrated%20circuit,ability%20to%20process%20greater%20workloads

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