Geopolitics Unplugged

EP48: Après Erdoğan, le déluge? What comes after Erdoğan?

Summary:
In this episode, we analyze the potential implications of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's departure from office in 2028. We examine the possible successors to Erdoğan's leadership, the future of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the broader political and economic impacts on Türkiye. We discuss the potential changes in Türkiye’s foreign relations with countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, along with the country's future role in the global landscape. We explore how a change in leadership could affect Türkiye’s relationship with Western powers like the United States and the European Union, and how the country's future direction depends on the outcome of the upcoming elections.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the key challenges facing a post-Erdoğan AKP government?
What are the possible consequences for Türkiye's foreign policy if the AKP loses power in the next election?
How might Türkiye's global role change depending on who succeeds Erdoğan?
Long format:
 Après Erdoğan, le déluge? What comes after Erdoğan?
TL;DR
President Erdoğan, Türkiye’s longest-serving leader, announced that the 2024 elections would be his last, setting up a pivotal shift in Türkiye’s future. His departure leaves open questions about the AKP’s continued dominance and the emergence of a successor. Key opposition figures include Ekrem İmamoğlu, who leads in Istanbul, and Kemal Kilicdaroglu, a coalition-backed secular candidate. The AKP’s potential successor, Selcuk Bayraktar, lacks political experience, casting uncertainty over the party’s direction.
Economically, the AKP faces challenges due to high inflation and eroding public confidence, while ideologically, it must balance conservative values with growing demands for change. Internationally, Türkiye’s relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the West could shift significantly if an opposition leader assumes power, potentially softening Türkiye’s Islamist stance and enhancing diplomatic ties. If Erdoğan’s influence remains strong, however, Türkiye may continue its independent, nationalist approach, maintaining current regional complexities and selective Western engagement.
Introduction
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who is 70 years old is Türkiye’s longest-serving leader, having served in that position since 2014. He previously served as the 25th prime minister from 2003 to 2014 as part of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he co-founded in 2001.
In March 2024, he announced publicly that his current term in office would be his last. This begs the questions:
Who comes next?
Will the momentum of Türkiye’s advancements run out of steam?
Erdoğan has shaped Türkiye’s political landscape over two decades, transitioning the country from secularism to an Islamist-leaning governance. This paper examines what may come after Erdoğan’s departure, exploring potential successors, the future of the AKP, and the broader political implications for Türkiye.
Erdoğan’s Legacy: Consolidation of Power and Shifting Alliances
Erdoğan’s tenure began as Istanbul’s mayor in the 1990s, and he later served as prime minister in 2003 when the role held primary executive authority. His ascendance to the presidency in 2014, followed by a 2017 referendum shifting Türkiye from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, effectively solidified his grip on power. Under Erdoğan, Türkiye has undergone significant ideological transformation, moving from its secular Kemalist roots toward a governance model that emphasizes religious values and nationalism.
This ideological shift led to substantial changes in Türkiye’s foreign and domestic policies. Notably, Erdoğan’s administration, which initially showed openness toward former allies like Israel, experienced a significant rift with the country. The resurgence of tensions during the October 2023 Israel-Hamas conflict illustrates Erdoğan’s continued commitment to his Islamist-leaning foreign policy. His authoritarian approach domestically has involved restrictions on the press, civil society, and the judiciary, consolidating power within the executive branch. However, these policies have not been without consequence; Türkiye now faces widespread economic issues, with inflation at record levels and a public demanding change. The upcoming departure of Erdoğan therefore represents a turning point in Türkiye politics.
The Uncertain Future of the AKP
Across analyses, a consensus emerges that Erdoğan’s departure will significantly impact the AKP and Türkiye’s political landscape. His statement that this election was his last in office reflects a degree of confidence that the AKP will retain power post-Erdoğan. He has implied that the March 2024 local elections will offer a “blessing” and a “transfer of confidence” to his successors within the party. This language suggests that Erdoğan’s intent is for a seamless transition of leadership within the AKP, maintaining continuity in the party’s control and influence over Türkiye’s political system.
But things did not go according to Erdoğan’s plan with the March 2024 elections. This recent Turkish elections highlight a potential turning point as the opposition gained momentum against Erdoğan and his ruling AKP party. Led by Ekrem İmamoğlu, the opposition CHP has not only maintained control in major cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir but has also won several traditionally AKP-controlled municipalities, signaling Erdoğan's weakening grip on power. İmamoğlu's significant win in Istanbul, despite Erdoğan’s heavy campaigning and media support for the AKP, establishes him as a formidable opponent and potential future presidential candidate.
The AKP’s inability to recover in urban areas, coupled with Türkiye’s struggling economy and high inflation, suggests that Erdoğan and his party may be losing public favor. Despite Erdoğan’s strategic use of media and judiciary power, his repeated defeats by İmamoğlu raise the possibility of a post-AKP Turkey. However, İmamoğlu’s political future remains uncertain due to ongoing legal challenges which could block him from running against Erdoğan in the 2028 presidential race. These issues center on allegations of insulting public officials during a 2019 speech following his initial victory in Istanbul’s mayoral race. The legal dispute underscores the broader challenge of judicial independence in Turkey, as critics argue that the judiciary may be used as a tool to sideline political rivals to Erdoğan and the ruling AKP. İmamoğlu faces a potential ban from politics if an appeals court upholds a previous ruling against him, stemming from a charge of “insulting public officials.” In Turkey, such legal convictions can result in restrictions on holding public office, which would prevent İmamoğlu from running for president. While İmamoğlu has appealed the ruling, the process’s outcome is uncertain, and any political ban would effectively remove a leading opposition figure.
Nonetheless, Turkey's shifting political landscape shows Erdoğan facing a stronger, revitalized opposition.
However, Erdoğan’s absence will create a leadership vacuum, posing questions about who will rise to fill it. The AKP’s core constituency, approximately 40% of the Turkish electorate, remains loyal, largely due to Erdoğan’s emphasis on conservative and nationalist values, but this base alone may not be sufficient to sustain the party’s dominance. The rise of secular opposition and factionalism within Turkish politics underscores that the AKP must retain its ideological coherence and political unity to survive without its long-time leader. Analysts agree that the AKP faces internal challenges in sustaining Erdoğan’s policies while potentially adapting to Türkiye’s changing economic and social climate.
The Viability of Successors and the Prospects of Continued AKP Dominance
While there is broad agreement on the importance of Erdoğan’s legacy, there is debate over the viability of potential successors and whether the AKP will retain its influence in Turkish politics. Several successors are speculated to inherit Erdoğan’s mantle, yet none possesses the same charismatic authority.
Ekrem İmamoğlu: A Strong Opposition Candidate
Ekrem İmamoğlu, Istanbul’s current mayor and a member of the secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP), has emerged as one of Erdoğan’s most formidable challengers. His decisive victories in Istanbul, including a recent re-election, have made him a popular figure, even among moderate conservatives. His governance style emphasizes inclusiveness, a stark contrast to Erdoğan’s more authoritarian approach, and his populist tactics allow him to appeal across ideological divides within Türkiye’s opposition. Analysts see İmamoğlu as a likely presidential candidate for 2028, with the potential to lead Türkiye toward a more secular, democratic governance model, yet his popularity does not guarantee victory. İmamoğlu’s secular rhetoric and association with Atatürk—a secular icon in Türkiye—could alienate religious conservatives and limit his appeal among Erdoğan’s core base. However, as noted above, his political future certainly is in jeopardy due to court decisions.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu: The CHP Leader and Coalition Candidate
Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the CHP and the Nation Alliance coalition’s presidential candidate, contrasts Erdoğan in both style and substance. Known for his integrity and secular principles, Kilicdaroglu brings a “calmer” vision for Türkiye’s future, promising to address corruption, restore the parliamentary system, and prioritize human rights. Kilicdaroglu’s backing from a coalition that includes six political parties marks a significant milestone in Turkish politics, as the opposition parties have set aside ideological differences to collectively oppose Erdoğan.
Despite this coalition, Kilicdaroglu’s lack of charisma compared to Erdoğan has been criticized, potentially making it difficult for him to gain widespread appeal across Turkey’s conservative-leaning electorate. Analysts believe that Kilicdaroglu may succeed in establishing institutional reforms if elected but may struggle to maintain long-term support due to his perceived lack of dynamism.
Selcuk Bayraktar: A Potential Successor from Within the AKP
Among those within Erdoğan’s circle, his son-in-law Selcuk Bayraktar has garnered attention as a potential successor. Bayraktar’s reputation as a defense technology innovator, particularly with the Bayraktar drones, has earned him national and international recognition. While Bayraktar’s conservative values align with Erdoğan’s, his limited political experience and association with Erdoğan’s family could hinder his ability to rally independent support. Bayraktar’s stance on foreign policy, particularly his hardline position on Israel, suggests continuity with Erdoğan’s Islamist agenda, yet his viability as a political leader is uncertain.
Key Challenges for a Post-Erdoğan AKP
The AKP, facing an economy strained by inflation and a skeptical electorate, must navigate several challenges if it is to retain power in the post-Erdoğan era. Analysts highlight the following areas of concern:
Economic Crisis: High inflation and declining wages have eroded public confidence in the AKP’s economic management. For any successor, restoring the economy will be paramount. Analysts believe that economic recovery will require a shift from Erdoğan’s heavy-handed monetary policies, which have contributed to currency devaluation and high living costs.
Preservation of Conservative Values: Erdoğan’s leadership has promoted an Islamic identity within Turkish society, appealing to conservative Turks wary of secularist policies. AKP successors must navigate the delicate balance of retaining this ideological base while addressing the demands of a more diverse electorate.
Institutional Legacy and Foreign Policy Realignment: Erdoğan’s approach has centralized power in the presidency and reoriented foreign policy toward a more nationalist, sometimes isolationist stance. Türkiye’s diplomatic relations with NATO, the European Union, and the United States may experience renewed strain under an Erdoğan successor if foreign policy becomes a campaign issue. Some speculate that the CHP may realign Türkiye’s stance more favorably toward the West, potentially restoring ties strained by Erdoğan’s Islamist-leaning policies.
What the immediate internal future looks like
Türkiye’s post-Erdoğan future presents a dynamic and uncertain political landscape. While Erdoğan has asserted that the AKP will continue to dominate Turkish politics, his departure leaves open critical questions about the country’s direction. The challenges for his successors include overcoming entrenched economic issues, managing ideological divides, and recalibrating foreign relations.
Ekrem İmamoğlu and Kemal Kilicdaroglu emerge as leading opposition candidates, advocating for a secular and democratic Türkiye that contrasts sharply with Erdoğan’s Islamist governance. Within the AKP, figures like Selcuk Bayraktar represent continuity with Erdoğan’s legacy, though his political experience remains limited. For Türkiye, the period after Erdoğan’s departure will likely involve an ideological tug-of-war, a potential shift in foreign relations, and a reevaluation of its position within the global landscape.
The departure of Erdoğan signals the end of an era marked by centralization, populism, and religious conservatism. In his absence, the AKP’s future will hinge on whether it can adapt to Türkiye’s evolving political and economic landscape, a challenge that may redefine Türkiye’s governance and influence its democratic stability for years to come.
What the immediate external future looks like
Ekrem İmamoğlu’s potential disqualification from the presidential race could have a broad impact on Türkiye’s foreign relations, particularly with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, as well as Türkiye’s future role on the global stage. As a leading figure in Turkey’s secular opposition, İmamoğlu represents a break from President Erdoğan’s Islamist-leaning foreign policy. If he or another opposition leader were to rise to power, Türkiye’s diplomatic posture could shift significantly. Conversely, if Erdoğan’s influence persists or another figure from the AKP or a similarly aligned successor takes power, Türkiye is likely to maintain its current foreign policy orientation. Here’s how these dynamics could play out:
Türkiye-Israel Relations
Türkiye’s relationship with Israel has fluctuated sharply under Erdoğan, who has often criticized Israel, particularly over Palestinian issues, and maintained close ties with Hamas. While recent attempts were made to improve relations, the October 2023 Israel-Hamas conflict saw Erdoğan revert to strong anti-Israel rhetoric, once again straining diplomatic ties.
If İmamoğlu or a Similar Opposition Leader Gains Power: A shift in leadership could lead to a more balanced and less antagonistic relationship with Israel. İmamoğlu’s secular background and pragmatic approach could foster better cooperation, especially in trade, technology, and defense sectors. An opposition-led Türkiye might also distance itself from groups like Hamas, opening the door to diplomatic rapprochement with Israel, possibly even working jointly on regional security issues or energy projects.
If Erdoğan’s Influence Persists: If Erdoğan remains influential through an AKP successor or if his party continues to shape Turkish politics, the current approach toward Israel—supportive of Palestinian causes and at odds with Israeli policies—would likely continue. Türkiye would probably sustain its critical stance on Israel’s handling of Palestinian territories, keeping relations cool and constraining the potential for cooperation.
Turkey’s Relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt
Erdoğan’s foreign policy also impacted relations with other key regional players, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Türkiye’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its opposition to Saudi-Egyptian policies on issues like Qatar and Libya have led to years of tension. Recent diplomatic overtures have brought some improvement, but fundamental ideological divides remain.
Under an Opposition Government: An İmamoğlu-led or opposition-aligned government could further thaw relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The opposition, more secular in orientation, is less likely to support groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and more likely to engage constructively with Riyadh and Cairo. This change could ease tensions and lead to a normalization of relations, enabling Türkiye to play a more collaborative role in regional economic initiatives, security arrangements, and energy cooperation.
If the AKP or Erdoğan’s Influence Continues: An AKP-led administration would likely maintain an ambivalent stance toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, balancing pragmatic cooperation with ideological differences. While pragmatic in terms of trade and security coordination, an AKP-led Türkiye may continue to support factions in regional conflicts that align with Erdoğan’s Islamist leanings, potentially complicating deep diplomatic alignment.
Türkiye’s Future Place in the World
Türkiye’s role on the global stage has shifted under Erdoğan from a Western-aligned secular state to a regional power pursuing independent, often contentious policies that prioritize Turkish sovereignty and nationalism. Türkiye’s relations with the EU, the United States, and NATO have become increasingly complex as Erdoğan’s policies have sometimes conflicted with Western priorities, including relations with Russia and regional security concerns.
If İmamoğlu or a Secular Successor Takes Office: A leadership shift could bring Türkiye closer to the West and improve its standing in NATO and relations with the EU. The opposition has indicated support for a return to a parliamentary system, democratic reforms, and the rule of law, which would align with EU standards. Improved democratic credentials could revive EU accession talks and foster better relations with the U.S. A recalibrated foreign policy would likely aim to balance relations with Russia, maintain NATO commitments, and potentially bolster cooperation with Western allies on regional security issues.
Continuation of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy: If Erdoğan’s legacy endures through an AKP successor or another ideologically similar figure, Türkiye may continue to pursue an independent and assertive foreign policy. This approach would likely involve balancing relations with Russia, engaging selectively with the West, and maintaining influence in the Middle East. Türkiye’s position as a bridge between East and West would remain, but the emphasis on sovereignty and nationalism could make closer integration with the EU and deeper NATO collaboration more challenging.
Conclusion
Türkiye’s future global role will be shaped significantly by the outcome of its internal political dynamics. If İmamoğlu or a secular opposition figure takes power, Türkiye could pivot toward a more Western-friendly and diplomatically balanced approach, potentially easing regional tensions and strengthening international partnerships. However, if Erdoğan’s influence persists through a successor, Turkey may continue to prioritize an independent, nationalist approach, which could limit deeper cooperation with Western allies and maintain regional complexities in its relationships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The outcome of Türkiye’s political transition will therefore play a crucial role in defining its future influence and alliances on the global stage.
Sources:
https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/the-question-of-erdogans-succession/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/04/turkey-local-elections-erdogan-akp-imamoglu/
https://theconversation.com/whats-next-for-turkey-after-local-elections-put-erdogan-on-notice-227430
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-battles-key-rival-turkeys-local-elections-2024-03-31/
https://www.npr.org/2023/05/03/1172704065/turkey-election-candidate-kemal-kilicsdaroglu-erdogan-challenger
 

Episode 47: The 269-269 Scenario

Summary:
In this episode, we discuss the potential for a 269-269 tie in the Electoral College during the US presidential election. It explains how the 12th Amendment mandates that the House of Representatives would then choose the President, with each state delegation receiving one vote. We analyze the current composition of the House and Senate to assess which party would likely have the advantage in such a scenario, ultimately concluding that the outcome is uncertain and depends heavily on the results of the upcoming Congressional elections.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
How does the Electoral College system potentially lead to a 269-269 tie in the presidential election?
What are the procedures outlined in the 12th Amendment for resolving a presidential election tied at 269-269?
How does the current composition of the House of Representatives and Senate impact the potential outcome of a 269-269 tie?
Long format:
 The 269-269 scenario
In one week from now the United States turns to the ballot box to select various elected officials including members of Congress, some US Senators and the President of the United States.
As we all know the President of the United States is selected by the Electoral College. Under this system, rather than a direct popular vote, each state is assigned a certain number of electors (equal to its total number of Senators and Representatives in Congress). When voters in a state cast their ballots for president, they’re actually voting for a slate of electors pledged to a candidate. The candidate who wins the majority of votes in a state typically gets all its electoral votes (except in Maine and Nebraska, which split them). A candidate needs a majority of the 538 total electoral votes to win the presidency (270 or more). There are a total of 538 electoral votes in the Electoral College. A candidate needs at least 270 of these votes to win the U.S. presidency. But as one can see by math because the total number of Electoral College votes is an even number, then the result in theory could be 269-269. A tie.
The 12th Amendment was adopted to examine this outcome and codify what happens in the event of an Elector Collage tie. Here is the relevant text as it exists (don’t worry we will make it plain after the legal gobblydegook).
The exact text:
“and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.–]”
Stated more plainly, if there’s an Electoral College tie, meaning each candidate receives exactly 269 electoral votes, the 12th Amendment specifies that the election for president moves to the House of Representatives. In this process:
Each state’s delegation in the House gets one vote. So, instead of each representative voting individually, the representatives from each state come together to decide which candidate they’ll support as a state.
A candidate needs a majority of states (at least 26 out of 50) to win the presidency.
If the House cannot come to pick and it is 25-25, and that log jam keeps up until March 4th, then whomever the Senate picks as Vice-President becomes the President.
So let’s use math and look at the current composition of the House other see what would happen in the case of the 269-269 tie. If the current House were to vote (meaning that there was no 2024 election for Congress and every Congress member remained and if every member of Congress followed party lines and voted for the President of their party), the result would be the Republican candidate would get 26 votes, the Democrat candidate would get 22 votes and two states would be tied as they have the same exact number of Democratic members of Congress and the same exact number of Republican members of Congress (those two states are Minnesota and North Carolina). This is the fourth column of my chart. The current Republican candidate would win given all of these assumptions.
Now, obviously with this Congressional election some seats will be won by one party and lost by the other. But in the aggregate, will flipping one or two seats change the outcome of a state’s delegation enough to flip the one vote that the state has to the entire other party? In my analysis, I looked at the “balance of the parties” to look at the number of Democrat versus Republican Congress members. If that balance of the parties were within 2 Congress folks, I designated that the state was “too close to call” and therefore could go either way under the one vote per state rule. I figured that it was unlikely that in a state that 3 seats would flip. A line has to be drawn somewhere and that’s where I drew the line. Under this scenario, the math shows 25 solid Republican states, 17 solid Democrat states and 8 too close to call. Under this scenario, the Republican candidate would have to pick up one of the “too close to call” states to win, but the Democratic candidate would need to pick up ALL of the “too close to call states” just to tie. A tie would do no good to that Democratic candidate unless there would an entire state that would show attrition and come over to the Democratic candidate before March 4th.
If it is tied and goes past March 4th, the Senate would have picked the Vice President and the Vice President would then be President. Let’s look similarly how the Senate would most likely vote. Again, applying similar logic as we did with the House of Representatives, this is the math as far as current composition of the US Senate. Recall they also get one vote per state too. As of right now there are 20 states where both Senators are Republican. There are 23 states where both Senators are Democrat. There are 3 states that have one Democrat Senator and one Republican Senator (a tie). And that leaves 5 states that have independents. I labeled the states with the independents as unknown. However, one can look at those 5 states with independents to see which of the two parties that other Senator is and imperfectly infer which way it “leans” perhaps. When one does that it reveals that there are 3 states leaning Republican and 1 leaning Democrat.
When we do this, under the current composition, there is no clear winner. However with 23 votes, the path for the Democratic candidate by math alone is a little bit easier.
(N.B., I did not have time or interest to research which way each independent Senator tends to vote or which US Senators are vulnerable or safe— so sorry. But I figured that if there were two of one party, then there is no way that both flip because of staggered terms. I therefore recognize that there could be more ties too. I also did not care to delve into the polls and discover what the possible outcome might be of a given race. This is just a thought exercise if a really deep whatif.)

Episode 46: Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) why you should care

Summary:
The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) is a legislative initiative aimed at securing the EU's access to critical raw materials. The Act seeks to strengthen domestic supply chains, reduce reliance on single suppliers (particularly China), and promote sustainable mining, processing, and recycling within Europe. By facilitating access to existing EU funds and prioritizing “Strategic Projects”, the CRMA aims to increase the EU’s self-sufficiency and reduce supply chain risks associated with critical raw materials, which are essential for advanced technologies like electric vehicles, renewable energy, and defense. However, the Act’s impact is uncertain due to high costs and infrastructure needs, and its potential to affect global supply chains, impacting the cost and availability of these technologies for consumers and industries worldwide, remains to be seen.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the main objectives and strategies of the European Union's Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA)?
How might the CRMA affect global supply chains for critical raw materials and the broader technology landscape?
How does the CRMA's approach to securing critical raw materials differ from the US CHIPS Act and IRA, and what are the potential consequences of these differences?
Long format:
Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) why you should care
A lot of focus and attention is placed on the US CHIPS Act and the IRA and rightfully so. One additional and somewhat related EU act that should be likewise known is The European Union's Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA).
TL;DR: European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA)
The CRMA aims to secure the EU’s access to critical raw materials by strengthening its supply chains, reducing dependency on single suppliers (especially China), and promoting sustainable mining, processing, and recycling within Europe. This includes “Strategic Projects” with streamlined permitting and funding access to develop essential materials like lithium, cobalt, and rare earths for technologies such as EVs, renewable energy, and defense.
Unlike the U.S. CHIPS Act and IRA, the CRMA doesn’t offer direct funding; instead, it facilitates access to existing EU funds. While aiming to bolster the EU’s self-sufficiency and reduce supply chain risks, the Act’s impact is uncertain due to high costs and infrastructure needs. Americans should care because it could affect global supply, possibly impacting the cost and availability of critical technology components worldwide.
CRMA
The European Union's Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) is a legislative initiative designed to secure the EU's access to critical raw materials by strengthening its domestic supply chains, reducing reliance on single suppliers, and promoting sustainable practices, aiming to mitigate risks of supply disruptions in key industries like cleantech and digital technologies by increasing extraction, processing, and recycling capacities within the EU while diversifying import sources.
The Act seeks to identify “Strategic Projects" with streamlined permitting and access to finance to build domestic capabilities to reduce the influence outside of the EU and China.
The Act identifies specific raw materials considered "critical" due to their high economic importance and potential supply chain vulnerabilities, such as rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and graphite.
According to the European Union Critical Raw Materials Act, "critical raw materials" are raw materials considered highly important to the EU economy but with a high risk of supply disruption, while "strategic raw materials" are a subset of critical raw materials that hold additional strategic importance due to their use in advanced technologies like green energy, digitalization, defense, and space applications; essentially, strategic raw materials are considered even more critical for the EU's security and technological advancement.
The CRMA aims to diversify the EU's sourcing of critical raw materials by reducing dependence on single third countries and encouraging partnerships with multiple suppliers. In other words, trying to China-proof themselves.
The Act incentivizes the development of mining and processing capacities within the EU to increase domestic extraction and processing of critical raw materials.
A key aspect of the CRMA is to enhance recycling and reuse of critical raw materials to improve circularity within the value chain.
Americans should care about the European Union's Critical Raw Materials Act because it could significantly impact the global supply chain for essential minerals used in critical technologies like electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and electronics, potentially affecting the cost and availability of these products for American consumers and industries, particularly if the EU prioritizes securing its own supply chains at the expense of other markets due to concerns over reliance on single suppliers, like China, for critical raw materials like lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
The effectiveness of this Act is unknown and not yet at all certain. Building domestic mining and processing capacity in the EU can be costly and time-consuming, requiring significant investment and infrastructure development. One of the “holes” of the Act is the lack of direct government funding. This may curb its effectiveness.
Unlike the CHIPS and IRA Acts, the European Union Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) does not provide direct funding itself, but instead facilitates access to existing EU funds like the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Just Transition Fund, European Regional Development Fund, Innovation Fund, and InvestEU to support "Strategic Projects" which are critical raw material projects deemed of high strategic importance, enabling them to receive streamlined permitting and potential financial assistance through these funds; essentially, the Act creates a framework for prioritizing and expediting funding for key projects in the critical raw materials sector rather than directly allocating new funds itself.
Sources:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/critical-raw-materials/#:~:text=An%20EU%20critical%20raw%20materials,and%20the%20development%20of%20substitutes
https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials_en#:~:text=The%20Critical%20Raw%20Materials%20Act%20is%20a%20comprehensive%20response%20to,functioning%20of%20the%20single%20market
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Critical%20Raw%20Materials%20Act%20aims%20to%20strengthen%20EU's,supply%20chain%20sustainability%20and%20circularity
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2748#:~:text=With%20this%20Act%2C%20the%20EU,Member%20States%20and%20large%20companies
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/m/qanda_24_2749#:~:text=What%20does%20the%20Critical%20Raw,stage%20of%20the%20value%20chain
https://www.slrconsulting.com/insights/understanding-the-european-commission-s-critical-raw-materials-act-crma/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20EU%20definition,shown%20in%20the%20image%20below
https://unece.org/media/news/391440#:~:text=Additionally%2C%20the%20Act%20mandates%20that,risk%20of%20supply%20chain%20disruptions
https://www.fastmarkets.com/metals-and-mining/eu-critical-raw-materials-act/#:~:text=1.,and%20enhance%20its%20recycling%20infrastructure
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2023/december/7/eu-critical-raw-materials-act-what-does-it-mean-for-business#:~:text=The%20CRMA%20is%20part%20of,important%20to%20the%20EU%20for:
https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/eu-critical-raw-materials#:~:text=The%20Critical%20Raw%20Materials%20Act%20may%20well%20be%20an%20important,away%20from%20meaningful%20corporate%20regulation
https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/the-eu-critical-raw-materials-act-handshakes-extracting-processing-and-recycling-why-not-reducing-and-prioritizing/#:~:text=The%20CRM%20Act%20defines%20the,supplier%20of%20eight%20of%20them
 

EP45: What is a blue water navy?

Summary:
In this podcast, we propose a new standardized definition for a blue water navy, outlining the key capabilities required for a navy to project power globally. We then categorizes various navies around the world into tiers based on this definition, examining the strengths and weaknesses of each navy. We highlight the United States Navy as the only Tier 1 navy, possessing unparalleled global reach. Tier 2 includes France, Japan, the UK, and Italy, though the UK's status is debated due to ongoing fleet maintenance and modernization challenges. Italy is a unrecognized navy that definitely deserves to be here. Tier 3 consists of China, India, and Russia, all of which have formidable forces, but lack the sustained operational and logistical capabilities for global reach.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the key characteristics that define a blue water navy?
How do the navies of different countries compare in their capabilities and strategic goals?
What are the current trends and challenges facing blue water navies globally?
Long format:
What is a blue water navy?
The term blue water navy is tossed about so much, but did you know there’s no universal definition?
I propose one.
TL;DR: Definition and Analysis of a Blue Water Navy
Oddly enough there is no standardized definition in geopolitics or even in the military for what the term “blue water navy” means. Within the deep dive I offer one.
Top Tiers:
Tier 1: USA – unmatched global capability.
Tier 2: France, Japan, the UK (questionable), and Italy.
—UK: Facing fleet maintenance and modernization challenges, limited carrier availability.
—Japan: Recently expanded carrier capabilities, though constrained by constitutional defensive-only policies.
—Italy: Often overlooked, possesses the capability for global operations.
Tier 1 and 2 countries meet the proposed standardized definition and therefore ought to be considered “blue water navies”.
Tier 3: China (PLAN), India, Russia. Each have formidable forces but…
—India’s mindset prevents its desire to operate much out of its EEZ
—PLAN and Russia lack the sustained operational and logistical capabilities needed for global reach. Plus, Russia at the present has no functioning aircraft carrier.
WHAT IS A BLUE WATER NAVY? A PROPOSED STANDARDIZED DEFINITION 
Here is a proposed standardized definition of “blue water navy” that I suggest.
A blue water navy is able to independently and regularly sustain and operate in open ocean at distance from your own territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) a force projection to both deliver a large number of combat troops and associated logistics and also protect long distance shipping lanes vital for your home country’s trade.
Sustained means measured by at least one month of force projection activities with support as well as full time shipping lane protection.
Plus, there has to be a component of demonstrated force projection and shipping lane protection orientation if not actual capabilities beyond one’s EEZ.
A blue water Navy must have the capability to detect, identify and engage targets over the horizon. This implies some degree of sophistication in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as weapon capabilities.
I do think that some static features to serve as minimum requirements would be necessary to serve as thresholds. I propose:
At least one functional aircraft carrier that is open seaworthy.
A cadre of cargo ships that can be used in trade and/or logistics enablers for far off force projection.
Submarines (both attack and Ballistic missile submarines)
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Landing craft
With that in mind, we examine the candidates.
TIER 1:
Tier one and standing all alone at the top is the USA.
TIER 2:
Tier two is France, Japan and perhaps the UK and Italy.
There’s unlikely to be a debate that France or the UK belongs on this list. The UK is teetering on the edge of being delisted. The UK is withdrawing quite a bit. The UK is undergoing fleet maintenance and modernization issues. The Royal Navy is getting rid of its entire minehunter fleet. Delays in procurement programs make it difficult to maintain older ships, which can then be unavailable for operations for extended periods. As of February 2024, the UK's aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth was sidelined due to a propeller shaft issue. The HMS Prince of Wales only in September 2024 returned to service after issues.
Where there may be disagreement is including Japan and Italy. But let’s look closely.
Japan makes the list as of October 21, 2024, when the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) reached a milestone in its aircraft carrier capabilities as a U.S. Navy F-35B Lightning II conducted its first landing on the JS Kaga (DDH-184). Japan possesses a fleet of highly advanced warships including destroyers with powerful missile systems, capable submarines, and helicopter carriers, allowing for multi-mission operations in distant waters. It boasts two multi-purpose operation destroyers (de facto aircraft carriers), two helicopter carriers (called helicopter destroyers), 26 destroyers, 10 small destroyers (or frigates), six destroyer escorts (or corvettes), 22 attack submarines, 29 mine countermeasure vessels, six patrol vessels, three landing ships and 30 minesweepers. Article 9 of Japan's constitution prohibits the country from maintaining a military for offensive purposes, technically limiting its ability to project force far beyond its borders. It is developing an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade to conduct operations on land from the sea. Japan’s close cooperation with the US through joint exercises and technology sharing, leveraging the US's expertise in force projection. Japan does not have nuclear submarines.
The Italian Navy doesn’t get the respect I think it should. Let’s look at it objectively using the above criteria and definitions. The Italian Navy possesses the capabilities to operate effectively across vast ocean expanses, far from its home shores, including a fleet of modern warships like aircraft carriers (Cavour and Giuseppe Garibaldi), amphibious assault ships, destroyers, and submarines, allowing it to deploy and participate in multinational operations in distant regions like the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, demonstrating its ability to project power on a global scale. This is further supported by its routine participation in large international naval exercises like RIMPAC. The Italian Navy has a well-maintained and technologically advanced fleet with various types of surface combatants and submarines. It has on order and therefore demonstrated its commitment to modernize and expand its capabilities. Italy does not have nuclear submarines.
TIER 3:
Tier three is PLAN, India, Russia
These tier three navies don’t make the cut to blue water navy. Let’s talk about why.
PLAN
The Chinese have a very formidable force on paper. It is the world’s largest navy by number of hulls. It has 12 nuclear submarines with half being attack types and half being boomers. It has three aircraft carriers. It has 32 landing ship tanks, 33 landing ship mediums, and 4 landing helicopter docks. Overall, it has 79 submarines. It has 62 destroyers, 58 frigates, 75 corvettes, 150 missile boats, 26 submarine chasers, over 17 gunboats, 36 mine countermeasure vessels, 19 replenishment ships and 23 auxiliaries. And it is growing.
What makes it not a blue water navy is logistics,  sustained force projection realities and its orientation. The PLAN fleet lacks the necessary logistical infrastructure, operational range, and global basing capabilities to project significant military power across vast expanses of the open ocean. It lacks friendly ports that would be available to it in the time of global conflict. It also primarily focuses its naval operations within its near seas, particularly around the East and South China Seas. This means they are not currently capable of sustained operations far from their home shores like a true blue water navy would be.
RUSSIA
It also has the same logistical difficulties that China has but not as bad. Following the Soviet Union's collapse and limitations in its shipbuilding and fleet maintenance capabilities has made its ships fall into disrepair. Russia currently has no aircraft carriers in service.
INDIA
India also has a quite formidable force on paper. India has nuclear submarines (4). It has about 150 ships. As of July 2022, they have two aircraft carriers, one amphibious transport dock, eight tank landing ships, 12 destroyers, 12 frigates, 16 conventionally powered attack submarines, 20 corvettes, ten large offshore patrol vessels, five fleet tankers as well as various auxiliary vessels and small patrol boats.
Indian military mindset is mostly defensive, non-violence principles really have large mindshare in Indian geopolitical thinking. No one in India is thinking that they should be a global police, other than sticking to Indian Ocean.
Sources:
https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-decline-of-the-royal-navy
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-navy-f-35-fighter-jet-just-landed-japanese-aircraft-carrier-213300
https://www.navair.navy.mil/news/US-Navy-partners-Japan-Maritime-Self-Defense-Force-deliver-JPALS-equipment/Tue-02072023-1436
https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-defense-cooperation-japan-acquisition-and-industry#:~:text=Japan's%20latest%20national%20security%20and,well%20as%20regional%20security%20challenges
https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/12/23/japan-steps-closer-to-global-military-power/#:~:text=It%20has%20also%20sought%20to%20augment%20its,destroyer%20and%20air%20defence%20and%20strike%20capabilities
https://www.stimson.org/2023/deterrence-by-denial-japans-new-strategic-outlook/#:~:text=Operationalizing%20Deterrence%20by%20Denial,operations%20to%20dissuade%20conflict%20escalation
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1996/march/italian-navy-major-role-sea-troubles#:~:text=Italy's%20national%20interests%20are%20extended,of%20the%20former%20mare%20nostrum
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/11/09/italy-plans-new-destroyers-for-2028-delivery/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CDestroyers%20are%20fundamental%20for%20a%20blue%20water,of%20maritime%20and%20joint%20operations%2C%E2%80%9D%20Vice%20Adm.&text=%E2%80%9CApart%20from%20carriers%2C%20amphibious%20vessels%20and%20submarines%2C,strike%20and%20task%20group%2Dprotection%20capabilities%2C%E2%80%9D%20he%20added
https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/global-maritime-power-russian-navy-faces-an-uncertain-future#:~:text=In%20the%20first%20place%2C%20because,oceans%20for%20some%20more%20years
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/admirals-look-nervous-can-putin-stop-collapse-russian-naval-power-211486#:~:text=During%20the%20Cold%20War%2C%20the,tug%20and%20a%20replenishment%20ship!
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/06/07/russia-aircraft-carrier-kuznetsov-navy-jets-mig-29/#:~:text=The%20Russian%20navy's%20sole%20aircraft,Kuznetsov%20didn't%20leave
https://www.pw.live/exams/defence/list-of-active-indian-navy-ships/

EP44: The Assent of Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Turkey)?

Summary:
In this episode, we examine Türkiye’s evolving military capabilities, particularly its naval and air forces. The sources discuss Türkiye’s development of new fighter jets and submarines, its ambitions to become a major naval power, and its recent decision to acquire a new domestically designed and manufactured aircraft carrier. We also discuss Türkiye’s current economic and political climate, highlighting factors that influence its military growth. We provide insight into Türkiye’s military modernization, focusing on its naval and air forces, and their implications for the region.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
1. What is the current state of Türkiye’s  military modernization efforts, particularly concerning its naval and air capabilities?
2. How does Türkiye’s domestic population growth and demographic trends impact its national security posture and regional ambitions?
3. What are the major economic and political challenges facing Türkiye and how do these factors influence its military development and foreign policy decisions?
Long format:
The Assent of Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Turkey)?
With the news released on Saturday, October 26, 2024 that Türkiye is now developing its own fifth-generation stealth fighter, the TAI Kaan (also known as TF or MMU), aiming to rival advanced aircraft like the F-35, it makes sense to look at Türkiye again and see where it is militarily, demographically and finally economically.
TL;DR: Türkiye's Military, Economic, and Demographic Overview
Military: Türkiye, the second-largest NATO military, has advanced its defense industry significantly, highlighted by its development of the TAI Kaan stealth fighter. The air force ranks 9th globally, emphasizing unmanned drones and airspace defense. Its navy is ranked 10th, with a substantial submarine fleet and an aircraft carrier, and aims to transition to blue-water capability. The Turkish Army, with 401,500 personnel, operates globally and is modernizing its tank and artillery assets. Türkiye also boasts a highly regarded Special Forces unit.
Demographics: Türkiye’s fertility rate (1.98) is below the replacement rate but higher than many developed countries, with a population median age of 34. It is in far better shape than a lot of countries.
Economy: Türkiye’s $1.024 trillion economy is the 17th largest worldwide. While inflation and currency devaluation are concerns, the country’s strategic location, young workforce, and diversified economy support steady growth, though foreign investment and productivity challenges persist.
MILITARY
Türkiye has come a long way in a short amount of time in terms of its military capabilities and its military industrial complex. Here are some updated facts to consider.
Türkiye is the second largest military in NATO, behind the United States.
Türkiye has a large land force, with significant armored capabilities, alongside a capable air force and naval fleet.
Türkiye has developed extensive experience in recent conflicts like the Syrian Civil War and operations in Libya. It is no longer a virgin in terms of actual operation in combat spaces.
Türkiye has a growing capability to produce advanced weapons systems, including drones, significantly enhancing their military strength.
TURKISH AIR FORCE
Türkiye's air force is ranked ninth in the world, according to a 2023 list from Global Firepower.
The Turkish Air Force has 34,600 personnel (2024)
Turkish Air Force features:
607 aircraft including 230 F16s (they were removed from the F35 program and no operational models in inventory), 
4 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft
7 Boeing KC-135R Stratotankers (refuelers), 
ordered a total of ten A400M Atlas aircraft heavy military transport aircraft, and 
the strength of their Air Force is their top tier unmanned aerial vehicles including the world’s most advanced fully autonomous AI powered Hunter-killer drone the STM Kargu-2. 
The key operational characteristics of the Turkish Air Force include: 
a significant presence in NATO operations, 
a strong focus on air defense of Turkish airspace, and
participation in international exercises
All of this leads many to conclude that Türkiye is one of the largest combat aircraft fleets within NATO, with a considerable ability to engage in international operations and missions across continents.
Türkiye even has 3 modern reconnaissance satellites in space with high resolution optics.
Türkiye anti aircraft anti missile capabilities are multi-layered, experienced and evolved. Türkiye has a variety of anti-aircraft and anti-missile capabilities, including: 
SİPER which is a long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system that can defend against aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-ground missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 
ATILGAN PMSS which is a pedestal mounted air defense system that has been used by the Turkish Land Forces for over a decade. 
HISAR which is a medium-altitude air defense system that can detect, track, identify, and fire on targets such as fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, cruise missiles, and UAVs. 
HISAR-A which is a low-altitude air defense system designed to defend against aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and UAVs
SUNGUR which is an air defense missile system with a high explosive, semi armor piercing warhead. 
KORKUT which is a system with cannons that can fire 35×228 mm ammunitions, including smart ammunition that ejects tungsten pellets at a predetermined distance. 
Levent which is a naval air defense system that uses modernized AIM-92 missiles. 
Kara Atmaca which is a surface-to-surface missile system that has successfully hit targets at long range. 
Under contract to produce Chinese FD-2000 long range missiles.
They have bought S-400 missile systems from Russia.
TURKISH NAVY
Türkiye is a fourth tier navy. It is not a blue water navy, but it is certainly coming along towards making that leap into the third tier and making it a blue water navy. The World Directory of Modern Military Warships (WDMMW) ranked Türkiye's navy 10th in the most recent global assessment.
Here are some facts and figures:
The Turkish navy has 45,000 active personnel and 55,000 reserve personnel
The Turkish Navy has a large fleet of ships, including the biggest submarine fleet in the region. The Turkish Navy also has a variety of ships, including frigates and corvettes, and 60 maritime aircraft. Turkey's Navy and Coast Guard operate more than 300 ships.
Türkiye has a 12-piece submarine fleet. They are all attack style submarines. 
They have one amphibious assault ship, 17 frigates, 10 corvettes , 26 offshore patrol craft, 18 fast attack craft, and many more including unmanned surface vehicles. Plans of a guided missile destroyer 
Türkiye has one aircraft carrier (TCG Anadolu) in service. The TCG Anadolu can accommodate helicopters, including the domestically produced T129 ATAK, and AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters and SH-70B utility helicopters. It also launches USVs. They have plans to build domestically another aircraft carrier. In February 2024, the Ministry of National Defense shared photos of the design for Turkey's future aircraft carrier. They also have more than 2,800 older M48 Pattons.
TURKISH ARMY
The Turkish Army has 401,500 members. The Turkish Army has a global footprint that includes military operations in northern Iraq and northern Syria, deployments in northern Cyprus, and exercises in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas. At present, the primary main battle tanks of the Turkish Army are the Leopard 2A4 and the M60T. There are also around 400 Leopard 1 and 750 M60 Patton variants in service. They are on a building/spending spree to update and enhance their armor capabilities including South Korean K2 Blank Panther battle tanks. They have a domestically designed and produced main battle tank called the Altay. It has 2 current deployed with 1000 planned. They have well over 800 modern self-propelled artillery pieces as well as nearly 1000 towed artillery pieces. They have around 300 rocket artillery pieces. They also have a cadre of unmanned ground vehicles either on station or in development or pending delivery.
Türkiye has six months of compulsory military service.
TURKISH SPECIAL FORCES
The Turkish Special Forces, officially called the "Special Forces Command," are a fairly highly trained, multi-purpose unit capable of performing specialized operations like direct action, reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, and foreign internal defense. They are considered by some to be one of the top special forces units in the world, with a reported force size of around 14,000 personnel, organized into brigades with the capacity to scale operations depending on the mission requirements.
TURKISH MILITARY INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES
This has been a disappointment generally. The government of Türkiye has had to import a lot of arms and equipment from foreign partners. The lone bright spot has been on drone production. However, as noted above Türkiye has announced that it will begin to increase its ship building capabilities including attempting to build its own aircraft carrier domestically. In addition, the slow crawl of delivering a main battle tank of its own design and production has been frustrating to Türkiye. Türkiye is clearly trying to build its own domestic capabilities… and it needs to in order to make it to the next level.
DEMOGRAPHICS 
In 2023, Türkiye’s total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.994 children per woman, which is below the replacement level of 2.1. This is a significant drop from 2001, when the TFR was 2.38. However, recently, reports have stated that current fertility rate for Turkey in 2024 is 1.980 births per woman. This is closer to the needed 2.1 replacement rate. The fertility rate for Turkey in 2023 was 1.994 births per woman, a 0.85% decline from 2022. The fertility rate for Turkey in 2022 was 2.011 births per woman, a 0.84% decline from 2021. So yes, they are below the replacement rate but not to the degree that Germany's total fertility rate (TFR) in 2024 is 1.35 children per woman or China's total fertility rate (TFR) in 2024 is estimated to be 1.55 children per woman or Taiwan at 1.11.
In 2023, Türkiye’s population growth rate was 1.1‰, which is an all-time low. This is down from 7.1‰ in 2022 and 14.7‰ in 2018.
In 2024, Türkiye’s age structure was estimated to be 21.7% for ages 0–14, 68.6% for ages 15–64, and 9.6% for ages 65 and over. The median age was estimated to be 34 years old which is much better than a lot of countries.
ECONOMICS
In brief, Türkiye’s economy is the 17th largest in the world, with a GDP of $1.024 trillion as of 2023. It is a member of the OECD and the G20. Turkey's economy grew 4.5% in 2023, down from 5.5% in 2022. Türkiye’s GDP growth in 2024 is projected to be between 3% and 3.5%. Türkiye’s biggest trade partners are the European Union (EU) (31.8%), China (12.4%), Russia (12.6%), the United States (2nd largest export partner), and Switzerland (5.5%). Türkiye’s economy is made up of a mix of modern industry, agriculture, and services, with the service sector being the largest contributor to GDP. It is located between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and is close to key export markets. It has a large internal domestic market with good rates of consumerism. Türkiye has a young population and an educated workforce. Türkiye has a highly developed technological infrastructure in transportation, telecommunications, and energy sectors. Türkiye has attracted $262 billion in foreign investment since 2003. In fall 2022, inflation reached 85.5%, the highest rate in two decades. A significant increase to the minimum wage in 2024 has contributed to the recent inflation. The Turkish lira has hit record low levels. The central bank's low-interest policy to stimulate borrowing and investment has led to a strong depreciation in the value of the lira. Türkiye is dependent on imported energy and intermediate goods. Türkiye has a high level of short-term private external debt and low level of gross international reserves. The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom ranks Türkiye 102 out of more than 180 economies. 
Corruption in Turkey poses a significant challenge to its bid for European Union membership. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which ranks 180 countries based on perceived public sector corruption (from 0 as highly corrupt to 100 as very honest), Turkey’s score has steadily declined. Since the index adopted its current scale in 2012, Turkey’s score has dropped from a high of 50 in 2013 to a low of 34 in 2023, indicating a worsening perception of corruption. In 2023, Turkey ranked 115th globally, well below the average score of 43. Regionally, within Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Turkey’s score also trails behind the average of 35 and the region’s highest score of 53, emphasizing the need for improvement.
Some have pointed to low productivity growth, weakening foreign direct investment, credit-driven growth performance, and Inefficient monetary policy as headwinds for Türkiye.
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Türkiye’s ascent reflects a nation that has strategically invested in its defense, economic stability, and demographic resilience. With the unveiling of the TAI Kaan fighter jet, Türkiye signals its intent to join the global elite of military technology, bolstered by a robust armed forces structure that includes a potent navy and capable special forces. Economically, while challenges like inflation and currency depreciation persist, Türkiye’s advantageous location, young population, and industrial growth support its ambitions on the world stage. As Türkiye continues to expand its domestic capabilities and modernize its military infrastructure, it is positioning itself not only as a formidable regional power but as an influential player in both NATO and the broader geopolitical landscape. The road ahead will require balancing internal economic pressures with its ambition for military self-sufficiency and global stature, but Türkiye’s progress thus far suggests a commitment to overcoming these challenges.
Sources:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/tai-tf-kaan-turkeys-new-stealth-fighter-born-213396
https://www.incirlik.af.mil/News/Photos/igphoto/2000533411/#:~:text=The%20Turkish%20Air%20Force%20is,back%20to%20their%20home%20bases
https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/air/kaan-takes-flight-turkey-s-new-era-in-advanced-fighter-jets#:~:text=The%20KAAN%20fighter%20jet%20will,operations%20as%20a%20standard%20feature
https://www.defensenews.com/native/turkish-defence-aerospace/2020/09/21/the-rise-of-turkish-naval-industry/#:~:text=Turkey's%20Navy%20and%20Coast%20Guard,element%20of%20Turkey's%20export%20capability.
https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-aims-to-become-a-major-naval-power-alarming-neighbors/7778465.html#:~:text=Turkey%20is%20undertaking%20a%20massive,meet%20Turkey's%20growing%20regional%20commitments
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/our-first-look-at-the-turkish-navys-future-aircraft-carrier/#:~:text=On%20February%2016%2C%202024%2C%20the,Turkish%20Navy's%20future%20aircraft%20carrier
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/08/turkish-navy-commissions-first-reis-class-aip-submarine-tcg-piri-reis/#:~:text=Importance%20of%20the%20project&text=The%20Turkish%20Navy%20has%20a,diesel%2Delectric)%20attack%20submarines
https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2023
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_ships_of_the_Turkish_Naval_Forces
https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Birth-Statistics-2023-53708&dil=2#:~:text=Number%20of%20live%20births%20was%20958%20thousand%20408%20in%202023,children%2C%20Mardin%20with%202.40%20children
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/turkey-turkiye/#:~:text=People%20and%20Society-,Population,1%2C000%20population%20(2024%20est.)
https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/tur/turkey/fertility-rate#:~:text=The%20current%20fertility%20rate%20for,a%200.84%25%20decline%20from%202021
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview#:~:text=T%C3%BCrkiye%20is%20the%2017th,official%20development%20assistance%20(ODA)
https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TUR#:~:text=Highly%20politicized%20and%20inefficient%20monetary,following%20Russia's%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine
https://www.coface.com/news-economy-and-insights/business-risk-dashboard/country-risk-files/tuerkiye
https://www.allianz-trade.com/en_US/resources/country-reports/turkey.html#:~:text=Deteriorated%20business%20environment,output%20and%20the%20recycling%20rate

EP43: Update on Geothermal Power Plants: Fervo Energy’s Project Red, Project Cape and FORGE

Summary:
In this episode, we analyze Fervo Energy's recent advancements in enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) technology as part of geothermal power plants. The company's Project Red and Project Cape aim to generate electricity by harnessing deep geothermal heat using hydraulic fracturing techniques. While EGS has the potential to provide constant, baseload power, it faces challenges like low energy density, high water usage, and limited scalability. Despite these challenges, Fervo has achieved significant breakthroughs in drilling efficiency and production, demonstrating the potential for EGS to become a more commercially viable renewable energy source. We examine the advantages and drawbacks of EGS, comparing its performance with other renewable and non-renewable energy sources, ultimately highlighting the need for further research and development to determine its viability in a broader energy policy context.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What are the main advantages and disadvantages of Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS) compared to other renewable energy sources?
How does Fervo Energy's Project Red and Project Cape differ from traditional geothermal power plants in terms of technology and performance?
What are the key challenges and potential solutions for scaling up EGS geothermal energy to meet broader energy needs?
Long format:
 Update on Geothermal Power Plants: Fervo Energy’s Project Red, Project Cape and FORGE
On September 10, 2024 at the Houston Enegery and Climate Startup Week, Fervo energy hosted its 2nd annual Technology Day, and just 2 days ago (October 24, 2024) press embargo for the presentations elapsed thereby permitting the slide ware and white papers to be published. There was some new information, most of it quite promising. It begs an update. The most important of which is this one. https://eartharxiv.org/repository/view/7665/
TL/DR
Fervo Energy’s Projects Red and Cape use enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), which leverage hydraulic fracturing techniques to produce geothermal energy. EGS plants circulate water into deep, hot rock to create steam, driving turbines to generate consistent, emissions-free electricity. Fervo’s drilling innovations have significantly cut drilling time and costs, with Project Cape achieving 12 MW peak output.
Advantages:
EGS is a renewable and offers constant, baseload power, unlike wind and solar.
Early tests show no issues with pressure loss or thermal decline, key concerns in geothermal.
ESG GTPP has a very high capacity factor
Challenges:
EGS plants have very low energy densities, have a relatively low energy rate of investment (EROI), high water usage, and slow cold start up time.
Scalability is limited to areas with specific geological conditions, like California and Nevada.
Fervo’s advancements are promising. At least preliminarily, it appears the ESG GTPP is “king” among the renewables. But it’s uncertain if EGS GTPP will meet broader energy needs and will become truly commerical.
BACKGROUND
Fervo Energy's Project Red and Project Cape Geothermal Production Plant (GTPP) that use hydraulic fracturing horizontal drilling techniques. When the shale methods of unconventional drilling is used in Geothermal is called Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS).
THE TECHNOLOGY
Just as a quick reminder and oversimplified EGS systems inject high-pressure water into the ground to reopen fractures in hot rock, creating a reservoir. That reservoir is heated by the naturally occurring hot rock at that depth and in that location. This heat is generated due to the radioactive decay of various materials and continuous formation processes within the Earth’s structure. It is then circulated with the resultant steam brought back to the surface to drive steam turbines. The turning of the steam turbines creates electricity. The steam is then, of course, cooled back into water and reinjected back into the system for reuse. It, unlike other renewables like wind or solar (PV) is not an intermittent and can in theory run constantly. Therefore, it is a base load energy source.
In terms of the two domains of environmental concern, green house gases and water use, here is how ESG GYPP stack up. ESG GTPP is also technically emissions free. However, the other environmental concern, referring to water, is an issue. It does take a lot of water as you can imagine. During geothermal plant construction, water is mainly required for the construction of the production and injection wells. Estimated construction water use for both hydrothermal systems and EGS are less than 0.1 gal/MWh. Then, during operations, water is required for cooling processes (e.g., wet, dry, and hybrid). During plant operation, non-cooling-related consumptive water use was estimated and was found to be in the range of 0.001–0.12 gal/kWh. This water use is related to maintenance activities and other domestic uses. EGS has additional water requirements for simulation techniques, where a fluid which is often water is injected into the geothermal reservoir and circulated between injection and production wells to produce power. Some of this water is lost (1%–10%) as the reservoirs are not confined, and thus additional water is required to maintain system efficiency.
Water Consumption (gallons per MWh)
Process
Geothermal Technology
Meldrum et al. (2013) (Median Estimates)
Sullivan et al. (2013) (Average Estimates)
Plant Construction
EGS
N/A
13
 
Hydrothermal-flash
N/A
1
 
Hydrothermal-binary
N/A
1
Plant Operations
Binary: Hybrid Cooling
460
N/A
 
Binary: Dry Cooling
290
270
 
Flash
11
10
 
EGS: Dry Cooling
510
510
For visual learners I offer these two YouTube videos and this diagram:
https://youtu.be/4S3aiMxfwhY?si=fYFlxcM_Kz3kK9Ky
https://youtu.be/3GbEOrzZUBU?si=SN8go_nOlMeKm46Q
FERVO ENERGY SITES
Fervo has claim to have successfully drilled several horizontals. Specifically, at Project Cape fourteen wells have been drilled, and three of them have been stimulated. Meanwhile at Project Red one vertical and two horizontal wells were drilled. This drilling in and of itself isn't technically difficult using polycrystalline diamond compact (PDC) drill bits, but it is a unique use of the unconventional well drilling technology.
Further, according to Servo’s press releases it “has consistently reduced drilling times and costs in horizontal, high-temperature, deep granite drilling. Though Cape wells are hotter and over 2,100 feet deeper than Project Red wells, Fervo drilled its fastest Cape well in just 21 days, a 70% reduction in drilling time from Fervo’s first horizontal well drilled at Project Red in 2022. This increase in drilling efficiency has translated into significant cost reductions, with drilling costs across the first four horizontal wells at Cape falling from $9.4 million to $4.8 million per well.”
What is also claimed is that these EGS power plants do not go down as far as a typical shale well and instead is about half the depth. Less depth means less cost. That is a good thing.
It has resulted in what Fervo has stated in its press release as follows: "Fervo performed a 30 day well test, the results of which established Project Red as the most productive enhanced geothermal system in history."
Sounds amazing, right?
Well, let’s look at the data.
A 30-day production test was performed at the Project Cape three-well pad in July and August 2024. The first production well at the Cape site achieved a peak output of over 12 MW and a sustained output of 8-10 MW. The power capacity density is 9.1 MW per km3, 5-10 times larger than previous estimates for EGS technology.
BUT WHAT DOES THIS MEAN IN ALL PRACTICAL EFFECT?
Here are some comparisons:
The average capacity of a newly installed wind turbine in the U.S. in 2023 was 3.4 MW. However, extremely large wind farms can produce over 700 MW.
The size of solar photovoltaic (PV) power plants can range from less than 1 MW to over 2,000 MW.
The Department of Energy (DOE) defines large hydropower plants as those with a capacity of more than 30 MW. Small hydropower plants generate between 100 kilowatts and 10 MW, while micro hydropower plants have a capacity of up to 100 kilowatts.
Biomass power plants are generally larger than 15 MW, but can range from less than 1 MW to over 50 MW.
A typical natural gas-fired power plant can produce anywhere from 20MW to over 1,000MW, depending on its size and design, with larger, combined-cycle plants generating closer to 1,000MW and smaller plants producing around 20MW; a common range for a single unit within a plant is between 200MW and 500MW.
Coal-fired power plants can produce anywhere from 3,000 to 6,700 megawatts (MW).
A small nuclear plant with one generator can produce 476 MW, while a large plant with multiple generators can produce 3,825 MW.
In summary, while EGS geothermal plants have a peak output of 12 MW and a sustained range of 8-10 MW, they are relatively modest in scale compared to other types of non renewable power plants. However, their constant baseload power generation, independent of weather or time of day, gives them an advantage over wind and solar, which are intermittent. This leads us to understand that ESG GTPP may very well be the king of the renewables. This preliminary data is promising. (But there is the issue of water which we will address later).
BUT THERE IS GOOD
There are a lot of good things to consider. First this is not full production at the site instead it was a select number of horizontals stimulated. If it is all cranked up will it meet its projected goals? Time will tell.
Not well noted but I think is very good is the fact that in this 30 day test at Project Cape as well as at Project Red there has been no reports of pressure issues or thermal decline. One of the early concerns in ESG and GTPP was that there was the potential for declining reservoir pressure due to extraction of hot water and steam without proper reinjection. Further with the pressure issue was fears that there was a potential for induced seismicity caused by injecting high-pressure fluids into deep rock formations to create fractures and extract heat, which can trigger small earthquakes if not carefully managed, potentially leading to instability in the reservoir and surrounding areas; this is a major concern for the widespread adoption of EGS technology. The pressure issues seem to not be an issue which is good. Further, "thermal decline" refers to the gradual decrease in the temperature of the geothermal reservoir over time, which leads to a reduction in the amount of heat available to generate electricity, essentially impacting the plant's power output and efficiency; this decline can occur due to factors like excessive fluid extraction, poor reinjection practices, and the natural cooling of the reservoir rock. This concern also was absent these results which is another great result for the technology.
WHERE DOES ESG GTPP FIT INTO LOGICAL ENERGY POLICY?
Now I have to be a little bit of a Debbie Downer. One of the major drawbacks of geothermal are the big five considerations that I write about all the time.
As I write when we look at logical and unemotional energy policy we can to a degree reduce all of our goals (but for the priority/value judgement involved with environmental issues) into 5 statistics as they are quantifiable: (1) energy density, (2) power density, (3) energy return on investment, (4) capacity factor and (5) cold start up times.
-ESG GTPP energy density: 4.186 MJ/kg (which is the lowest on our chart of power plant designs, even lower than phytomass and dry firewood)
-ESG GTPP power density: 2.88 which puts is at among the highest of the renewable categories, but is an order of magnitude lower than other baseload power plants such as natural gas (482.1), nuclear (240.8) and anthracite (180.9)
-ESG GTPP EROI: unknown but traditional geothermal is at 9 which is less than wind, higher than PV, but no where near piped natural gas fired power plant or any form of hydroelectric or nuclear
-ESG GTPP Capacity factor: 71% which is leagues better than wind (34.6%) and PV (24.6%), better than natural gas fired power plants (54.4%) but less than nuclear (92.7%)
-ESG GTPP cold start up time: 2-4 hours which is bottom of the pack with coal (6-48 hours) and nuclear (12 hours) and way less than natural gas fired power plants (several minutes to 6 hours) and wind, hydroelectric and solar (10 minutes)
Finally, there are scalability issues. ESG and GTPP won’t work everywhere. They are location restricted. The most suitable locations are those with deep, hot rock formations with sufficient permeability to allow for fluid circulation, often found in areas with volcanic activity or tectonic plate boundaries. Current enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) are limited to brittle rock although Fervo is trying to deal with this limitation. In the United States, the best geographic areas that these conditions are thought to be met are California, Nevada, Utah, and Oregon. A significant amount of land area that is suitable for ESG GTPP is with Bureau of Land Management Land. Some research is starting to research of West Virginia and Pennsylvania may be suitable as well.
It’s too early to see if ESG and GTPP will be the “fix” that everyone is looking for. Time will tell.
Sources:
Power Density: A Key to Understanding Energy Sources and Uses (MIT Press) by Vaclav Smil
https://fervoenergy.com/fervo-energy-breaks-ground-on-the-worlds-largest-next-gen-geothermal-project/#:~:text=Earlier%20this%20year%2C%20Fervo%20announced,%2C%20Mayor%20of%20Milford%2C%20Utah
https://fervoenergy.com/fervo-energy-drilling-results-show-rapid-advancement-of-geothermal-performance/#:~:text=This%20increase%20in%20drilling%20efficiency,to%20$4.8%20million%20per%20well
https://linkedin.com/pulse/fervo-energy-technology-day-2024-entering-geothermal-decade-matson-n4stc/?trackingId=qF6bTgyiRICdGFEfX6YRhQ%3D%3D
https://pangea.stanford.edu/ERE/db/GeoConf/papers/SGW/2024/Xing2.pdf
https://pangea.stanford.edu/ERE/db/GeoConf/papers/SGW/2023/Xing.pdf
https://gdr.openei.org/files/1523/2023%20Annual%20Report%20Phase%203B%20and%20Appendices%20for%20GDR.pdf
https://pangea.stanford.edu/ERE/pdf/IGAstandard/SGW/2014/Shiozawa.pdf
https://eartharxiv.org/repository/view/7665/
https://jpt.spe.org/fervo-and-forge-report-breakthrough-test-results-signaling-more-progress-for-enhanced-geothermal

EP42: Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project suspends operations indefinitely

Summary:
In this episode, we discuss how the US led sanctions targeting Russia's Arctic LNG 2 project have significantly hindered its operations. The project, designed to boost Russia's global LNG market share, has faced challenges in securing buyers for its cargoes due to the sanctions, causing the project to temporarily halt production. The sanctions have also hampered construction of new trains and caused delays in equipment procurement, impacting the project's overall capacity. These difficulties underscore the broader challenges faced by Russian LNG projects under heightened sanctions, potentially reducing Russia's energy revenue and weakening its position in the global market.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
How do the latest US sanctions impact Arctic LNG 2's operations and future prospects?
What are the broader implications of Arctic LNG 2's suspension for Russia's energy industry and global LNG markets?
To what extent do the US sanctions on Arctic LNG 2 achieve their strategic goals of limiting Russian energy revenue and global market share?
Long format:
 The latest success of Russian LNG sanctions: Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project suspends operations indefinitely
As any far of our podcast and website over at Geopolitics Unplugged will remember, we have extensively covered in Episode 19: Are Russian oil sanctions working (short answer no) at https://www.geopoliticsunplugged.com/audio/ep19-are-russian-crude-oil-sanctions-working/ and Episode 14: Are Russian LNG sanctions working? (Short answer yes) at https://www.geopoliticsunplugged.com/audio/episode-14-the-health-of-the-russian-lng-sanctions/ , we have been watching the effectiveness of the sanctions against Russia.
On Friday, October 25, 2024, we got a big indication that the LNG portion of the sanctions are working.
Russia's Arctic LNG 2 project, led by Novatek on the Gydan Peninsula, has halted its operations as U.S. sanctions make it increasingly difficult to find buyers for its cargoes. The project ceased production at its first liquefaction train (6.6 million tons per year) several weeks ago when storage tanks reached capacity, according to sources close to the project. As a result, it may be unable to resume production this winter. Compounding the issues, gas production feeding into the facility has decreased to minimal volumes, underscoring the project’s operational challenges under intensified sanctions pressure.
After suspending production temporarily earlier in the year due to an inability to export LNG, Arctic LNG 2 resumed production in August. However, tankers that received shipments became targets of new sanctions by the Biden administration, which aims to reduce the economic benefits Russia derives from LNG sales. While U.S. sanctions avoid penalizing existing Russian LNG export facilities, the Arctic LNG 2 project has faced specific targeting to limit its new production volumes, a part of the broader U.S. strategy to limit Russia’s energy revenue following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Since August, Arctic LNG 2 loaded eight LNG cargoes, yet none have reached an end buyer.
Technical issues have also disrupted operations. The facility's only active LNG train has been running at below 50% capacity due to malfunctions with a Baker Hughes LM9000 gas turbine, which has recently undergone repair. When reinstalled, the turbine should allow production at full capacity, though it remains uncertain whether Train 1 will restart given the ongoing storage limitations. Moreover, the project’s second train, slated to begin by year-end, may be delayed as storage tanks remain occupied. The second train, completed and stationed at the Arctic site, has not yet commenced operations due to the operational and logistical challenges posed by sanctions.
Sanctions have also hampered construction of Arctic LNG 2's third train, initially planned for completion in 2026 but now postponed to 2028 due to equipment procurement issues. However, recent indications suggest that delays may be mitigated as hundreds of contractors from China’s Penglai Jutal Offshore Engineering Heavy Industries are expected to arrive at Russia’s Novatek Murmansk LNG construction center in January 2025 to assist with Train 3’s assembly. Despite these efforts, the project’s full potential is limited by logistical barriers, as Arctic LNG 2 has yet to receive all 21 ice-class tankers originally ordered to support the project’s three-train scheme, reducing its capacity for winter shipping.
The project is 60% owned by Novatek, with stakes held by TotalEnergies (10%), China National Petroleum Corporation (10%), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (10%), and a Japanese consortium of Mitsui and Jogmec (10%). The facility was launched in December 2023 with high expectations to boost Russia’s global LNG market share from 8% to a targeted 20% by 2030. However, with Train 1 offline and no imminent restart, these ambitions are in jeopardy as sanctions complicate market access, tanker availability, and equipment procurement.
The US administration’s strategic focus on Arctic LNG 2 aims to pressure Russia’s revenue streams specifically from new LNG ventures while permitting ongoing operations at other Russian LNG projects, such as the Yamal and Portovaya, to maintain broader energy market stability. As of late October, several LNG-laden tankers from Arctic LNG 2 are anchored, awaiting destinations amid buyer hesitation due to fears of secondary sanctions. This scenario reflects the broader logistical and market challenges faced by Russian LNG projects under heightened sanctions, with Arctic LNG 2 particularly impacted.
Further fueling the effectiveness of the sanctions is that LNG prices globally are low.
Recall, oil and gas revenues have accounted for 30–50% of Russia's federal budget over the past decade.Sources:
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/investing/2024/10/25/russias-arctic-lng-2-plant-halts-amid-tightening-us-sanctions/https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Russias-Arctic-LNG-2-Project-Put-on-Ice-With-No-Restart-Plans.html
https://www.energyintel.com/00000192-c449-d095-afde-c4ef15550000
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-25/russia-s-arctic-lng-2-plant-halts-amid-tightening-us-sanctions

EP 41: African Gold as a Russian means to help fund its fight in Ukraine

Summary:
In this episode, we explore the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, and its activities in Africa, specifically its involvement in gold mining and its role in supporting various African regimes. We expose how Wagner’s gold extraction operations in countries like the Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali and beyond provide a significant source of revenue for Russia, potentially contributing to its funding of the war in Ukraine. We also examine the impact of Wagner’s actions on local populations and the challenges faced by international organizations and governments in curtailing its operations. In addition to detailing the Wagner Group’s activities, we discuss various efforts made by Western nations, including the imposition of sanctions and the provision of military support to African countries, in an attempt to counter Wagner’s influence in the region.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
How does Russia's use of African gold influence the war in Ukraine
What is the extent of the Wagner Group's impact on African nations?
What strategies are being implemented to counter the Wagner Group's influence?
Long format:
 African Gold as a Russian means to help fund its fight in Ukraine
In today’s episode and blog I want to focus on another source of Russia’s war economy that does not get as much publicity and attention as crude sanctions or LNG sanctions.
See our other episodes for information on oil and LNG sanctions:
About the lack of effectiveness of Russian oil sanctions:
https://www.geopoliticsunplugged.com/audio/ep19-are-russian-crude-oil-sanctions-working/
About the success and effectiveness of Russian LNG and natural gas sanctions
https://www.geopoliticsunplugged.com/audio/episode-14-the-health-of-the-russian-lng-sanctions/
Russia is getting a fairly significant amount of gold from Africa facilitated by the Wagner Group. That gives us quite a few questions.
How much control does Russia have over African gold production through groups like the Wagner group?
Is it just restricted to the Sahel region?
How “big” is the problem? What if anything is being done about it?
WHO:
The Wagner Group (Russian: Группа Вагнера, romanized: Gruppa Vagnera), officially known as PMC Wagner (ЧВК «Вагнер»), is a Russian state-funded private military company (PMC) controlled until 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former close ally of Russia's president Vladimir Putin. You may remember Prigozhin swan song when he marched off the front lines of Ukraine with his troops towards Moscow. The steam went out. And… eventually Prigozhin’s steam went out by way of most likely an act of sabotage or bomb on a plane that he was on. Funny how that happens. His troops were in Belarus and now have been more or less fully re-assimilated into the Russian sphere of influence.
WHAT:
Wagner is active in countries with rich gold resources, and the group's operations extend beyond military support to include disinformation, suppression of political opposition, and silencing independent media. Here are some of their top actions:
1. Central African Republic (CAR):
-Ndassima Gold Mine: Wagner has been granted exclusive rights to operate the Ndassima mine, the largest gold mine in the country. Wagner Group was granted exclusive rights to operate the Ndassima Gold Mine in the Central African Republic (CAR) as part of a broader arrangement in which the mercenary group supports the authoritarian regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadera. This agreement was part of a quid pro quo that involved Wagner providing military and security services in exchange for access to lucrative natural resource extraction opportunities, especially gold.
-Human Rights Abuses: Wagner has displaced local miners, sometimes through violence, and is involved in brutal tactics, including attacks on civilians, to maintain its control.
2. Sudan:
-Unreported Gold Market: Wagner controls major gold refining and smuggling operations. Russian military transport flights have been identified smuggling gold out of Sudan.
-Key Activities: Wagner is the dominant buyer of unprocessed Sudanese gold and plays a major role in smuggling processed gold out of the country. It has reportedly moved nearly $2 billion in unreported gold out of Sudan annually.
-Political Role: Wagner has supported military factions, including aiding the former dictator Omar al-Bashir in suppressing protests and working closely with the military since his removal.
3. Mali:
-Military Support: Wagner is paid an estimated $10.8 million per month to support the ruling military junta led by Colonel Assimi Goïta. They are also involved in destabilizing rebel groups and suppressing democratic movements.
-Mining: Wagner operates more indirectly in Mali’s gold industry, but it benefits financially from the country's reliance on Western gold mining companies, which pay substantial taxes to the junta. Wagner assists the junta in controlling the state and extracting revenues.
-Expansion: Wagner is reportedly involved in building a new mega-refinery, which will handle gold produced by international companies.
4. Other Potential Operations:
-Libya: Wagner has been involved in supporting military factions, particularly Khalifa Haftar’s forces. While Wagner's direct exploitation of gold in Libya is not well-documented, its strategic presence in southern Libya gives the group leverage over gold smuggling routes from Africa. Gold from Sudan, in particular, is often smuggled through Libya, taking advantage of the country's porous borders and weak governance in certain regions. Wagner's military operations have likely facilitated the safe passage of gold and other resources, indirectly benefiting the group's financial interests.
-Madagascar: There are indications that Wagner may be expanding its influence. While gold mining in Madagascar is less industrialized compared to some African countries, there are extensive artisanal mining operations across the island. Wagner’s interest in Madagascar likely stems from its potential to exploit these resources, much like it has done in other African countries where it combines political support with resource extraction deals.
-Burkina Faso and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): There are reports suggesting Wagner’s potential interest in expanding operations in these resource-rich but unstable regions, though the extent of current operations remains unclear. Burkina Faso has well been a hot mess and is politically unstable with a series of coups or near coups. That type of instability is well suited for Wagner’s special brand of joy spreading. Burkina Faso  is one of Africa’s largest gold producers, and the industry is vital to its economy. The country is home to several industrial gold mines as well as a large number of artisanal mining operations. Gold mining represents a significant revenue stream, making it an attractive target for Wagner's model of resource exploitation. The DRC is attractive to anyone as the country has vast deposits of gold, much of which is mined in the eastern regions, such as Ituri, South Kivu, and North Kivu provinces, which are also areas of ongoing conflict. Gold mining in the DRC is largely informal and involves a high degree of artisanal mining, making it difficult to regulate and susceptible to exploitation by armed groups.
WHY DOES THIS MATTER?
Since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has made more than $2.5 billion from trade in African gold, according to the Blood Gold Report. To put this in perspective
As of January/February 2024 reports, the best estimate is that military operations in Ukraine have cost Russia up to $211 billion and the country has lost $10 billion in canceled or paused arms sales.
So this gold grab is paying for more than 10% of the war in Ukraine. Not bad. But that’s not the entire story is it?
According to most estimates, every day of the war in Ukraine costs Russia $500 million to $1 billion.
According to another February 2024 report, the war had cost Russia an expected $1.3 trillion in previously anticipated economic growth through 2026 and about 315,000 Russian troops.
Russian central bank maintains an interest rate of 19%, while claiming that annual inflation is only 9.1%. These are published figures with a lot of economists saying the best case is to add at least another 3% to that.
According to an October 2024 report, including all the hidden costs, Russia will probably spend about $190 billion, or 10% of GDP, on the war this year, and that figure presumably represents the peak, given the constraints imposed by Western financial sanctions.
<<<As an aside, for comparison, Ukraine has held Russia in a stalemate by spending about $100 billion per year on the war – half from its own budget, and half in kind through arms donated from abroad. https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/ ) >>>
WHAT IS BEING DONE ABOUT WAGNER AND RUSSIA IN AFRICA?
Honestly, not terribly much that has a major impact. If you are an outlaw, rules don’t apply, right?
The United States, European Union, and the United Kingdom have imposed targeted sanctions on Wagner Group, its key members, and associated companies. These sanctions aim to disrupt Wagner’s ability to operate by freezing assets, restricting their access to financial markets, and blocking any transactions with entities linked to the group. For example, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Wagner’s leaders and affiliated companies involved in resource extraction, including gold, diamonds, and other natural resources. Some Western governments, notably the U.K. and the U.S., have been considering designating Wagner as a terrorist organization. This designation would make it easier to prosecute Wagner operatives and impose stricter sanctions on individuals and companies associated with the group. While this effort has not yet fully materialized, it remains an ongoing topic of discussion, as designating Wagner as a terrorist group would significantly complicate its operations by restricting its financial transactions and making it illegal for any entities to provide support to Wagner. Some Western countries, particularly France and the United States, are increasing military and counterterrorism support to African nations to provide alternatives to Wagner’s security services. This includes training and equipping local forces in regions like the Sahel, where countries like Mali and Burkina Faso have turned to Wagner for help in fighting insurgencies.
Sources:
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-war-economy-weakening-under-sanctions-by-anders-aslund-2024-10
https://apnews.com/article/mali-wagner-mercenaries-russia-abuses-b03cf8fe6d9ddbbcdb2d012464944906
https://bloodgoldreport.com/
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-operations-ukraine-have-probably-cost-up-211-billion-us-official-2024-02-16/
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/02/16/ukraine-war-has-cost-russia-up-to-211-billion-pentagon-says/
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa
https://www.state.gov/the-wagner-groups-atrocities-in-africa-lies-and-truth/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/whats-ahead-for-the-wagner-group-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/
https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12389

EP 40: Russia Provided Targeting Data for Houthi

Summary:
In this episode we detail Russia's alleged provision of targeting data to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, enabling them to launch attacks on Western ships in the Red Sea. This assistance highlights Russia's efforts to undermine the U.S.-led global order and destabilize regions where its partners are engaged in conflicts with the U.S. and its allies. We also discuss the potential consequences of Russia's involvement, including the heightened risk of escalation and the potential for the Houthis to acquire more advanced weaponry.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
 1. How has Russia’s support of the Houthis impacted the stability of the Middle East and global trade?
2. What are the implications of Russia’s growing military partnerships with Iran and North Korea for global security
3.What are the potential consequences of Russia’s involvement in the conflict between the Houthis and the United States and its allies?
Long format:
 Russia Provided Targeting Data for Houthi Assault on Global Shipping
Per the Wall Street Journal.
Russia provided targeting data for Yemen’s Houthi rebels as they attacked Western ships in the Red Sea with missiles and drones earlier this year, helping the Iranian-backed group assault a major artery for global trade and further destabilizing the region.
The Houthis, which began their attacks late last year over the Gaza war, eventually began using Russian satellite data as they expanded their strikes, said a person familiar with the matter and two European defense officials. The data was passed through members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who were embedded with the Houthis in Yemen, one of the people said.
The assistance, which hasn’t been previously reported, shows how far Russian President Vladimir Putinis willing to go to undermine the U.S.-led Western economic and political order. Russia, in this case, supported the Iran-backed Houthis, which the U.S. designates as a terrorist group, as they carried out a series of attacks in one of the world’s most heavily traveled shipping routes.
More broadly, Russia has sought to stoke instability from the Middle East to Asia to create problems for the U.S., analysts say. The widening conflict in the Middle East, triggered by last year’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, has absorbed resources and attention at a time when Washington has sought to focus on the threatsfrom Russia and China.
“For Russia, any flare up anywhere is good news, because it takes the world’s attention further away from Ukraine and the U.S. needs to commit resources—Patriot systems or artillery shells—and with the Middle East in play, it’s clear where the U.S. will choose,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, a think tank based in Berlin.
A spokesman for the Russian government didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment. A Houthi spokesman declined to comment.
Moscow has sought to build tighter military partnerships with autocracies, pulling Iran and North Korea deeper into its Ukraine war effort. The countries have provided ammunition, drones and missiles, and North Korea sent 3,000 troopsto train in Russia in recent weeks, according to U.S. and South Korean officials.
The assistance gives battlefield help to Russia, which is running short on manpower and materiel, but it also serves Moscow’s strategic aims by destabilizing two regions where its partners are facing off against the U.S. and its allies.
South Korea, a top U.S. ally in East Asia, has expressed increasing concern at the prospect that North Koreans could gain battlefield experience through their exposure to the Ukraine war. South Korea is one of the world’s fastest-growing weapons manufacturers, and Seoul has warned it would take measures in response, including potentially sending lethal aid to Ukraine. While South Korea has sent weapons to countries supporting Ukraine, it has declined to send arms directly.
In the Middle East, the Russian assistance underscores a tectonic shift in its strategy. Putin has strengthened ties with Iran, while turning a cold shoulder to his longstanding relationship with Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel has engaged in a growing conflict with Iran and the militias it backs in the region, such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Putin has criticized the U.S. and Israel over the Gaza conflict. On Thursday, he said the region was on the brink of a full-scale war.
The Houthis began launching their attacks in the Red Sea, where ships travel to and from the Suez Canal, late last year in protest against Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza, and continued them through the first months of this year. In total, the militants have attacked more than 100 ships since November 2023, sinking two and hijacking another.
The attacks caused major disruptions to global trade, as shippers diverted vessels for a period south around the Cape of Good Hope, a longer and more expensive voyage. Almost 1-in-10 barrels of oil shipped every day worldwide transit through Bab al-Mandab, the strait that separates the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean. The tanker traffic through that route was 77% lower in August 2024 compared with October 2023, according to Windward, a maritime-intelligence company.
The U.S. vowed to protect the international shipping lanes, and in December of last year launched a multinational naval coalition to escort ships traveling through the strait. By April, the U.S. had spent some $1 billion on munitions to knock out Houthi drones and missiles and protect shipping in the Red Sea. The U.S. has since gone further and earlier this month sent B-2 Spirit bombers to strike Houthi arsenals.
The U.S. has been concerned that Russia could escalate the situation further by providing the Houthis with Russian antiship or antiair missiles that could threaten the U.S. military’s efforts to protect ships in the region, but there is so far no evidence that Russia has done so.
Earlier this month, Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, who had recently been released from a U.S. prison in a prisoner swap with Moscow was trying to broker the saleof about $10 million worth of automatic small arms to the Houthis, The Wall Street Journal has reported. It was unclear whether the sale had been initiated or blessed by the Kremlin.
Since the Houthis started attacking vessels connected to Israel and its allies almost a year ago, most vessels undertaking the dangerous crossing near their territories have started switching off their radio signals, complicating efforts to track them. Once a vessel goes dark, its live movements can only be continuously accessed through high-quality satellite imaging. Commercially available satellite services tend to suffer gaps in coverage and delays in transmission.
Tankers carrying Russian oil cargoes, including by Kremlin-connected Rosneft, have been attacked by the Houthis on several occasions. But these shipments are carried out through a so-called ghost fleetowned by shell companies to evade sanctions whose Russian connection is only known by a close circle of Russian oil officials and market players.
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My take on it is this is major revelation. If this assistance can be linked to the June 2023 Houthi attack where the Houthi’s launched a barrage of missiles that got with 200 meters of the multi billion dollar US aircraft carrier USS Dwight D Eisenhower and the Similar close calls were reported, including a January incident involving a missile that nearly struck the USS  Gravely(DDG-107), this is pretty big. 
Now the administration did attack the Houthis by way of a B2 strike on hardened bunkers and missile facilities on October 16, 2024
Sources:
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3937640/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-us-airstrikes-in-houthi/
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/just-200-meters-away-houthi-missile-nearly-struck-navy-aircraft-carrier-213258
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b

EP39: Russia’s submersible LNG tanker plan

Summary:
In this episode we discuss a proposed Russian project to transport liquefied natural gas (LNG) using nuclear-powered submarines. While some see this as an ambitious solution to Russia's challenges in shipping LNG, especially in icy waters, critics point out the country's lack of shipbuilding capacity and the complex engineering involved. This idea, first proposed in 2019, envisions a submarine more than twice the size of the largest existing submarine, powered by three reactors and capable of carrying 180,000 tons of LNG.
 
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
1. What are the technological challenges and potential implications of using nuclear-powered submarines to transport liquefied natural gas?
2. How does the proposed LNG-submarine project compare to existing submarine designs and the current state of Russian shipbuilding capacity
3. What are the geopolitical and economic motivations behind Russia's proposal to use nuclear-powered submarines for LNG ?
 
 Long format:
  Submersible nuclear LNG tankers
In the weird news department…. I think I found THE winner for today. I offer this:
Russia Is Looking to Use Nuclear-Powered Subs to Transport LNG
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-looking-use-nuclear-powered-subs-transport-lng-213328
At first I thought this was a put on. But apparently this is being discussed. 
I guess the thinking is if you can’t buy or make Arc7 ice-class tanker or rally your existing ice breakers to clear a reliable path for the few LNG tankers you have, you either build some that no one on earth has attempted or repurpose your nuclear sub fleets to do it. How they will do it even in the short term, sure beats me. 
Above water LNG carriers are some of the most difficult vessels to build, and can take up to 30 months to construct. Add on nuclear propulsion and all the complexities with making a “good” submersible… ambitious. 
This is not simple crude transport, it requires for it to be at about -260° Fahrenheit (-162 C) for shipping and pressurized. 
I found some sources dating back to 2019 when this was first floated out (pun intended) and used google translator to get some additional details. 
The world’s largest submarine today is the Soviet-designed ballistic missile carrier of the Typhoon class which is 175 meters long and 23 meters wide. The proposed LNG-submarine would in others words be more than twice the size of the Typhoons.
Unlike navy submarines, which have one or two reactors, the LNG-submarine would be powered by three reactors, providing 90 MW power to the propellers.
It would carry 180,000 tons of liquified natural gas
In a different publication, Aleksandr Nikitin, a nuclear expert that until 2022 chaired the St. Petersburg-based Environmental Right Centre Bellona said “Russia doesn’t even have basic shipbuilding capacities,” he argues and point to the fact that the country is short of abilities to build basic tankers and dry cargo ships.
“In short, this is nonsense from Kovalchuk,” Nikitin says.
But I guess all of that is a mere detail to the Russians.
Sources:
https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/fantasy-project-nikitin-says-about-nuclear-gas-carrier-submarine/326492
https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/industry-and-energy/sunrise-could-come-for-nuclearpowered-submarine-tanker/137649